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1853a



CHARACTERISTICS

OF

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

LONDON:

Printed by G. BARCLAY, Castle St. Leicester Sq.

CHARACTERISTICS

OF

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

APART FROM

HIS MILITARY TALENTS.

BY

THE EARL DE GREY, K.G.

SECOND EDITION, REVISED AND ENLARGED.



LONDON:

THOMAS BOSWORTH, 215 REGENT STREET.

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Peabody Institute

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INTRODUCTION.

It may be thought, and not unreasonably, that another work relating to the illustrious Duke of Wellington is unnecessary ; more especially from one who had no professional or private connexion with him ; because all the events of his public career, and, indeed, most things connected with his private life, have been already collected and laid before the world.

The press has teemed with his Memoirs in every guise and in every form, and they have been published at a cost calculated to bring them within the reach of almost the poorest reader ; and if the following sheets professed to be merely a general memoir of his *military* and *political* life, or a series of anecdotes, however interesting and well-authenticated, they would, indeed, be superfluous.

His voluminous Dispatches embrace so wide a field, and extend over so many years, recording events or opinions in chronological order as they arose, upon such a diversity of subjects, that it is difficult to fix the attention upon every one.

A general impression of the talent and assiduity possessed by him who wrote them, must strike the most casual observer : but it requires time and observation,

which may not always be at command, to separate the objects, and to understand clearly the full extent of each.

It has appeared to the writer, therefore, that it would be an act of justice to the memory of that great man, and might be of service to his surviving fellow-countrymen, to put together in a more condensed form some observations upon his private feelings and principles, as forming a beautiful and touching part of his character, apart from his public and professional position, which is already before the world.

The Duke was a soldier, and every act of the greater part of his life, and every letter in the Dispatches, were in reference to his profession. But this is not a *military* work. We do not profess to give a memoir of his campaigns, nor do we presume even to detail any of his military measures, or to comment upon any of his professional proceedings.

His "*Military Talents*," we believe, would not have shone with so much lustre, if they had not been accompanied by some of the "*Characteristics*" which it is our object to illustrate. Many of them are intimately connected with his profession, and all were conducive to his military renown; but they are essentially *separate*, and no doubt a man might be a great soldier without being so eminently gifted with them. Believing, however, that we observe them very strongly marked in him, our object is to point them out "*apart from his military talents.*"

They are qualities of mind which would have done equal credit to his head or to his heart, if he had been subjected to the same contingencies in any other branch of the service of his country.

It may be fairly said, that no man's character was ever subjected to so severe an ordeal *during his life* as the Duke of Wellington's.

The *actions* of many former great men have been published during their lives ; but it has been left to after ages and subsequent elucidations to explain the *motives* which led to them. Many a hero has received the plaudits of his contemporaries, whose glory was perhaps accidental, or whose success arose from unforeseen and fortuitous circumstances, which were untold at the time, and the concealment of which might have been dictated by sound and honest policy.

But here every deed, and the ground upon which it was founded, are shown at the same time.

Nothing but the most entire confidence in the honesty and integrity of every public act of his life, could ever have made a man consent to the exposition and publication of all his motives, feelings, views, and wishes, which are laid open in the wonderful collection of these Dispatches. *He* had that confidence. *He* knew that not one word would be found in them of which he need to feel ashamed ; and from them alone, sanctioned as they have been by his own supervision, every argument and every deduction in the following pages will be drawn.

Where, indeed, could more unquestionable documents be adduced, upon which a subsequent judgment of the human mind could be formed ? Written without preparation, under circumstances frequently of the most trying nature, upon every diversity of subject, and to every variety of correspondents, without, at the time, the most remote probability that any but the avowed " Official Dispatches " would meet the public eye,—if ever there were undeniable proofs of the real mind of the writer, here they are !

We lay claim to no attempt at novelty. Every sentence which is quoted has been before the public, and well known for years : many of them have been printed

and reprinted, till the world knows them by heart : but our object has merely been to collate them, so as to afford the reader a more defined view of the point to which they have reference.

Brought forward in early life into a position of eminence, and invested with an extent of authority during all his Indian campaigns which would have been apt to turn the head of most men, he seems, as we find by all his correspondence of that period, to have shown the same equanimity, the same patience under disappointment, and the same forbearance towards those whose faults or failings had a tendency to thwart his own more enlarged and energetic views, which we find him to preserve to the end of his glorious career.

It was, in fact, a remarkable feature in his remarkable life. Gifted by nature, as he seems to have been, beyond the ordinary run of mankind, with forethought, and a power of looking, not merely at the events passing under his eyes at the moment, but at almost every possible contingency which might befall him, he never seems to testify impatience at finding that others were not equally apt and ready ; or, at least, he never suffered his consciousness of it to affect his conduct towards them.

Another striking feature was his remarkable placability. Those who saw him only at a distance, deemed him cold and austere. He has been called the "Iron Duke," whom nothing could move ; and it was said that, though he acquired the *esteem* and *respect* of all, he gained the *affection* of few. To a certain extent, as regards the world at large, this might be true. He was, no doubt, too cautious a man to lay himself open in ordinary con-

versation to every one who might wish to engage his attention, and afterwards to boast that he had been "in the confidence of the Duke;" and his habit of forming his own opinions, and acting upon them, without consulting others in the early stages, or divulging his intentions in the more advanced parts of his undertakings, no doubt gave an idea to casual observers that it was not in his nature to have friendly and confidential intercourse with any one.

It is true, therefore, that he had few intimates, but all who did enjoy that happiness entertained the warmest feelings of affection and regard towards him.

He was, no doubt, stern and inflexible in the performance of his own duty, and in exacting from others the due performance of what belonged to them. Unfortunately, he often had too much cause for apparent severity. The British army had never been assembled in such numbers, and, in fact, had never seen service upon such a scale; and no doubt there were many individuals of all ranks utterly unfit for the duties now imposed upon them. Numberless instances may be selected in the pages of his correspondence, of conduct which, in any other military nation, would have been followed by severe punishment, or instant expulsion from the service, which he, in the kindest and most forbearing manner, notices with merely expressing a hope that the honour, the good sense (?), and the gentlemanly feelings of the delinquent will prevent a repetition! In his confirmation of the sentences of courts-martial, or in his comments upon the proceedings of the court, and in his answers to letters (which we do not see, but the nature of which we may fairly conjecture from the tone of his reply), his language is always firm and unyielding; but we find many in

which, though his sense of duty compels him to give a reprimand, or to convey an unpleasant communication, it is obvious that he does it with reluctance, and with an anxious wish to hurt the *private* feelings of the person as little as possible. And it is a well-known fact, that when the Dispatches were in course of compilation, he never would allow *a name* to be recorded (even of private soldiers) when it was connected with any misconduct ; because, although the person alluded to might have been dead, surviving relations might be wounded or distressed.

The caution and apparent coldness to which allusion has already been made, was an essential part of his character ; and, perhaps, it is not too much to say that the eminent success of some of his great military measures may be mainly attributed to it. Secrecy — absolute secrecy—in the midst of thousands, including, of course, many who must be *personally* engaged, was not to be looked for : but he preserved a nearer approach to it than any other man. His officers might deem him close, and some of them might feel that he did not show them the confidence to which they might think they were entitled ; but he acted upon principle. He knew by experience that every gossiping letter from the army to friends in England was very speedily communicated to the newspapers, who made use of this limited information as best suited their own political objects, and generally distorted the facts. He might occasionally feel nettled at the malignant and violent party-feelings so displayed, or at the unjust and ungenerous comments passed upon himself (though that was the part respecting which he felt the least anxiety) ; but he knew that during many years of the war, the principal part (indeed, at times, the whole) of the information respecting the strength and disposition of his force was conveyed to the French

army, solely by the circuitous channel of the English newspapers.

His forgiveness of positive injustice to himself is also a remarkable feature in his character. We do not here allude to the noble disregard which he showed to the ignorance, the vanity, and the presumption of many individuals at home, in different high assemblies, whether in the Houses of Parliament, or the Common Council of the City of London : that was the natural and instinctive disregard which the magnanimous Newfoundland shows to the snarling cur ; and he might have a fair reliance upon the returning sense of justice from the majority of his fellow-countrymen when the first effect was passed. But we allude more especially to the way in which he overlooks the unceasing attempts of so many members both of the Spanish and Portuguese Governments, to injure him in the estimation of their respective nations, which he had no means of repelling or explaining ; which were creating hourly dangers to the gallant men under his command ; and which, with a weaker-minded or more petulant man, must inevitably have made him throw up the cause for which he was making such marked and extraordinary efforts.

The buoyancy of his hopes and expectations was another most remarkable characteristic. Oppressed as he was (more especially during the first years of the Peninsular war) by the consideration of questions which belonged to the Statesman, the Financier, and the Diplomatist, rather than to the General, and to which we will venture to say no general was ever before subjected ; thwarted as he was, in all the more enlarged views which he took of the means by which difficulties were to be averted or overcome, he never flagged, he never gave way ! If we were to be guided merely by his official dispatches,

published in the Gazette of the day, or such parts of them as the Government at home thought themselves justified in making public, we might never have ascertained his own opinions. The reference would have been to the past, and not to the future. We know that men in such situations, whatever may be their real feelings of doubt, or even despondency, must conceal them from the world at large. It is impossible to deny that there were times, at home, when the public were almost without a hope of ultimate success. His withdrawal at that moment, although it would no doubt have been the cause of much obloquy to himself, and of triumph to those who had constantly predicted failure, would in all probability have been felt by the nation as unavoidable; and he had difficulties to contend with that must have weighed with the Government and the public if he had recommended such a step. A sense of his own arduous responsibility, a sense of duty to those under whom he was acting, would compel him in his "private" communications to make known his *private* apprehensions, if he had them.

How do we find this in his case, where every secret thought and every private feeling is laid open to us? No ignorance of the difficulties, no insensibility to the dangers, no unconsciousness of what (to most men) would have caused almost a hopelessness of success! but, with a full sense of all this, there is a self-confidence, a belief, that as he was conscientiously acting for the best, the result would ultimately turn out for the best, which shows itself in every confidential communication.

Another very observable point in his character was the openness and candour with which he admitted any error which he might feel convinced at a later period

that he had committed. No man has probably passed through life (not so eventful, or pregnant with deeds so essentially affecting the interest of thousands, as his was) who has not felt, that, if certain events were to occur again, the conduct adopted would have been different. But most men would wish, and would probably attempt to make it appear, that they had done right. He, no doubt, intended to do right, and thought *at the time* that he had done so. But his sense of truth was such, his integrity was so great, that if at a later period he believed that failure had resulted from mistake or miscalculation of his own, he had the honest, open, fearlessness to avow it.

His disregard of everything that could savour of self-interest as to rank, or pecuniary advantage, is most striking. We do not say that men whose lives are daily in peril, and whose whole worldly interests are embarked in the profession they follow, are to be called grasping because they do their best to turn their position to advantage; but we believe that few instances can be adduced of a man starting in his profession with nothing beyond a younger brother's portion (whatever that might be) who so nobly and disinterestedly refused the allowances and pay offered to him by the foreign nations in whose service he was employed, and to which he was fully entitled from the military rank which he held in their armies, but which he knew the finances of their country could ill afford.

The rewards afterwards bestowed upon him by the Parliament of his own country were, of course, to be regarded in a different light. He accepted them with gratitude, as proud proofs of his country's approval!

Ambition, avowed honourable desire of distinction, no doubt formed part of his character. But nothing of

this shows itself in his conduct ; no artificial struggle for elevation, no effort to place himself above those with whom he was acting : we cannot believe, however, that he was devoid of it.

Disappointment at being deprived of what he conceived would have led to such distinction in his profession, is observable only once in his long career. His letters upon what he felt to be superseding him in India, when troops were sent from that country to Egypt, are the only indication that he ever gave of such feelings. And, of course, his mortification was connected with the expectation of the professional reputation which he should have gained by it.

We must all feel how wisely and inscrutably Providence dispenses its arrangements ! Colonel Wellesley, commanding a comparatively small body of troops from India, which did not arrive in Egypt till too late for any display of military prowess or distinction, might have been cut off by disease or accident, and the world might thus have been deprived of the greatest military genius of our own or any other age !

This, however, is beside our subject, except as a further illustration of the command of temper, and of the high sense of duty, which distinguished him thus early in life, and which shone with increased lustre in proportion to the brilliancy of his subsequent career. The innate, natural, and honourable feeling of ambition did not desert him ; the disappointment of what he felt to be well-founded expectation did not induce him to retire in disgust ; and the age and the country which he adorned have reason to be thankful for that frame of mind which induced him to continue his profession.

Without, therefore, any attempt to repeat the often-

told but never wearying tale of our great Duke's *exploits*, or to give a repetition of the *events* of his life, we merely wish here to bring before his fellow-countrymen proofs of his *feelings* and *principles* under various circumstances, as important characteristic points, and as showing,—

- 1st. His confidence in himself, and buoyancy under personal responsibility.
- 2d. His forbearance, and forgiveness of injustice.
- 3d. His firmness under home and foreign annoyances.
- 4th. His natural feelings of secrecy and caution.
- 5th. His disinterestedness as to money or rank, and his general candour and simplicity of character.
- 6th. His placability as to the faults and failings of others, evinced by his feelings connected with subordination and courts-martial.

These various points we shall establish by reference to his dispatches written at the time, under the impulse of the moment, and often under circumstances which might have caused the bravest mind to quail, or the coolest head to be excited; and showing in its native colors what, we believe we may venture to assert, was one of the most noble, great, and glorious spirits that ever existed in man.

BUOYANCY OF SPIRIT, AND SENSE OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY.

AN attentive perusal of the private inward feelings laid open before us in these Dispatches will prove to the reader that the caution, and what his political or other opponents called his Fabian policy (which they, and indeed many rash and wrong-headed men, in his own army, at times almost considered as timidity), was combined with a buoyancy of hope, and a glimpse, even under the darkest cloud, of brighter though distant gleams, which few men possessed.

The circumstances under which he was frequently placed were, indeed, enough to have oppressed the most cheerful mind, and at some moments the least prospect of success might have been looked upon as chimerical: but *his* spirit did bear up, and his hopes were eventually realised. They were not founded upon the careless expectation or belief, which persons so often entertain, that "things will all turn out for the best," or that "when things are at the worst they must mend," and which are the only resource or consolation of weak minds; but, with the hope, he always gives his ground for entertaining it.

He had, no doubt, a very strong feeling of self-confidence. He did not allow that feeling to precipitate him into any unnecessary risk, and his natural caution led him to weigh and consider well before he decided. He had too many instances amongst the Spanish generals

of the total failure which must follow such displays of arrogance, vanity, and presumption as they continually exhibited, and indeed boasted of, as instances of national courage and glory: and if at any time his own elastic spirit quailed, it was when those vain-glorious men destroyed whole armies, and wasted every resource, in spite of his utmost efforts to prevent them.

But when the smallest prospect of success presented itself, his spirit seized and took advantage of it; and we believe most firmly, that on more than one occasion he was almost the only man in his army who did entertain the feeling.

At an early period, and when, it is true, that the circumstances were not of such a pressing nature, we find him possessed of the firmness to take, and the fearlessness to act upon *his own views*, and to carry out what *he* believed to be right.

Troops were assembled at the Island of Ceylon with a view to certain expeditions, which were afterwards given up, in order to send a force to Egypt. Colonel Wellesley, for reasons which he gives in detail, decided upon sailing with those troops to Bombay, on their way to the Red Sea, instead of remaining at Trincomalee to await further orders.

This did not meet with the approbation of the Hon. Frederick North, the Governor of Ceylon, who appears to have remonstrated *officially*. If misfortune or failure had followed, the Ceylon authorities would of course have shown that they ought not to be implicated, and that the whole blame must be laid upon him: and probably few officers of Colonel Wellesley's standing at that time would have had the resolution to persevere, however strong his personal conviction might have been that he was right.

He conscientiously believed himself to be so, and had the boldness to act upon his own judgment.

In his reply to the Governor he says :—

“The existence of your *public* letter upon the records of your government increases considerably *my responsibility* on this occasion. However, notwithstanding that, I conceive the grounds upon which I have determined to go to Bombay, and the urgency of the measure, so great, that *I persist*; and still hope that it will meet with your approbation, and that of General Macdowall.” (i. 71.)

He eventually took the troops to Bombay, where General Baird assumed the command, and sailed to the Red Sea.

Colonel Wellesley was prevented by illness from going with the expedition, and returned to Seringapatam. He was made a Major-general; and in 1803 was appointed to command a portion of an army destined to act against the Mahrattas.

He was invested by the Governor-general with considerable extra powers, and appointed to the chief command (subject only to General Stuart and General Lake) of all the British troops, as well as to the general direction and control of all the political and military officers within certain limits.

These orders were communicated to the Government of Bombay; and in virtue of them, General Wellesley opened a communication with that government respecting some of the troops stationed in the Guickwar territory, within that presidency, but under his military command. He wrote again, more than once, to complain that certain measures had not been taken, and it is obvious that he had no great confidence in the judgment of that government.

We are not informed of the grounds upon which the

Governor dissented from the General's views. Another officer, Major Walker, was apparently more in his confidence; and though, as a military man, the latter was of course subordinate, yet his influence was probably paramount. We do not here contest the point of whether Major Walker's or General Wellesley's suggestions were preferable, but merely adduce the proof that the latter was quite prepared to *incur the responsibility*, if he felt that what he proposed would be fully carried out.

In a letter to the Secretary of Government, with reference to certain disposition of the troops there, he says:—

“ I object, upon military principles, to the separation of our small forces in that quarter. If the Governor in Council thinks proper to adopt the suggestions of Major Walker, they must be carried into execution; and *I hope that I shall not be considered responsible* for the consequences.” (i. 328.)

General Wellesley felt that it was hopeless to contend against this, and in a letter very soon after to the Private Secretary of the Governor-general at Calcutta, he says,—

“ I have proposed a plan to Mr. Duncan (the Governor of Bombay) for the organization of the troops and the general defence of Guzerat: but although he cannot disapprove of it, it interferes with his little prejudices, and I see plainly it will never be carried into execution as it ought. Under these circumstances I had serious thoughts of writing to the Governor-general, to request him to relieve me from the command in Guzerat; but I have refrained, and *shall persevere as long as I can.*” (i. 336.)

Again he writes to the Governor of Bombay:—

“ I learn by your letter that you disapprove of my plan, and you lay it upon my responsibility to carry it into execution. I certainly am *ready and willing to be responsible for any measure which I adopt*, and to *incur all personal risks* for the public

service: but I should be presumptuous if, after your opinion, I were to persist; and I should deserve to incur the severest responsibility for any misfortune that might arise." (i. 342.)

In a letter to Colonel Murray, advertng to Mr. Duncan's letters, he says:—

"After having objected to my plan, in principle as well as in detail, he has called upon me to order its adoption, and has thrown upon me all the responsibility for its consequences. *I am not afraid of responsibility*, God knows! and I am ready to incur any personal risk for the public service: but under such circumstances I should be mad if I were to order this plan to be carried into execution." (i. 343.)

And again he writes to Major Shawe:—

"I am sorry to tell you that I have been obliged to relinquish the command in Guzerat. After Mr. Duncan had acquiesced in my plan for the defence of those territories, he has written to say that *acquiescence* is not *approbation*: but that if I choose to be responsible for the consequences it shall be carried into execution. I should have *no objection to taking upon myself to be answerable* for any measures that I have recommended, provided I was certain that they would be carried into execution. But I know that these would be impeded, and I should incur blame when I should not deserve it." (i. 348.)

And yet, with all these well-founded grounds for distrust, and conduct which had tended to break off friendly and confidential intercourse, we find that when his final departure from the army approached, considering Mr. Duncan as a public servant, whose authority must be supported, such was his general disposition to forget and forgive, that he would permit no angry feelings to prevail, and the following is the conclusion of his official correspondence:—

“ Upon the occasion of relinquishing the command, and consequently giving up the immediate communication which I have held with your government, allow me once more to return you my thanks for the many instances of your confidence, favour, and kindness. Although at a distance, I shall ever be anxious for the honour and prosperity of your government, and I shall be happy to have any opportunity to evince my zeal in your service.” (ii. 307.)

He left that country on the 24th of June, 1804, and went to Calcutta. He was again sent to Seringapatam in the expectation of more service, but ultimately left India, and arrived in England in September 1805.

A considerable time elapsed without his being again in any situation that required correspondence upon professional subjects; but at last, in June 1808, he was appointed to the command of that detachment of British troops which opened the Peninsular war. His success upon landing was brilliant, but the arrival of more troops, with senior officers, deprived him of the command, and he returned to England; and the inquiry into the Convention of Cintra took place in November.

In March, 1809, he was again sent to command in Portugal, where he arrived on the 22d of April. His military movements to Oporto were prompt and successful; when he turned his attention to the Spanish frontier, and writes home with his usual cheerful anticipation of success to Lord Castlereagh,—

“ I think it probable that Cuesta and I *shall be more than a match for the French army* on the Guadiana, and that we shall force them to retreat. My instructions will then be important,

and unless they are altered I shall be obliged to halt at the moment when my advance might be most important to the cause of the Spaniards. I wish the king's ministers to give me a latitude to continue my operations in Spain, if I consider them consistent with the safety of Portugal."

His communications, personal or by letter, were always cheering to those under his command. Major-general Mackenzie had been left in charge of a small corps of observation upon the frontier near the Tagus, during Sir Arthur's expedition with the main body of the army to Oporto, and had apparently been led to expect an attack from the French upon his small force. Sir Arthur writes to him, giving his reasons why he does not think the attack probable, and having in his former letters to him taken all contingencies into his calculation, concludes with a short inspiring postscript:—

"Look at your instructions, my dear Mackenzie,—act boldly upon them, *and I will be responsible for all the arrangements.*" (iv. 323.)

In June it was believed that the British Minister at Lisbon, the Honourable John Villiers, was about to retire. Sir Arthur writes to him, to express his regrets, and thanking him for the assistance which he had received. He announces the expected arrival of reinforcements, and the extension of his own authority to advance if he thought proper, and still retaining his characteristic tone of cheerfulness, concludes with these words:—

"So that *the ball is now at my foot*, and I hope I shall have strength enough *to give it a good kick*. I should begin immediately, but I cannot venture to stir without money." (iv. 384.)

He afterwards did advance, at the request of General Cuesta, though evidently with a conviction that the

movements proposed were not the most advisable ; and he found it impossible to act cordially with him. The battle of Talavera took place, but with little benefit, in consequence of Cuesta's retreat, which compelled Sir Arthur to do the same. He was naturally much mortified, as he felt that if Cuesta would have complied with his suggestions the prospect of success was good.

But, in spite of all, his hopes do not desert him ; and he writes thus in his private letter to Lord Castlereagh, on August 1st :—

“ My public letters will give you some idea of our situation. It is one of some embarrassment, but *of which I think I shall get the better* ; I hope, without fighting another desperate battle, which would cripple us so much as to render all our efforts useless. I certainly *should get the better* of everything if I could manage General Cuesta ; but his temper and disposition are so bad that that is impossible.” (iv. 523.)

Lord Wellesley had been appointed to succeed Mr. Frere as the British minister with the Central Junta, and the first letter to him from Sir Arthur, after his arrival at Seville, is one in which his buoyant spirit seems almost to be breaking down :—

“ I wish I could see you, or send somebody to you ; but I cannot. I think, therefore, that the best thing you can do is to send somebody to me as soon as you can ; that is to say, if I remain in Spain, which I declare I believe to be almost impossible, notwithstanding that I see all the consequences of withdrawing : but a starving army is actually worse than none. The soldiers lose their discipline and their spirit ; they plunder even in the presence of their officers. The officers are discontented, and are almost as bad as the men ; and with an army which a fortnight ago beat double their numbers, I should now hesitate to meet a French corps of half their strength.” (v. 15.)

The same state of affairs continued, and there was

certainly nothing to justify hope : but yet we find, in the midst of his depressing circumstances, that bursts of cheerful projects still break out. He writes to Lord Castlereagh :—

“ My dispatches will give you an unpleasant account of our situation, than which nothing can be worse : we want everything and can get nothing.” But still he adds,—“ I acknowledge, however, that I go with regret ; and I wish that I had been able to stay a little longer : not that I think I could have done much good.” And then, kindling with the feeling of what he might have done, he continues,—“ If we could have fed, and have got up the condition of our horses, we *might*, probably, after some time, *have struck a brilliant blow* upon Soult at Placentia, or upon Mortier in the centre.” (v. 73.)

No events of importance took place for some months. In the meantime Lord Castlereagh had left his office in England and was replaced by Lord Liverpool, to whom Sir Arthur reports in November :—

“ I am of opinion, that unless the Spanish armies should meet with some great misfortune, the enemy could not make an attack upon Portugal ; and the force at present is able to defend it. I conceive that till Spain shall have been conquered, and shall have submitted to the conqueror, the enemy will find it difficult, if not impossible, to obtain possession of Portugal, if His Majesty should continue to employ an army in defence of it, and if the improvements in the Portuguese military service should be carried to the extent of which they are capable.” (v. 268.)

“ In respect to the embarkation of the British army, in the event of failure in the contest which we may expect in Portugal, I have *no doubt that we should be able* to embark and bring away the British army ; not including the horses.” (v. 275.)

“ I do not think they will succeed with an army of 70,000, or even of 80,000 men, if they do not make the attack for two or three months, which I believe now to be impossible.” (v. 310.)

“ During the continuance of this contest, in which there may be no brilliant events, and in which, after all, I may fail, I

shall be most confoundedly abused, and in the end I may lose the little character I have gained ; but I should not act fairly by the Government if I did not tell them my real opinion,—which is, that they will betray the honour and interest of the country if they do not continue their efforts in the Peninsula, which in my opinion *are by no means hopeless.*” (v. 353.)

Sir Arthur was created Viscount Wellington in August 1809.

He had been always in the habit of drawing up a memorandum of the operations of the year ; and a very valuable paper of that nature is placed amongst the dispatches, dated December 9, 1809. It was sent to Lord Wellesley with MS. comments of Lord Wellington’s own, referring to the motives which had influenced him, or to information which had subsequently reached him up to the period of his sending it, together with his own feelings as respected the different events. The concluding observations are not cheerful, in consequence of the wretched conduct of the Spaniards ; but the *thorough-bred* spirit breaks out. His very last words in a note are :—

“If the Spaniards had not lost two armies lately, we should keep up the ball for another year. But, as it is !——BUT I WON’T DESPAIR !”

This is exactly the moment when we believe he was nearly the only man in his army who did not despair.

The Common Council of the City of London thought proper to pass judgment upon his proceedings, and presented an address to the King praying that his conduct might be inquired into.

The only effect which this produced upon him is very tersely expressed in a letter to Mr. Villiers, as soon as he had received the information from England :—

“You see the dash which the Common Council of the City

of London have made at me ! I act with a sword hanging over me, which will fall upon me whatever may be the result of affairs here : but they may do what they please, I *shall not give up the game* here as long as it can be played." (v. 391.)

In his letter to Lord Liverpool he says :—

"I think it probable that the answer of the King to this address will be consistent with the approbation of the acts which these gentlemen wish to make the subject of inquiry, and that they will not be well pleased. I cannot expect mercy at their hands, whether I succeed or fail ; and if I should fail, they will not inquire whether the failure is owing to my own incapacity, to the faults or mistakes of others, to the deficiency of our means, or to the great power and abilities of our enemy. In any of these cases I shall become their victim ; but I am *not to be alarmed* by this additional risk, and whatever may be the consequences I *shall continue to do my best* in this country." (v. 392.)

In a letter very soon after to Mr. Villiers, in which, from the great want of money for the payment of either British or Portuguese troops, he expresses his feeling that Great Britain had undertaken more than she could execute, he says :—

"I have no objection to communicate to you, that the army in its *present* state is not sufficient for the defence of Portugal ; but the troops are recovering their health daily, reinforcements from England are expected, and if I can bring 30,000 effective British troops into the field, I will *fight a good battle* for the possession of Portugal, and see *whether the country cannot be saved*. I do not mean to say that more troops would not be desirable ; but it must be obvious to you that the Government could not give more. Circumstances have certainly altered since my letter of November, but the question for me is, Have they so altered as to incline me to think that with 30,000 men, which I have reason to believe I shall have in a few weeks (together with the Portuguese army, which, by the bye, is better than I ever expected it would be), I shall not be able to save Portugal, or, at all events, to sell the country dearly ?

"We should hold our ground as long as possible ; and,

please God, *I will maintain it as long as I can*; and I will neither endeavour to shift from my own shoulders on to those of the Ministers the responsibility for the failure by calling for means which I know they cannot give: nor will I give to the Ministers, who are not strong, an excuse for withdrawing the army from a position which, in my opinion, the honour and interest of the country require they should maintain as long as possible." (v. 412.)

This was not merely the tenor of his official letters to the official authorities, either at home or in the Peninsula, for, amongst other valuable corroborative proofs, we find a *private* letter to his former friend and associate in India, Colonel Malcolm:—

"Talavera was certainly the hardest-fought battle of modern days, and the most glorious in its result to our troops. It is lamentable, that, owing to the miserable inefficiency of the Spaniards, the glory is the only benefit which we have derived from it. If the Spaniards had not contrived, by their own folly, and against my entreaties and remonstrances, to lose an army about a fortnight ago, I think we might have brought them through. *As it is*, however, *I do not despair!* I have in hand a most difficult task, from which I may not extricate myself; *but I must not shrink from it.* I command an *unanimous army*. I draw well with the authorities in Spain and Portugal, [nothing but his own generous and ardent spirit, we believe, would have thought so], and I believe I have the good wishes of the whole world. In such circumstances one may fail, but it would be dishonourable to *shrink* from the task."—*Suppl. India*, 232.

In January, 1810, he writes home to Lord Liverpool:—

"I certainly think the army improved. They are better than they were some months ago. But still, these terrible continued outrages of the soldiers give me reason to apprehend that, notwithstanding all the precautions I have taken, and shall take, they will slip through my fingers as they did through

Sir John Moore's, when I shall be involved in any nice operation with a powerful enemy in front." (v. 436.)

He was very much pressed by the Spaniards, through Mr. Frere, to make a forward movement. He acknowledges that it would be desirable, if it were practicable : but he had not the means—he could not bring 20,000 men into the field. The Portuguese army was improving, but still sickly from want of clothing and provisions ; and therefore he says,—

"I have, with great reluctance, given up all thought of moving at present." (v. 454.)

But in a letter to Lord Liverpool, a few days after, his hopes and wishes again show themselves : adverting to the above proposal, and explaining the reason which had induced him to write to Mr. Frere, he adds :—

"I have not, however, *given up* all thoughts of it, and I propose to carry it into execution hereafter, *if circumstances should permit*." (v. 466.)

But even *he* considered it a very doubtful question, and it became necessary to consider what must be the alternative.

"It is probable, that though the Spanish *armies* may be lost, the war of *partisans* may continue. When the affairs of Spain shall be brought to that state, and when all regular resistance shall cease, and there will exist no probability of a renewal of the contest in that country,—the question will arise, Whether the continuation of the contest will afford any reasonable prospect of advantage against the common enemy, or of benefit to His Majesty's allies ?

"Adverting then to the probability, that the whole or the greater part of the French will be disposable to be thrown upon this country, I should be glad to know whether it is the wish of His Majesty's Government that an effort should be made to defend it to the last ; or whether I shall turn my mind seriously to the evacuation of the country, and to the embark-

ation of as large a body of people, military as well as others, as I can.

“Whatever may be the force with which the enemy may invade Portugal, I am of opinion that, in all events, I shall be able to *bring away the British Army.*”

A change took place in the Spanish Government. Lord Wellington writes to Lord Liverpool, saying that the new members of it are persons of integrity, and more acquainted with the affairs of their country; but he is apprehensive that they have been called too late to effect much good. Referring to the probability of any attack upon Portugal, he says :—

“The enemy could not be in a situation for a considerable time to attack this country; and though the time may come when it may be doubtful whether perseverance will hold out any prospect of advantage, I consider that it is a difficult question for the King’s Government at the distance to decide; that it must depend upon events in Spain, upon the spirit and resistance of the people in Portugal, and in some measure upon the season of the year; and adverting to the *certainty that the army can embark*, it would, *probably, be best to leave to the officer commanding the period of evacuation as a military measure.*” (v. 483.)

Many men would have felt too happy at being able to leave the decision to the Government. The officer in charge of the army would thus have been sheltered under their responsibility; and any censure which might be passed upon the conduct or conclusion of the undertaking, would be thrown upon them, and not upon him.

But that was not a line of conduct consistent with his feelings. He had his misgivings: it was evident that he was not sanguine: he felt, apparently, a very strong *probability* that the army could not maintain its ground: but there was a *possibility* of its doing so. If that possibility should arise, he was the man to take advantage

of it ; but to do so with effect, it was necessary that he should be left to his own discretion and his own decision.

But is there not something striking in the very language in which he urges this ? He leaves *himself* out of the question : he speaks of “ the *officer commanding* ” in the third person, as if he was giving an opinion referring to a military measure in Russia or America. Is it possible to believe that any other man so deeply involved in a most arduous and trying proceeding, and who must have been fully aware of the weight of his opinion, would not have spoken of the course which *he intended* to pursue, instead of merely urging what “ *would probably be best ?* ”

The *confidence in himself* which made him offer the suggestion, was there : but the sense of duty to those under whom he was acting, made him defer to their judgment, as if *he* had no voice in the matter !

The French had at this time received great reinforcements, and had pushed forward with a view to attacking Cadiz. Lord Wellington sends many suggestions to General W. Stewart who commanded there, and concludes with the sort of cheering spirit that always distinguished him,—

“ Every man who knows anything of the state of Spain, and of the sentiments of the people, must be certain that if Cadiz should hold out, and the Mediterranean islands continue in possession of the patriots, the Bonapartes may have the military possession of the country, but, *sooner or later, they must lose it.* ” (v. 512.)

In another letter to General Stewart, after expressing his regret at the little progress made by the Spanish troops in their discipline, he adds :—

“ We must not be discouraged by these untoward circumstances. The affairs of the Peninsula have invariably had the

same appearance — they have always appeared to be lost — means have always appeared inadequate to objects — and the sole dependence has apparently been upon us. The contest, however, still continues, and is in its third year, and we *must continue it as long as we can*, as it is obvious that Great Britain cannot give us larger means than we have." (v. 578.)

His cheerful views continue, and we find him writing to Col. Torrens, the Secretary to the Commander-in-chief, —

"I am in a situation in which no mischief can be done to the army, or to any part of it. I am prepared for all events; and if I am in a scrape, as appears to be the general belief in England, although certainly not my own, *I'll get out of it.*" (v. 590.)

The necessity, however, continued, for being prepared against any emergency; his tranquillity remained undisturbed, and on the 2d April we find him saying, —

"All my preparations for embarking and carrying off the army, and everything belonging to it, are already made; and my intention is to embark it as soon as I find that a *military necessity* exists for so doing. In short, the whole of my conduct shall be guided by a fair and cool view of the circumstances at the moment." (vi. 6.)

He then discusses the different points for such embarkation, giving his reasons for or against them, and deciding in favour of Lisbon. It is foreign to our purpose here to consider the military grounds upon which he comes to that conclusion: but his fourth reason is so characteristic of his buoyant (we had almost said *boyish*) spirit, and is such a lively, playful representation of the case to be taken by a man in his anxious position, that we cannot refrain from quoting it: —

"Fourthly, when we do go, I feel a little anxiety to go

like gentlemen, out of the *hall-door* (particularly after the preparations which I have made to enable us to do so), and not out of the *back-door*, or *by the AREA* !

“ I am willing to be responsible for the evacuation of the country, under your instructions of February 27. Depend upon it, whatever people may tell you, I am not so desirous as they imagine of fighting desperate battles : if I was, I might fight one any day I please. But I have kept the army for six months in two positions, notwithstanding *their own desire* and that of the Allies that I should take advantage of many opportunities which the enemy apparently offered.

“ I am convinced, that if the Spaniards had followed my advice Spain would now have been out of danger. I am quite aware of the risks which I incur personally, whatever may be the result in Portugal. All I beg is, that if I am to be responsible *I may be left to the exercise of my own judgment*. If the Government take the opinions of others upon the situation of affairs here, and entertain doubts upon the measures which I propose, then let them give me their instructions in detail, and *I will carry them strictly into execution*.” (vi. 9.)

It is evident here that the Government were much alarmed : and this was the crisis of affairs. Officers in his own army were apparently doubtful as to the wisdom of his policy ; the Government were influenced by public opinion at home ; and one word of doubt or vacillation, on the part of Lord Wellington himself, would have sealed the fate of the Peninsula.

In this last paragraph of his dispatch are displayed two of the noblest characteristics of his nature : *Indomitable courage*, if left to *himself* ! *Implicit obedience*, if controlled by *others* !

It is obvious, towards the end of the summer of 1810, that in spite of his natural confidence, if duly

supported, he began to have doubts of what support he should receive from home.

“Nothing can be more irksome to me than the operations of the last year; and it is obvious that a continuance of the same cautious system will lose the reputation which I had acquired, and the good opinion of the people of the country. Nothing, therefore, could be so desirable to me personally as that either the contest should be given up at once, or should be continued with a force so sufficient as to render opposition hopeless.

“In either case the obloquy heaped upon me by the ignorant of our own country, as well as of this (who, after all, would be but imperfectly protected in their person and property), would fall upon the Government. But seeing as I do *more than a chance* of final success, if we can maintain our position, I should not do my duty if I did not inform the Government of the real situation of affairs, and urge them with importunity even to greater exertion.

“I acknowledge that it has appeared to me, till very lately, that the Government felt no confidence in the measures they were adopting towards this country; and not an officer has come from England who has not told me that it was generally expected that he would, on his arrival, find the army embarking; and some have said that this expectation was entertained by some of the King’s Ministers.

“This is not encouraging, and I acknowledge that I have attributed the little exertion to the want of confidence of the Government in the result of the contest.

“If Government are really in earnest, I recommend the following measures.” (vi. 326.) [Which he proceeds to detail.]

The state of responsibility in which he was placed was, indeed, perilous, under which none but a mind of the firmest class could have borne up. His care was not confined merely to the military charge of his own army; he was looked to, in great measure by his own Government, and entirely by the half-informed British

public, and the ignorant Spaniards (ill as they supported him), as the person upon whom every arrangement depended. In fact, the weakness of the Spanish Government made it impossible to rely upon their judgment or firmness for any measure of precaution. The islands of Minorca and Majorca were threatened, or at least the forethought of Lord Wellington made him feel the risk they ran, from a sudden attack by a French fleet; and though it formed no part of his duty to provide for their security, he was too well aware that if he did not, they might be lost by the supineness of their own Government. And with this weight upon him he writes to Mr. Wellesley:—

“The security of the Balearic Isles is of the utmost importance. You and I (*I*, probably, more than you) *will be considered responsible* for everything that occurs, although we have no means in our power, and no power to enforce the execution of what is necessary. It is desirable that we should advert to everything, and recommend to the Spanish Government those measures which appear to us to be necessary.” (v. 580.)

In a correspondence with Mr. Frere a short time before, referring to a renewed application from Don F. de Saavedra, the Spanish War Minister, for British co-operation, he gives his reason for declining; and he concludes by saying,—

“With respect to the blame that will be transferred *to us* for the misfortunes which there is reason to apprehend will be the result of these operations, I am *too much accustomed* to receive blame for the actions of others *to feel much concern* upon the subject, and I can only endeavour not to deserve any for my own.” (v. 291.)

Admiral Sir George Berkeley seems to have made some communication to him about supplies; he says in reply:—

"I am concerned that you should imagine that the measures taken for the supply of the army occasion an useless expense. If ever there was an officer at the head of an army interested (I may say personally) in keeping down expense, it is myself; for I am left wholly *to my own resources*, and am obliged to supply the Allies as well as the British from what I can get: and if I fail, God will, I hope, have mercy upon me, for nobody else will." (v. 419.)

We do not learn what were the opinions alluded to in the following letter to the Admiral, but we must acknowledge the weight of Lord Wellington's argument, both in it, as well as in one to Mr. Villiers, which follows it, and which refers apparently to some similar suggestions:—

"I am much obliged for the opinions you have communicated to me. I must consider not only what is desirable, but what is practicable; and I must first look at the facts of the case, and consider the means in my power.

"In case of the occurrence of a great disaster, it will be no justification for me to say that the plan was that of the Portuguese Government, and that I would not oppose it, or that you approved and urged it. In the existing temper of the times, and *for me particularly*, such a justification will not be allowed." (v. 569.)

He says, in one of his letters to Mr. Villiers:—

"Men in your situation and mine must look at all questions with a very different view, which is the main cause of any difference which may appear to exist between us. In my situation I am bound to consider not only what is expedient, but *what is practicable*; and no general officer in these days can venture, even in a confidential dispatch to a minister, to speculate upon advantages which it is not practicable to accomplish. If he ventures upon such speculations, the *tables are immediately turned upon him*; and although none of the conditions or requisites of his speculation may have been performed, he is asked for what reason he did not acquire those advantages which he had described in his dispatches." (v. 326.)

We have already given a letter addressed to Major-general Mackenzie (p. 19) in an earlier period of his operations, as an instance of the cheering and cheerful nature of his instructions to his officers. We meet with another of the same character addressed to General Hill, a year after, which we cannot help inserting :—

“The plot seems to thicken in some degree, but with prudent management and decision *I do not doubt that we shall get through.*

“If any point occurs to you on which you think you are not fully instructed, or you entertain any doubts, let me know it, and I will communicate my opinion immediately; and if you are obliged to act in any manner without waiting for my opinion, *do so with confidence* that I have every disposition to approve of everything you do.

“I consider all my letters, though in a private form, to convey *official* instructions and *authority* upon every point.” (vi. 82.)

After the unexpected fall of Almeida, in the latter part of August 1810, the public confidence in Lisbon began to flag, and some disapprobation seems to have been expressed by the Governors there at his not having moved to succour the place. He replies :—

“I request permission of the Governors of the Kingdom to say, that much as I wish to remove this impression on the public, *I do not propose to alter the system* of operations which have been determined upon.

“I request the Government to believe that I am not insensible of the nature of their confidence; but I should forget my duty to my Sovereign, to the Prince Regent of Portugal, and to the cause in general, if I should *permit public clamour or panic* to induce me to change, in the smallest degree, the system of operations which I have adopted, and which daily experience shows to be the only one likely to produce a good end.” (vi. 384.)

After the battle of Busaco, and when he was in full

retreat to the lines, he writes, full of confidence, to Mr. Stuart :—

“I am quite certain the French will not get Portugal *this winter*, unless they receive a very large reinforcement indeed. It is probable that they will not succeed even in that case.” (vi. 454.)

A little later, when within the lines, he writes to Mr. Wellesley :—

“I have no idea what the French will—or, rather, what they can—do. *I think it is certain they can do us no mischief*, and that they will lose the greatest part of their army if they attack us. They will starve if they stay much longer, and they will experience great difficulty in their retreat.” (vi. 502.)

And afterward to Lord Liverpool he says :—

“I have no doubt that the enemy is not, and does not, consider himself able to force our position : indeed I believe I have the means of beating the force now opposed to me. I think that the ‘*Moniteur*,’ of 23 November, shows that our position is considered so strong that it ought not to be attacked in front. I am also certain, that if the British should not be obliged to evacuate Portugal, the French *must withdraw* from Andalusia. *I do not despair of holding my ground*, and have taken measures to prevent the only inconvenience—a deficiency of supplies. The question whether I should attack has been well considered. *I think I should succeed*, but the loss must be very great. And what is to be gained? failure would be the loss of the whole cause.

“In the last year I cannot forget that I brought upon myself and General Cuesta not less than five *corps d’armée*. In this year I have had three, the most efficient in Spain, upon our hands for eight months. The Spaniards have made no move, because they want pay, clothing, means of subsistence, transport, discipline, and everything.

“Your Lordship will deem this a melancholy picture of prospects in the Peninsula, but you may rely upon its truth.

“It is the result of defects in the national character : they

have no army ; no means of raising one ; no authority to discipline one if they could raise it ; no means to arm, equip, clothe, or feed anything which could be collected under that name.

“ If all this is true, our business is not to *fight* the French army, which we certainly cannot beat out of the Peninsula, but to give occupation to so large a portion of it as we can manage, and leave the war in Spain to the guerillas.” (vii. 51.)

“ Mr. Wellesley informs me that it is *probable* the Spanish Government will offer me the command of their armies, of which I apprise your Lordship by the earliest opportunity, that the King’s Government may take the subject into consideration. If such an arrangement had been made a year and half ago, and the Spanish Government had seriously set to work to feed and pay their army, the cause would have been safe. It is impossible to say what will be the effect now. It will answer no purpose, excepting to throw upon me the additional trouble, and the blame and odium of certain ultimate failure, if measures are not taken to feed and pay the troops.

“ I shall answer, that the acceptance of the command will depend upon His Majesty’s commands, which will leave the question open ; and I request to have, by return of post, directions what I shall do.” (vii. 216.)

The answer which he received authorised him to decline, and in a letter to the Honourable Henry Wellesley he says :—

“ The answer which I received, disapproved of my acceptance of the office, and I must acknowledge that I never expected that the proposition *would be made*. I propose, under the instructions which I have received, to carry on such military operations as may lie in my power. I shall communicate confidentially, as I have done, with the Spanish authorities, and shall recommend such measures as may accord with my views ; and I can only say, that whether they attend to my suggestions or not, *I shall continue to do the enemy all the mischief which the means at my own disposition will enable me.*” (vii. 484.)

Again he says, rather later, in spite of this discouraging prospect :—

"I am glad to hear such good accounts from the north. [Alluding to affairs in the North of Europe.] God send they may prove true, and that we may overthrow this disgusting tyranny. Whether true or not at present, something of the kind must occur before long; and *if we can only hold out*, we shall yet see the world delivered." (vii. 583.)

In a private letter to Mr. Villiers, who had at that time given up the mission to Lisbon, he says:—

"I persevered in the system which I thought best, notwithstanding that it was the opinion of every *officer* in the country that I ought to embark the army; while, on the contrary, the Portuguese *civil* authorities contended that the war ought to be maintained on the frontier, for which we wanted, not only physical force, but the means of providing for the force which they would produce.

"To this, I believe, nothing but something worse than firmness could have carried me through the nine months' discussion with these contending opinions. To this, add, that people in England were changing like the wind, and you will see that I have not much to look to *but myself*." (vii. 593.)

In June, 1811, after describing to Lord Liverpool the state of his army, and the last reports that he had of the position of the French, he says:—

"With this force it becomes a question whether any and what operations shall be undertaken. With the fine and well-equipped army which we have, and with our cavalry in such good order as it is, I am anxious not to allow this moment of the enemy's comparative weakness to pass by, without making an effort." (viii. 111.)

He then proceeds to discuss various points, and continues:—

"The next operation which presents itself is the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. This enterprise promises the best, and I am tempted to try the enterprise. I may be obliged to abandon it, and in a case where the relative force of the two armies will be

so nearly balanced, it is impossible to foresee all the results. I propose to put the army in motion, if circumstances afford a chance of success."

The question, Who was to take Lord Wellington's place in case of any calamity? has often occurred; and it is almost a fearful thing to look back upon. Without disparagement to those officers who, by seniority in the service, must have succeeded to the command until they could be relieved or superseded, it is no injustice to say that they would have been involved in an awful responsibility; for which, perhaps, few would have felt themselves prepared.

Lord Wellington's confidence in himself, no doubt, was a most valuable quality, and carried him through many difficulties; but his life was beyond his own control, and in looking at the immense interests concerned, at this more remote period, when all temporary excitement has passed away, it cannot be denied that the risk does appear too great!

We read his own feelings upon the subject, though they do not appear to have had full weight with those upon whom the matter rested:—

"I am sorry to inform you that there is reason to apprehend that Sir Thomas Graham will be obliged to quit the army on account of his eyes.

"I mention it in case your Lordship should think proper to make provision for the event of any accident happening to prevent me from continuing to hold the command.

"As far as I am concerned, I certainly *should prefer that no officer should be sent out*. There are few who understand the situation of second in command of these armies. Unless he should be posted to command a division of cavalry or infantry, and perform that duty, he has really, on ordinary occasions,

nothing to do ; at the same time that *his* opinion relieves *me* but little from responsibility, and that, after all, I must act *according to my own judgment* in case of a difference of opinion. There are but few officers who should be sent from England as 'second in command' who would not come here with opinions formed, probably, on very bad grounds, and with very extravagant pretensions. To this add, that when necessary to detach a body of troops in any situation, but few would be satisfied to remain with that detachment, unless it should consist of nearly the whole army.

"If, therefore, Sir Thomas Graham should be obliged to go, I am not desirous of having anybody sent to fill his situation, as far as I am concerned ; and *I am convinced we shall go on better if nobody is sent.*" (ix. 209.)

Sir Thomas Graham was obliged to quit the army, and Sir Edward Paget had been sent out. He was, unfortunately, taken prisoner on the retreat after Burgos, in November 1812, which gave rise to the present discussion.

The rank of Marshal, which had been conferred upon Sir William Beresford as head of the Portuguese army, had already created much embarrassment with general officers who were his seniors in the British service.

The question now under consideration, of the second in command, naturally involved this point.

Lord Wellington was *Marshal-general*, in virtue of which he commanded both the British and Portuguese. Any officer succeeding to the command of the British, in consequence of his rank in that service, would not necessarily command General Beresford (who held the Portuguese rank of marshal, though junior as an English general), unless he were also made marshal-general, and Lord Wellington submitted the point to the Government at home.

"The Commander-in-chief having decided that officers in

the British and Portuguese services should rank *with each other* according to the dates of their commissions, there is no doubt that Marshal Beresford, holding the rank of marshal, ranks next to me in the Allied army. I hold the rank of Marshal-general.

“His Majesty’s Government have thought proper from time to time to appoint a general officer to be second in command to the British army (senior in rank in the British service to Sir William Beresford), on which officer it has been the intention that the command of the *Allied* army should devolve, in case any circumstance should deprive me of the command.

“In case circumstances should so deprive me of the command which I now hold over the *Allied* army, as Marshal-general of the Portuguese, either the second in command of the British must be made Marshal-general likewise, or Marshal Beresford must quit the army at a moment when his absence might be interpreted to his disadvantage; or *he* must assume the command of the Allied army, and not the officer selected by His Majesty’s Government as the person on whom they wish it should devolve.

“In case Government should think proper to send any officer to replace Sir Edw. Paget, it is desirable they should advert to the circumstances affecting his situation.” (ix. 585.)

It does not appear to have been then clearly decided upon by the Government at home; for we find a further letter on the subject to Marshal Beresford:—

“I am glad that our ideas agree about your military situation. It is certain that Government have always thought it necessary to have an officer here, selected by them, to succeed to the command, in case I should be deprived of it; and there are some so partial to old practice and precedent, that they do not like a departure from either, in not calling this officer ‘the *second in command*.’ This officer might have been very useful in the days of Councils of War, &c.; it may look very well in a newspaper to see that such a general is ‘second in command;’ but there is nobody in a modern army who must not see that there is no duty for the second in command to perform, and that the office is useless. It is at the same time inconvenient, as it

gives the holder pretensions which cannot be gratified except at public inconvenience." (ix. 608.)

He says again, in a letter to Lord Bathurst :—

"What Marshal Beresford and I ask for is a settlement of the question: not in his favour, if the Government deem it expedient that it should be otherwise; but that he should not be in the awkward predicament of being obliged to claim the command against the wishes of his own Government, or of quitting the army at a critical moment, in case of the event for which it is intended to provide.

"I cannot state positively, but I do not think he has any intention to retire, if the question is decided against his rank. I know that *I would not retire*, and I shall exert all the influence I can possess over his judgment to induce him to remain. But the point must be settled.

"In my opinion, the office of second in command in these days, when Councils of War have been discontinued, and the Chief is held severely responsible for everything, is not only useless but injurious. A person without defined duties, excepting to give flying opinions, from which he may depart at pleasure, must be a nuisance at moments of decision; and whether I have a second in command or not, *I am determined* to act according to the dictates of *my own* judgment, being certain that *I shall be responsible for the act*, be the person whom he may, according to whose opinion it has been adopted. One person in that situation may give me a little more trouble than another; but substantially I must be indifferent whether it is the Marshal or any of the generals who have been named. I must be *out of the way* when any one of them should be called upon to act in command, and I can have no preference to one officer over another." (x. 41.)

In a letter to Marshal Beresford he says :—

"It is obvious to me that the question is not understood in England. If it is decided against you, it must be by an arrangement with the Portuguese Government, to which you must always be a party.

"In whatever way it may be decided, I recommend to you

not to be induced to resign. What we have here is *the* army. You cannot be in any other than a distinguished situation, whatever may be the decision; and I earnestly recommend to you not to relinquish it. I beg you not to decide till you know what the decision is, and the mode in which it is brought about."

The question was decided by the Government in favour of sending out an officer senior to Marshal Beresford, to whom, ten days after, he writes again:—

"I enclose an extract from Lord Bathurst's letter regarding the command, from which you will see that the business is settled as you supposed it would be. However, being settled, I do not conceive that it is any business of yours to inquire in what manner or on what principles." (x. 121.)

But the question about the second in command, or who was to succeed in case of anything befalling him, was still left unsettled; because, although the British Government had appointed an officer senior to Marshal Beresford in the British service, and who was evidently intended by them to succeed to the general command, it could not have given him seniority over a Portuguese *Marshal*.

"I most fully concur in Sir John Hope's appointment. I am quite certain that he is the ablest man in the army.

"The question about Sir W. Beresford occurs again. You mean that Sir J. Hope shall command the Allied army in case any accident occur to me. Who is next to me in the allied British and Portuguese armies till that accident happen? Have you settled anything with the Portuguese Government what becomes of Sir W. Beresford's rank of marshal? It is most desirable that something should be settled; for although Sir William is gone to Lisbon, he will probably return soon, and if circumstances should render it expedient that we should not move forward on this side, as I shall be desirous of going into Catalonia, I must leave some person in command here." (xi. 143.)

“If you wish that Sir J. Hope should have the command in the event of my quitting it, you should settle with Portugal that that arrangement is to take place. If you do not, Marshal Beresford, as a marshal, must have the command. The Portuguese Government would make Sir J. Hope Marshal-general, in succession to me, if they acquiesce.

“Marshal Beresford talks of eventually going to England in the winter. If I retain the command, and should not enter further into France this winter, I ought to go into Catalonia, to put matters on a better footing than they are. How I am to settle the rank and pretensions of the gentlemen left behind me, I am sure I do not know.” (xi. 208.)

The Spaniards seemed at length to have been convinced of the comparative inefficiency of their own generals, and of the military superiority of Lord Wellington; and, in spite of their national vanity, conferred upon him the command of their armies.

It had been often talked of, though perhaps never in earnest, and his distrust of every military arrangement in the country had invariably made him reluctant to accept it, even if it had been offered. But having now entered upon the soil of Spain, having taken possession for a time of the capital, and having found in every affair where Spanish troops were, or professed to be, engaged, how utterly worthless they were under existing circumstances, he gave way, for these reasons:—

“I am informed that the Spanish Government have conferred upon me the command of their armies.

“The circumstances affecting the decision on this subject have altered; and it is impossible that operations can be successfully carried on by British and Portuguese armies, and with Spanish troops, without some concert. Indeed, as the Spaniards have lost *nearly* all their cannon, and *all* their cavalry, they cannot act *separate* from the Allies; and it is expedient on every

ground that the general command should be vested in one person.

"I have not thought proper, therefore, to decline." (ix. 470.)

He had made his arrangements by the end of March, 1813, for the approaching campaign, and with his usual sanguine cheerfulness writes to Mr. Wellesley, expressing his entire confidence, if he had any other people to deal with but the Spaniards, who had done little or nothing about money :—

"I wish and propose to open the campaign on the 1st of May, and to aid the several Spanish corps ; but, from all I hear, I am afraid that none of them will be ready. *We* shall be so ; I hope, completely ; and if there was money I should entertain no doubts of the result of the next campaign : but I have certainly the most obstinate and worst-tempered people to deal with that I have yet met in my life.

"Depend upon it, the next campaign depends upon our financial resources. I shall be able in a month to take the field with a larger and more efficient British and Portuguese force than I have yet had ; and there are more Spanish troops clothed, armed, and disciplined, than have ever been known ; and we are making daily progress towards getting out of the chaos in which I found matters." (x. 240.)

"I never saw the British army so healthy or so strong. We have gained in strength 25,000 men since we went into cantonments in the beginning of December, and infinitely more in efficiency !" (x. 357.)

He commenced his movements on the 19th of May, and quitted Portugal for the last time. The battle of Vittoria took place on the 21st of June, and he advanced to the Pyrenees immediately. He writes to the Government as to his future movements :—

"It is a common error to believe that there are no limits to military success. After having driven the French to the frontier of France, it is generally supposed that we shall *immediately*

invade France; and some even expect that we shall be at Paris in a month.

“I entertain no doubt that I *could* enter France to-morrow, and establish the army on the Adour; but I could go no further. So far for the *immediate* invasion of France; which, from what I have seen of the negotiations in the north of Europe, I have determined to consider only in reference to the convenience of my own operations.” (x. 613.)

Here was the bold and resolute general, whose arrangements and forethought had been attended with all the success which he could have anticipated, combining caution with confidence. Not seduced by the brilliancy of his advance so far,—not dazzled by the glory which his brave army had acquired,—not run away with by the intemperate ardour of those who (as we have just read) calculated upon being at Paris in a month, he exercises his judgment and authority to repress (which is perhaps sometimes more difficult than to excite) the ardour of his victorious troops.

His ultimate decision upon the advance into France was naturally dependent, in a great measure, upon the state of the war on the German frontier. The Allies had been very successful; and some offer appears to have been made to him, or, at all events, some suggestion had been thrown out for him, to change the scene of his glory from the Peninsula to the North. But he was not to be tempted or dazzled, even by the splendid prospect of commanding the masses that were assembled from every power in Europe; and he answered with his usual willingness to comply with orders, but offering, with the simple, honest, and proud consciousness of his value where he was, his reasons against such an appointment.

His reply to Lord Bathurst, on the 12th of July, 1813, was:—

“My future operations will depend a good deal upon what

passes in the north of Europe. However, the Government and the Allies may depend upon it that *I will do all that I can*.

"In regard to my going to Germany, I am the Prince Regent's servant, and *will do* whatever he and his Government please. But I would beg them to recollect, that the advantages which I enjoy here consist in the confidence that everybody feels that I am doing what is right ; which advantage I should not enjoy (for a time, at least) in Germany. Many might be found to conduct matters as well as I can, both here and in Germany ; but nobody would enjoy the same advantage *here*, and I should be no better than another in *Germany*. If a British army should be left in the Peninsula, it is best that I should remain with it." (x. 523.)

In the latter part of that year it appears to have been a question with the Government at home, whether it might not be more advantageous to employ a British army in *Holland* or in the north of Europe, in preference to the *Spanish frontier*, and that some proposition of the sort had been made to Lord Wellington.

"In regard to the scene of operations, it is a question for the Government, and not for me. With about 30,000 men in the Peninsula, we have now for five years given employment to at least 200,000 French, as it is ridiculous to suppose that either the Portuguese or the Spaniards could have resisted for a moment. If we were withdrawn, it is much more likely that he would make peace with the Peninsula, and turn against the Allies the 200,000 men, of which 100,000 are such troops as their armies have not yet had to deal with.

"The change of scene of the operations of the British army would put it entirely *hors de combat* for four months at least, even if the new scene were Holland ; and they would not then be such a machine as this army is.

"Does any man believe that Napoleon would not feel an army in our position more than he would feel any 30 or 40,000 British troops laying siege to a fortress in Holland ? If it be only the resource of men and money of which he will be deprived, and the reputation he will lose by our being in this

position (further advanced in the French territory than any of the allied powers), it will do ten times more to procure peace than ten armies on the side of Flanders.

“It is the business of the Government, and not mine, to dispose of the resources of the nation. I wish, however, to impress, that you cannot maintain military operations in the Peninsula *and* in Holland: you must give up one or the other, as the British establishment is not equal to two armies in the field.

“I do not wish to make complaints, but if you look at every branch of the service here you will find it stinted.

“You are also acquainted with the state of our financial resources. We are overwhelmed with debts, and I can scarcely stir out of my house on account of public creditors waiting for payment of what is due to them.

“I draw your attention to these facts, to show that Great Britain cannot extend her operations without starving the service here, unless additional means should be used to procure what is wanted.” (xi. 384.)

We have thus established what we set out by pre-mising, that he was gifted with a feeling of self-confidence, and an elastic buoyancy of spirit, that have seldom been more strikingly displayed, and never, perhaps, more severely tested.

FORGIVENESS OF INJUSTICE TO HIMSELF,
AND GENERAL SIMPLICITY OF
CHARACTER.

A SINGULAR power of overlooking and forgiving what men, in all conditions of life, might not unreasonably consider as injustice to themselves, seems to have distinguished him from a very early period of his professional career. In every case of the sort which is brought to our notice, we find that, strongly as he may have felt it, he invariably brings it to a conclusion by looking at the *public*, rather than the *personal* result. It would not be in human nature that he should not feel it, but his equanimity, his temper, and his exalted sense of duty, enabled him to view it in the most favourable and placable light.

The first, and indeed, perhaps, the most striking, because the most important instance of this, is furnished by his letters in India in the year 1801, when he was suddenly, and, as he thought, unfairly, superseded in a military appointment, which he felt justly was of vital importance to his future professional prospects.

In the latter part of the year 1800 a force was ordered to assemble at Trincomalee, under Colonel Wellesley, with Colonel Champagné as second in command, to be applied, amongst other objects (if required), to co-operate with any British force then employed in Egypt.

An attack upon the Isle of France was also projected; and Colonel Wellesley was ordered to proceed there, if the plan should appear to be practicable. The Governor-general, in a private letter of the 1st December, 1800, expresses to Colonel Wellesley his feeling that —

“Great jealousy will arise among the general officers in consequence of my employing you; but I do so because I rely upon your good sense, decision, activity, and spirit, and I cannot find all these qualities united in any other officer in India who could take such a command.” (i. 36.)

Colonel Wellesley was at this time thirty-one years of age, and it would not have been surprising if such an eulogy from such a man had tended to abate the modesty and simplicity of character which we shall show that he possessed, and retained unimpaired.

The Governor-general's letter continued :—

“If you succeed in taking the Isles of France and Bourbon, I mean to appoint you to the government of them, with the chief military command annexed. But I consider Mysore to be a greater field for you, where you might be more useful to the public.”

Three weeks after, the Marquis Wellesley writes again :—

“It is necessary that I should inform you, that if circumstances ultimately determine me to attempt the expedition to Egypt, it will require so large a force as to occasion the necessity of my employing one or two of his majesty's general officers. You will judge whether your best post would not be Mysore. Either Sir James Craig or General Baird, or both, would probably be employed in the service against Egypt; and I apprehend that in neither of these cases your situation would be very eligible.” (i. 47.)

All these expeditions, after many changes of plan, were ultimately abandoned, and that to Egypt was fixed

upon, under the command of General Baird, with Colonel Wellesley as second in command.

General Baird had not arrived, and Colonel Wellesley decided, upon his own responsibility, upon taking the force to Bombay, on their way to their ultimate destination, the Red Sea.

The Governor-general writes to him :—

“I am persuaded that a full consideration of the question will induce you to agree with me, that the extent of the force rendered it necessary to appoint a general officer to the chief command, while the sudden call to active service precluded the possibility of removing you from the second in command without injuring your character. You will, however, exercise your judgment upon the propriety of desiring leave to return to Mysore : but my decided opinion is, that you will best satisfy your public duty, and maintain the reputation of your public spirit, by serving cheerfully and zealously in your present situation.” (i. 75.)

Cheerfully and *zealously* was the way in which he always performed every duty, and he remained with the expedition ; but we learn by his private letters how deeply he felt it.

In a letter to his brother Henry he says :—

“I shall always consider these expeditions as the most unfortunate circumstances for me that could have occurred, and as such I shall always lament them. I was at the top of the tree in this country. The Governors of Fort St. George and Bombay placed unlimited confidence in me, and I had received strong and repeated marks of their approbation.

“But this supercession has ruined all my prospects, founded upon any service I may have rendered.

“Has there been any change of circumstances that was not expected when I was appointed to the command ? If there has not, my supercession must have been occasioned by my own misconduct, or by an alteration of the sentiments of the Governor-general ! I have not been guilty of robbery or

murder, and he has certainly changed his mind : but the world, which is always good-natured to those whose affairs do not exactly prosper, will not, or rather does not, fail to suspect both.

“ I did not look, and did not wish for the appointment, and it would probably have been more proper to give it to somebody else ; but when it was given to me, it would have been fair to allow me to hold it till I did something to deserve to lose it.

“ I put private considerations out of the question, as they ought to have no weight either in my original appointment or my supercession. I am not quite satisfied with the manner in which I have been treated on the occasion.

“ However I have lost neither my *health, spirits, or temper*, in consequence thereof. It is useless to write upon a subject of which I wish to retain no remembrance whatever.” (i. 82.)

In another letter, a few days later, to the Hon. H. Wellesley, he says :—

“ My former letters will have shown you how much this will annoy me : but I have never had much value for the public spirit of any man *who does not sacrifice his private views and convenience when it is necessary.*” (i. 84.)

Judging by the remarkable taciturnity which distinguished him to the end of his life, in all cases strictly *personal*, his feelings must have been very much excited upon this occasion to have induced him to give vent to them in such terms.

But whatever they might be, no rancour or bitterness existed toward General Baird, who arrived at Bombay and assumed the command, with Colonel Wellesley under him. He did not, however, accompany the expedition. He was seized with an intermittent fever, which lasted till after the fleet sailed : and though he had intended to follow it, he was attacked with another disorder, which required him to seek a colder climate,

and compelled him to relinquish the idea. He reported this, of course, to General Baird (who had then sailed), and we annex a part of his letter, exemplifying strongly the quality of his mind as regards the forgiveness, or one may say the forgetfulness, of personal annoyance.

After mentioning the state of his health, he adds :—

“I should be mad if I were to think of going at this moment. As I am writing upon this subject, I will freely acknowledge that my regret at being prevented from accompanying you has been greatly increased by the kind, candid, and handsome manner in which you have behaved towards me : and I will confess as freely, not only that I did not expect such treatment, but that my wishes before you arrived, regarding going upon the expedition, were directly the reverse of what they are at this moment. As I know what has been said, and expected, by the world in general, I propose, as well for my own credit as for yours, to make known to my friends and to yours, not only the distinguished manner in which you have behaved to me, but the causes which have prevented my demonstrating my gratitude by giving you every assistance in the arduous service which you have to conduct.” (i. 89.)

Before he recovered and left Bombay, he wrote to Colonel Champagné, who had been nominated as his second in command, upon the first assembling of the troops at Trincomalee, and who was probably fully aware of his disappointment :—

“I am entirely ignorant of the circumstances which have caused my removal from the command ; but I conclude that the Governor-general found that he could not resist the claims that General Baird had to be employed. I believe you know that I always thought that General Baird had not been well used, when I was called to the command. But I do not think it was proper that *I* should be disappointed more than he was, in order that *he* might have no reason to complain. However, this is a *matter of little consequence to anybody but myself, therefore I say no more about it.*

“ Lord Wellesley allowed me to return to my old situation, but said he should regret my doing so ; and for this reason, and because I saw in the General the most liberal intention to allow me to render him the services I could, *I determined to proceed upon the expedition.* I was, however, seized with a fever, and cannot join the armament.

“ I see *clearly the evil consequences of all this to my reputation and future views ;* but it cannot be helped, and to things of that nature *I generally contrive to make up my mind.*” (i. 99.)

This is the last letter which we find upon the subject. It shows that to the last he was deeply impressed with what he considered a severe blow to his professional character, but it tends to throw out with additional lustre the high principle which induced him to overlook it all, and the high *sense of duty* which regulated every motive and every action.

The Governor-general had given him the assurance that he should be allowed to resume the command in Mysore ; but his official application to Lord Clive, the Governor of Madras, is so simple, that it really deserves insertion.

After stating the reasons for his not going with the army to Egypt, he says :—

“ I acknowledge, that though I expected to return under your lordship’s orders more worthy of your favour than I have been hitherto, I shall even now return with the greatest satisfaction. I have not forgot the confidence which was placed in me, nor the favour with which all my endeavours to serve the public were received by you ; and if your lordship should think proper to employ me again in the same situation, an adherence to the same line of conduct which has heretofore gained your approbation will, I hope, gain it again.” (i. 97.)

He resumed the command at Seringapatam, where he remained upwards of a year. He was made a Major-general in April 1802.

Early in 1803 the state of the Mahratta powers made it necessary to send a division of the British army into their territories. Lieutenant-general Stuart had the chief command of the troops in the Madras Presidency, and Lord Clive, the Governor, recommended to him that Major-general Wellesley should be selected for the command of the advancing detachment.

Previous to that advance, amongst the numerous communications to General Stuart (his chief), is one which again shows so strongly his sense of duty and subordination, combined at the same time with such an honourable consciousness of his own power and confidence of success, that it cannot in justice be omitted:—

“ If you should take the command of the detachment yourself, I hope you will do me the favour to allow me to accompany you, in any capacity whatever. All that is known of that country, in a military point of view, was learned when I was in it, and I shall do everything in my power to make myself useful to you. If you should not think proper to take the command, and should be pleased to entrust it to me, I shall be infinitely gratified, and shall do everything in my power to forward your views.” (iii. 22.)

General Stuart did not take the command, and General Wellesley was invested with very full powers, seldom, perhaps, entrusted to an officer of his comparatively junior rank, and thus commenced that brilliant career which has shed such a glory upon himself and his country.

But notwithstanding the feelings of honest pride and exultation which must have accompanied the glorious successes of the campaign, notwithstanding the almost unparalleled confidence which was reposed in him by all the superior authorities, and notwithstanding the unusually extensive powers with which he was invested,

he never seems to be dazzled by the splendour of his position, or run away with by the distinction which he was daily acquiring.

His own glory seems to be left out of his consideration. His views were entirely fixed upon the future benefit and advantage of the country for which he was fighting, and the effects which would be produced whenever he should be removed from his present exalted station.

This is strongly exemplified in a letter addressed to the Government of Bombay (with which he had not had entire reason to be satisfied) on Dec. 5, 1803 :—

“In conducting the extensive duties with which I am charged, it has been my constant wish to conform to existing rules and establishments, and to introduce no innovations; so that at the conclusion of the war, when my duties would cease, everything might go on in its accustomed channel. I do not comprehend, and cannot say that I admire the system, according to which the Guickwar government is carried on, but this probably proceeds from ignorance of the subject; and if I were to interfere at all, I might order a measure which would be inconsistent with the existing system. I am, therefore, very desirous not to be called upon to take a more active part than I have hitherto, and that matters should be conducted as usual.

“Whenever the Governor in Council may think proper to call for my opinion upon any subject, I will give it to him to the best of my judgment; and I will do so whenever I may think it necessary, in all matters which have a relation to our general situation. But I hope that he will not desire me to enter into the detail of Guzerat affairs, which I cannot be supposed to comprehend, and with which I am convinced it was never intended that I should be charged.” (i. 537.)

Having brought the war to a successful termination, the army was broken up, and he returned by Seringapatam, and ultimately resigned all his military powers

on the 29th of June, 1804. From thence he went to Calcutta.

In November, the state of affairs induced the Governor-general to reappoint him to the command in the Deccan, and he proceeded as far as Seringapatam. Here he was again attacked with fever, and the state of the country appearing to be more settled he did not go further. This decision seems to have been a source of anxiety to him; and in a letter to the private secretary of the Governor-general, in January 1805, he gives his reasons:—

“ I acknowledge that I have determined not to go, but not without doubt and hesitation. I know that all classes look up to me, and it will be difficult for another officer to take my place. I certainly do not propose to spend my life in the Deccan, and the same state of affairs which now renders my presence there desirable may exist for the next seven years. I should not think it necessary, in any event, to stay there one moment longer than the Governor-general should stay in India, and I conclude that he intends to go in February. Having considered whether my presence there for one, two, or three months would answer any purpose whatever, I am decidedly of opinion that it would not. In regard to staying longer, the question is exactly whether the Court of Directors or the King's Ministers have any claim upon me to remain for a great length of time in this country.

“ I have served the Company in important situations for many years, and have never received anything but injury from the Court of Directors,* although I am a singular instance of an officer who has served under all the governments; and there is not an instance on record, or in any private correspondence, of disapprobation of any one of my acts, or a single complaint, or even a symptom of ill-temper, from any one of the political or civil authorities with whom I have served.

“ The King's Ministers have as little claim upon me as the

* We find nothing in these Dispatches to explain this.

Court of Directors. I am not very ambitious, and I acknowledge that I never have been very sanguine in my expectations that military service in India would be considered in the scale in which similar services are in other parts of the world. But I might have expected to be placed on the staff in India; and yet, if it had not been for the lamented death of General Fraser, General Smith's arrival would have made me supernumerary. This is perfectly well known to the army, and is the subject of a good deal of conversation.

"If my services were absolutely necessary for the security of the British empire, or to ensure its peace, I should not hesitate a moment about staying, even for years; but these men or the public have no right to ask me to stay in India, merely because my presence may be attended by convenience.

"But this is not the only point. I have considered whether, in the affairs of India at present, my arrival in England is not desirable? Is it not necessary to take some steps to explain the increase of the military establishments, and to explode some erroneous notions upon this subject? Are there not a variety of subjects upon which verbal explanation is necessary?

"I conceive, therefore, that in determining not to go to the Deccan, and to sail by the first opportunity to England, I consult the public interests not less than I do my own wishes." (ii. 518.)

In a later letter to Major Shawe, the Private Secretary to the Governor-general, dated Feb. 3, 1805, he says :—

"I now feel an anxiety only about my departure for England, which I cannot describe. I have *no confidence in my own judgment* in any case in which *my own wishes* are involved. This is the cause of the great anxiety which I have felt, and still feel, upon these subjects. I know that my presence in England would be useful, and I am certainly very anxious to go there.

"I mistrust the judgment of every man in a case in which his own wishes are concerned; and I have not come to this determination without consulting Malcolm, who agrees with me upon every part of the subject." (ii. 572.)

He arrived in England in September 1805.

We have in other parts detailed his occupations from that time, till he was sent out the second time to Portugal.

No man could have been insensible to this mark of confidence (after all that had happened), in being selected as the man upon whom the military fame of his country was to rest; but nothing shows itself in his language or conduct. On the contrary, there is the same simplicity as ever; and when he is informed by our Minister to the Central Junta, that persons in authority at Seville had suggested his appointment to the command of the Spanish army, he replies thus:—

“I am much flattered at the suggestion. I have received no instructions from Government upon that subject; but I believe that it was considered an object of great importance in England that the Commander-in-chief of the British troops should have that situation, but one more likely to be attained by refraining from expressing it, and by leaving to the Spanish Government themselves to discover the expediency of the arrangement, than by any suggestion on our parts.

“I concluded that you had been made acquainted with the wishes of Government; but if you had no knowledge of them, I do not conceive that your insinuations upon the subject are likely to have any effect. That which will prevent the accomplishment of this object is the jealousy of the Spaniards.” (iv. 389.)

At rather a later period he writes to Lord Castlereagh:—

“I think the first part of this letter will give you my opinion respecting one notion you entertained, viz. that the Spaniards might be induced to give the command of their armies to a British commander-in-chief.

“If such offer should be made to me, I shall decline to

accept it till I should receive His Majesty's pleasure ; and I strongly recommend to you, unless you mean to incur the risk of the loss of your army, not to have anything to do with Spanish warfare, on any ground whatever, in the existing state of things. The jealousy of all the Spaniards, even of those most attached to us, is so rooted that even if they were induced in their present difficulties to cede Cadiz to induce me to remain in Spain, I should not think any garrison which this army could spare would be safe in that place.

"You ought, along with Cadiz, to insist upon the command of the armies of Spain." (v. 89.)

His judgment upon the Spanish character was a most correct one, and was abundantly proved on many subsequent occasions.

But although his natural good sense, and the total absence of all vanity, made him hesitate (indeed we may say, virtually refuse) to entertain any proposition respecting the Spanish command, advantageous as it would have been if frankly granted, he felt the difference of his position in Portugal, where he was made Marshal-general, and which he accepted without difficulty. In a letter to the British minister he says :—

"I have received a letter from the Prince Regent from the Brazils, appointing me the Marshal-general of his army, with all the power and privileges held by the Duc de la Foens. I believe that is what I had before, and was certainly as much as was necessary, or as I could manage ; and I do not see any reason for altering *our* arrangements, and the practice under the one appointment, even though the new one may be different." (v. 199.)

The Spanish Government and their military leaders in succession had so constantly rejected all his suggestions, that he had been compelled to break off all connexion with their army. Many efforts were made to induce him to renew his co-operation with them ; but he resolutely declined. General Areyzaga had succeeded

General Eguia ; but he appeared to be equally incapable, and his whole army was destroyed or dispersed at Ocaña on the 19th of November.

Lord Wellington was at Seville when the General commenced his march, and in more than one conversation with the ministers and members of the junta communicated to them his conviction that they would be defeated. But the first *official* information of the movement was received at Badajoz, the very day before the defeat. He gave a written answer to the communications the following day ; too late, of course, to avert the calamity, but recording the accuracy of his views.

It was, at all events, some satisfaction to him to be able to say, a little after,—

“ I understand that the people of Seville are informed of my opinion upon the late expedition, and that they have expressed an anxious desire that the Government should *attend* to what I shall recommend to them in future.” (v. 316.)

We do not adduce this with any reference to the military view of the question, but merely to prove that, in spite of their national pride and vanity, they could not help acknowledging the justness of his views ; and to show how very quietly and unostentatiously he felt that acknowledgment.

A feeling appears to have existed, that with the numerous discontented German soldiers serving in the French army, more advantage might have been taken to induce them to desert. Mr. Villiers had received suggestions to this effect, and had communicated them to his own Government, and Lord Liverpool had written about it to Lord Wellington.

The latter, feeling how little real ground there was to complain, was naturally distressed at finding that

his friend had written home without having consulted him :—

“ I wish that you had done me the favour to have referred the authority to me, upon which you founded your report on the subject of German deserters in your dispatch to England, before you sent it home, as I could have proved to you that it was incorrect, not only in those statements respecting transactions whilst I commanded the army, but also respecting the 500 Germans stated to have deserted upon a former occasion.

“ Several people in England have given credit to this statement, *supported as it now is by your authority*; and it is supposed that I have neglected the important means pointed out of diminishing the enemy’s forces. Now I must tell you a secret upon this subject, and that is, that *we* have lost more Germans by desertion than the *French*.” (v. 317.)

Mr. Villiers was apparently hurt, and Lord Wellington writes :—

“ I am much concerned that anything in mine should have hurt you. You certainly never communicated to me the information on which you founded your despatch. If I had known that your opinion, ‘ that much might be done to distress France by inducing foreigners to desert,’ was founded upon *reports*, I should have requested you not to send home those reports, as they would make an *impression injurious to me upon false grounds*. You naturally imagined that the facts were known to me, and that from an erroneous opinion I had neglected this mode of annoying the enemy.

“ You were right in bringing it before the Government, under the impression that I *had* neglected the subject : but what I regretted was, that I had not an opportunity of showing you that I had *not neglected* it, and that you were misinformed as to the facts.” (v. 325.)

The Principal Souza, as he was called, and the Patriarch (the Bishop of Oporto), had both been appointed

Members of Regency by the Court at the Brazils. The former was apparently a man of a very meddling disposition, and probably was very jealous of the power and weight of a foreign general. The latter, upon Sir Arthur's first arrival in Portugal, had professed a great regard for him; but was probably influenced afterwards by the same feelings as the Principal; and in the beginning of January, 1811, Lord Wellington expresses his opinion of them thus to Mr. Stuart:—

“The conduct of the Patriarch and of the Principal is very improper. I am convinced from their conduct, as well as from other circumstances which have come to my knowledge, that these persons are endeavouring to form an Anti-English party, which affords another reason for removing the Principal from Lisbon.” (vii. 92.)

“My opinion is, that there is a plot on foot against the English, at the head of which are the Bishop and Souza; and that they want to be able to show that they protested against our pretensions to command their army.” (vii. 101.)

A few weeks later he says:—

“I have lately received several anonymous letters, which I suspect have been written under the directions of the Principal, the Bishop, &c.; and I shall be very much obliged to you, if you will send me any papers you have in the handwriting of either of those persons, or their secretaries, &c.” (vii. 314.)

“Baron Eben has made some curious discoveries, and has given some papers written by those personages, which tend to show their folly equally with their mischievous dispositions. Among other plans, they have one for libelling and *caricaturing* me in *England*! They complain that I have had hunting-parties, and that I ate a good dinner at Oporto instead of pursuing Soult!” (vii. 321.)

“I have this day discovered that some of the anonymous letters to me are written by the Principal; and I suspect others by the Bishop. But this last is not so clear. These are men to govern a nation in difficult circumstances!

"One of the anonymous letters is *positively* written by Principal Souza. Two others, I think, by the Bishop; but of this I cannot be so certain, as his note to Baron Eben is written upon good paper, with a good pen; the letters written by the same persons to me are upon bad, brown paper, with a bad pen. The characters in both are very similar, and I have but little doubt are written by the Bishop. It would be very desirable to see more of his writings, if you can get some. If I can prove the fact clearly, I shall send the letters to the Prince Regent at the Brazils, that he may see what clever fellows the Governors of the Kingdom are." (vii. 322.)

A person of the name of Stockler had proposed to publish a book, upon which Lord Wellington writes to Mr. Stuart:—

"I return Stockler's paper, which I have not had leisure to read. The Government may publish any nonsense they please; it is entirely a matter of indifference to me: but I think they had better take care how they endeavour to set the people of the country against those who have saved them. They are much mistaken if they think they can do *me* any harm by such nonsense, or that they can themselves stand for a moment after they have convinced the people that the English, and I in particular, have not done my best for them. I am entirely indifferent as to Stockler and his book!" (vii. 354.)

"I am decidedly of opinion, that unless the Portuguese Government alter their system entirely, it will be impossible for the British army to remain in the country. Has any magistrate been yet punished, or even dismissed, for neglecting his duty? Has any alteration been made in the old system of allowing every booby to do as he pleases, provided that he cries '*Viva*,' and attends the levees of the Government and the Ministers?"

"A fresh invasion would find us exactly where we were last year, and I do not think it would be safe to trust the king's army in this country." (vii. 476.)

"I have so repeatedly received anonymous letters from the Patriarch and the Principal, that at last it is necessary to put an end to a practice which is carried on in the most barefaced

manner. I now enclose one, which I beg you will look at, merely that you may be able to recognise the writing again in case it should come in question, and that you will then forward it, as directed, to the Patriarch. I have not read it." (viii. 52.)

"I have no doubt but that the letter was written by the Patriarch, but as you entertain a doubt, I am much obliged by your stopping it.

"To send [back] an anonymous letter to any one is to accuse him of writing it, the meanest action of which any man can be guilty. It is not very proper, perhaps, to accuse a man in the Patriarch's situation, of being guilty of such an action; but he positively ought not to be accused if there is *any the slightest doubt*. I, therefore, acquiesce entirely in your retaining the letter." (viii. 67.)

Here ended any further notice from him of this miserable and contemptible affair. Whether the parties suspected ever had reason to believe that they were detected, we do not know; but though Lord Wellington still had abundant proofs of want of cordiality and support from the Governors of the Kingdom, we find no repetition of wretched and paltry personalities.

We have seen how nobly and magnanimously he could put up with all this unmerited calumny, and that the indignation he might naturally feel at such contemptible injustice did not prevent the continuation of his public duties with those who were implicated.

But we now have a more gratifying task before us. We have already adverted to the feeling of doubt and discouragement which had pervaded the public mind in England, to such an extent that the Government were dubious as to the line of policy they ought to pursue in regard to the war; and that, in fact, if Lord Wellington had himself given way, all must have been brought to a close.

His firmness saved the cause: his skill, his calmness, and the admirable combination of daring, when required, and of caution, when necessary, had produced their effects upon the minds of his fellow-countrymen. The tone of the debates in the House of Commons, upon questions relating to Portugal, had changed. Members who had held decided language against a continuance of the war, had retracted many of their opinions; and the following picture of Lord Wellington's position and character, in a most brilliant speech of Mr. Canning's, on the 26th of April, was greeted with approbation by many who had formerly held very different opinions. He described him as

“ a man whose natural genius and military experience insured the accomplishment of all that was attainable by human sagacity.

“ Follow him from the fatigues of the day to repose in his tent: when, instead of consolation, he found accusation; instead of encouragement, misrepresentation and obloquy; all his dangers magnified, and all the means of the enemy exaggerated; every one of *his* measures traced to temerity or compulsion, and all the movements of *the enemy* to wisdom and military skill. When the House took all this into its consideration, it was impossible not to ascribe his steady and unaltered perseverance to real magnanimity and true valour. Whilst exposed to such misrepresentation, *he never deigned to notice* any of the unfounded statements which he saw published: he determined not to reply to them in words, but to *let the result put the calumnies and calumniators to shame*; and steadily prosecuting his purpose, he forbore throughout all his correspondence from introducing *one word expressive of discontent*. If there was anything which could not be contemplated without admiration, it was a man exposed to such misrepresentation, and yet disdaining to indulge in any expression of his feelings: deliberately charged with the two most opposite feelings of general *temerity* and *procrastination*, and yet calmly pursuing that wise and salutary course which had brought his country to that happy state when Parliament could look back without regret, or look forward

with hope, and when gentlemen were at length enabled to discuss the question with very considerable advantages.”—*Parl. Debates*, xix. 773.

One of the most signal proofs of the changes we have adverted to, was a letter written within three days of this debate by Mr. Whitbread, M.P. for Bedford, who had been one of the most decided objectors to the line of policy at home and the general conduct of the war abroad. His opinion had changed, and he had the manliness and the honourable candour to write to Lord Wellington. The Dispatches do not, of course, contain the letter itself, but we gather its tenor and purport by the reply:—

“I was most highly gratified by your letter of the 29th April, which I received last night; and I beg to return my thanks for the mode in which you have taken the trouble of informing me of the favourable change in your opinion respecting affairs in this country.

“I acknowledge that I was much concerned to find that persons for whom I entertained the highest respect, and whose opinions were likely to have great weight in England and throughout Europe, had delivered opinions, erroneous as I thought, respecting affairs in this country; and I prized their judgments so highly that I was induced to attribute their conduct to the excess of the spirit of party.

“I assure you that, highly as I am gratified and flattered by the approbation of ———, and yourself, and others, that which gives me most pleasure is to be convinced that such men could not be unjust towards an officer in the service of the country abroad; and that the opinions which they had delivered were the real dictates of their judgments upon a fair view of all the circumstances which had come to their knowledge. To the gratification arising from this conviction to one who seems destined to pass his life in the harness, you have added that which I received from your obliging letter, and I assure you that I am very sensible of the kindness which induced you to write to me.” (vii. 585.)

The change of the seat of war, and the final removal of the British army (as a body) from Portugal, in May 1813, had caused a cessation of the personal hostility on the part of some of the Governors of that kingdom, and we have no repetition of the odious and vexatious proceedings of that nature from thence.

But the same spirit now broke out in Spain. He had been accustomed to every sort of neglect, and injury, and almost insult, from that Government, from a very early period, which he had borne with his usual complacency; and though he had often been tempted, and had threatened to give up their cause and withdraw, he had always felt the injury which such a course would inflict upon the general cause throughout Europe, and made the most vigorous efforts to repress his indignation and continue his services.

For a time, after they had become convinced of the utter incapacity of their own generals, and had conferred the command of their armies upon him, matters went on better. The Spanish troops were improved and brought forward; but, notwithstanding the success which attended him, there was a party at the seat of government who continued bitterly indisposed towards him, and almost every pledge and condition entered into with him was broken.

After the siege of San Sebastian a most violent and malignant libel was published against the English troops, in a paper called the "Duende," founded upon a letter written to the War Minister, by the Conde de Villa Fuentes, the "Xefe Politico" of Guipuzcoa, complaining of the conduct of our soldiers in the storming of the place. It charged the officers employed there with having *ordered* or suffered the sack and plundering of the town from a feeling of *commercial revenge*.

Lord Wellington, in his letter to Sir Henry Wellesley, says:—

“I need not assure you that this charge is most positively untrue. Several persons urged me, in the strongest manner, to allow the town to be *bombarded*, as the most certain mode of forcing the enemy to give it up. This I *positively would not allow*; and yet, if I had harboured so infamous a wish as to destroy the town from motives of commercial revenge, or any other, I could not have adopted a more certain method than to allow it to be bombarded. It was set on fire by the enemy.

“The ‘Xefe Politico,’ the author of these complaints, must have been as well aware of these facts as I am.

“In regard to the plunder by the soldiers, I am the last man who will deny it, because I know that it is true. I never saw, or heard of a town taken by storm, that it was not plundered.

“I lament the evils sustained by the unfortunate town as much as any man can; but a person like the ‘Xefe Politico’ should take care not to attack the character of honourable and brave men, who are incapable of being influenced by the infamous motives attributed to them in the libel.” (xi. 173.)

“If it is published in England I shall prosecute the printer. *I do not know how long my temper will last, but I never was so much disgusted with anything as with this libel*; and I do not know whether the conduct of the soldiers in plundering San Sebastian, or the libels of the ‘Xefe Politico’ and ‘Duende,’ made me most angry.” (xi. 185.)

“There is no end to the calumnies against me and the army, and I should have no time to do anything else if I were to begin either to refute or even to notice them. Very lately they took the occasion of a libel in an *Irish* newspaper, reporting a supposed conversation between Castaños and me (in which *I* am supposed to have consented to change my religion *to become king of Spain*, and *he* to have promised the consent of the *grandees*), to accuse me of this intention: and then those fools, the Duques de — and de —, and the Visconte de —, protest formally that they are not of the number who had given their consent to such an arrangement!!! What *can be done*

with such libels and *such people, excepting* DESPISE THEM, and continuing one's road without noticing them?

"I should have taken no notice of the libel about San Sebastian, if it had not come before me officially in the letter from the Minister of War; nor shall I of this second libel in the 'Duende,' although it is obvious that it comes from the Minister of War." (xi. 199.)

"In regard to these libels, I acknowledge that I cannot discover either law or justice in the Spanish law of libel, and I do not know how to proceed under it.

"What can be called 'a libel mischievous to the State,' if it is not one in a *servant of the Government* to call upon the people of Spain to take vengeance on our officers?

"If the charge were true, it cannot be proper for a *servant of the Government, proprietor of a newspaper*, to call upon the people to revenge themselves. One would suppose that such an act would be punished by the law. It appears, however, that it is entirely innocent.

"If such a paragraph as that in the 'Duende' had been published by an *officer of the Government* before I entered Spain in 1812, and the author had not been punished, or formally disavowed, I should never have entered the country, and none of the events would have occurred which have delivered it from the enemy.

"As we are now stationed, I wait till I know the conduct and decision of the Spanish Government before I take any further steps; being determined, if they do not completely vindicate us, I shall make known my opinion to the King's Government, that they ought not to risk their army here where an *officer of the government* has published such an atrocious libel, and then called upon the people of Spain to take revenge for facts falsely charged upon our officers, the law giving no redress, and the Government keeping their officer in his office and taking no notice of his conduct. If I was to decide, I would *not keep the army in Spain one hour.*" (xi. 232.)

"I think it advisable that you should have one of the best lawyers consulted, and see whether the 'Duende' cannot be brought to punishment for that part of his paper where he calls on the people of Spain to revenge themselves. The only mode

of getting the people in authority to do anything is to frighten them." (xi. 247.)

The "Duende" was prosecuted at the suit of the Ambassador before the *Junta de Censura*, and *acquitted*!

The Government published some statements, upon which Lord Wellington says:—

"I have perused the statement published by the authority of the Government on the 20th October, which I trust will have the effect of effacing the injurious impressions attempted to be made by the 'Xefe Politico' of Guipuzcoa, and by the infamous libellers of Cadiz, and will frustrate the still more infamous attempts of the latter to excite the animosity of the people of this nation against the British army." (xi. 258.)

A little later he says to Sir Henry Wellesley:—

"I agree very much with the British Government about these Spanish libels, and think, that being written by the most insignificant of the human race, and having no circulation excepting in Spain, and that which the English newspapers give them, they *are quite undeserving of our attention*."

"The only reason I noticed the libel in the 'Duende' was, that it affected Sir Thomas Graham and the officers of the army; and I was convinced that it was written under the direction of that *greatest of all blackguards*, the Minister at War. If it had not been so, I should have wished it to have passed unnoticed." (xi. 300.)

He afterwards writes home:—

"I have sent to Sir Thomas Graham all the libels, and the copy of the publication by the Spanish Government."

"The fact is, that the libels were published in the 'Duende' by an officer in the War Department, who is the editor of that paper, and they were part of a scheme to reconcile the Spanish public to *my removal from the command*. There is one of them in which the people of Spain are called upon to rise and revenge the supposed injury done to San Sebastian, upon which I pro-

posed to make a complaint to the British Government, if the Spanish Government, as usual, took no notice of the matter. I made no secret of this intention, which is, I believe, the reason why they published what they did." (xi. 313.)

Some of these aggravating circumstances might, perhaps, have been classed under the head of Foreign Annoyances, referable to the *public* service, instead of including them in the class of *Personal Injustice* to himself. It is true that they were connected with other officers, and with the service at large: and their effects (if his enemies in the Spanish Government had succeeded) would have fallen more upon straggling and unprotected soldiers of his army, than upon himself.

But we have been induced to place it here, from observing the deep interest which he took in it. "I do not know how long my temper will last," "I never was so disgusted," are phrases that we do not meet with on any other occasion; and we see in the last letter, from which we have made an extract, that however atrocious the act was, and however fatal it might have proved to the lives of many of his gallant soldiers, if the revengeful feelings of the Spaniards had been roused against them, he considered it mainly directed against *himself*, as a *foreign officer commanding the Spanish army*, and as part of a scheme to inflame the nation, and thus to lead to *his removal*.

We have seen the efforts which he made to repress his indignation and to continue his command, with a view to the public interest; and the speedy termination of his connexion with the country gave him no opportunity of showing how far he could have condescended to reconciliation with men who had treated him so infamously, and where he had felt himself impelled to call their chief War Minister "the greatest of all blackguards!"

We have no reason to doubt that, if necessary, he would eventually have overlooked the offence, upon public grounds ; and, in conformity with what we have seen in all other instances, that, even in this exasperating case, “his temper” would have recovered, and “his disgust” would have subsided, and that it would have still further tended to confirm our opinion of his general and habitual Forgiveness of Injustice to himself.

FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES.

INTIMATELY connected with the characteristic which we have just been considering (so much so, indeed, as to be hardly separated from it, excepting that one had reference to *personal*, and the other to *public* considerations) is the firmness and forbearance with which he bore up against the incessant (and at times almost ruinous) obstacles which beset him throughout the greatest part of his Peninsular career, and the temper and forgiveness with which he was always tempted to treat the authors of them.

They proceeded partly from his own country, and partly from the Portuguese and Spanish Governments. The two latter were so intermixed — operating often at the same moment — that, though proceeding from different persons, it is difficult to separate them; and it may be best, therefore, to take notice of them as they arose. But those originating in his own country arose from two sources, — the Government and the Public.

It was not from *the Government* (properly so called) that his principal embarrassments arose: he might have had his doubts, at times, whether Great Britain had not undertaken more than she would be enabled to execute, but he acknowledges on several occasions that the Ministers had done their utmost.

In a letter to Lord Castlereagh, of August 25, 1809, he says :—

“It may be satisfactory to you to know, that I do not think matters would have been much better if you had sent your large expedition to Spain instead of to the Scheldt.” (v. 86.)

The unfortunate termination of that expedition had created a strong feeling in this country, that the same expenditure of blood and treasure might have been better bestowed in augmenting Sir A. Wellesley's army. He gives his reasons for the opinion expressed above, and absolves the Ministers. And this is not confined to his official communications to them, for we find similar feelings in his private letters to Mr. Villiers. In January 1810 :—

“I do not mean to say that more troops would not be desirable ; but it must be obvious to you that the Government could not give more ; and we could neither feed nor pay more without increase of our pecuniary means, which all my communications forbid me to expect. Nor will I endeavour to shift from my own shoulders on to those of Ministers, who are not strong, the responsibility of failure, by calling for means which I know they cannot give.” (v. 413.)

It is true that the Government had difficulties to contend with, which were materially increased, if not created, by the tone of certain members of the House of Commons.

The British people, taken as a mass, are generally just and generous, and grateful when they have reason to believe that public services are honestly performed. But there is no denying that political violence frequently obscures this feeling ; and hostility to the reigning authorities and the party in power, causes a bitterness towards all who are employed under them.

Sir Arthur's early success upon his first landing

created, perhaps, an exaggerated feeling of triumph and exultation throughout all England ; and the interruption of that success, consequent upon his rapid supercession (arising from an unforeseen and unfortunate coincidence, in no degree reflecting blame either upon him or the Government at home), consummated by the disappointment of the nation at the Convention of Cintra, with which Sir Arthur's name as an executive officer was mixed up, caused a revulsion which was perhaps equally unreasonable. A few worthies in the House of Commons, and the learned and erudite members of the Common Council of London, were the persons who led the cry. The most rancorous hostility was displayed by persons who could have no personal feelings against him, who could not pretend from their professions or pursuits to any military knowledge which should justify them in pronouncing an opinion upon his fitness as a soldier ; but he was employed by a Government to which they were opposed, and therefore it was not inconsistent with their notions of honour and honesty to misrepresent him and his deeds, of which they really could know nothing.

But this was the fact : the embarrassments of the Government at home were greatly increased by the language and conduct of these men ; and nothing is more striking than the calm, firm, and temperate way in which Sir Arthur views it.

In one of his letters to Lord Liverpool he says :—

“ I assure you, that what has passed in Parliament respecting *me* has not given me *one moment's concern, as far as I am personally concerned* : it has given my friends an opportunity of setting the public right. But I regret that men like Lord —— and others should carry the spirit of party so far as to attack an officer in his absence, should take the ground of their attack

from 'Cobbett' and the 'Moniteur,' and should blame him for events over which he could have no control, and for faults which, if committed at all, were not committed by him." (v. 524.)

In a large army totally inexperienced in warlike operations upon a large scale, with officers of all ranks, who, if they had *ever* been *upon service*, could have seen little more than a flying, short-lived expedition (such as that to the Helder, &c.), it is not wonderful that there should have been many vain men who would be mortified at the exposure of their deficiencies, and therefore discontented with him under whom they were placed; and who would write home in terms of disapprobation of their commander. And it is not wonderful that there were many persons ready in this country to receive, to report, and to exaggerate every one of these crude representations, if it suited their own general tone of politics, and their own views, either in Parliament or in the columns of the press. Most of them could know nothing of military affairs: they sheltered themselves under the pretence of guarding *the finances* of the country. They predicted failure because they apparently wished it, and they nearly produced it by the daily impediments which they interposed. It was their hatred of "the Government" that influenced them; they felt that if they could thwart the military operations abroad, if they could stop the supplies requisite to carry them on, and if they could thereby create an impression in the public mind that the measures of that Government were impolitic, and that all the blood and treasure were fruitlessly thrown away, they should effect the object they had at heart.

An ingenious writer,* in defence of the conduct pursued by the Opposition of that day, has recently had

* "Edinburgh Review," July 1853, p. 218.

the candour to acknowledge this, and seems to consider that he offers sufficient grounds for it.

He says :—

“ We may be permitted to allude to the charge frequently brought against the Whigs for their marked opposition to the war carried on in Spain by the Duke, and their non-appreciation of his full worth.

“ We, in 1853, must remember, that half a century ago the great issue had joined upon the Peace or War question. The Tories in office knew failure to be the loss of place and power; while the Whigs, who really believed themselves to be better capable of governing for the interests of the country, thought a temporary reverse *not too dearly bought, if it put the helm into their hands.*”

And, with the utmost complacency, he goes on to say :—

“ If, in the life-and-death struggle, some *temporary injustice may have been done to the Duke*, how nobly has it been atoned for, when all differences merged into one national unanimity of respectful esteem and admiration!!!”

This fine piece of sentiment, translated into common language, would seem to imply, “ We did him all the mischief we could till we found it hopeless, and then we changed our tone.”

It may be very liberal, after a lapse of nearly half a century, “ *distinctly to disclaim,*” as this gentleman does, “ *the coarse diatribes of ‘ Cobbett,’ who re-echoed the lies of the ‘ Moniteur ;’* but they were most unscrupulously resorted to in those days, without exciting any such expression of virtuous indignation.

It was not, therefore, from the Government that he met with coldness or want of support. But we must acknowledge that it was from the Horse Guards, the

head of his own profession, where ancient customs and former habits still prevailed, and from whence he did not meet with the ready acquiescence or assistance that he thought he had a right to expect.

Pushed forward by his talents, which many of his official *political* colleagues were fully aware of, it cannot be concealed that his prominent position threw many of his *professional* contemporaries into the shade. This could not be said to apply to his military distinction in India. The nature of the service there is so essentially different, the number of officers of "the king's service" employed there is comparatively so small, that *his* pre-eminence was not likely to interfere with established customs, or to excite professional jealousy. But that service laid the foundation of his future fame, and pointed out an individual of comparatively junior rank, who in Europe must have undergone a much longer probation before he was likely to have been equally brought forward. The nature and extent of English military service was at that time almost entirely confined to limited, temporary, and fugitive expeditions, generally undertaken upon the spur of the moment, and, unfortunately, never leading to permanent benefit. A few thousand men were collected for a comparatively unimportant object, and generally returned after loss and discomfiture, in spite of the personal bravery and individual gallantry of those concerned. The habits and ideas, therefore, of those in authority were of a very limited nature. We do not impugn the good will, or the good intentions, of those who were at the head of the military profession; but in fact, up to that time, their knowledge and experience did not extend to service upon an *enlarged* scale.

The first expedition entrusted to Sir Arthur Wellesley was very much of the class above described. A sudden

and unexpected call from certain individuals in Spain, who were smarting under the usurpation of Napoleon, roused the feelings of this country. It was supposed that a few thousand men, with a few thousand spare stands of arms to distribute amongst "the patriots," as they were called, would be of service. The proposed expedition was very limited in extent, and was evidently ordered without any very definite idea of *where it was to go*, or *what it was to do*! Sir Arthur was known to be an active, intelligent officer, though not of high standing; and it did not appear derogatory to the rest of the profession, or an infringement of the rule or custom which on former occasions had placed even a prince of the blood in command, to entrust it to him.

It has been said, indeed (though we know not with what truth), that in a very early stage of the proceedings there were those who demurred to his appointment; and as the urgency of the Spaniards increased, and the feelings of this country responded, the moderate views which had placed a small force under the command of a not unknown, but junior officer, were extended; additional troops were ordered for the service, and senior officers were appointed to command them.

We shall not follow the military progress. We have merely adverted to the nature of the whole proceeding to show that Sir Arthur, in his subsequent position as the Commander-in-chief of the largest force ever embodied and sent out by Great Britain, was associated with, and acting under, persons of long-established habits, which did not readily accommodate themselves to his more enlarged views. And hence arose many difficulties, many obstacles, from the *Home* authorities, which it required more than ordinary equanimity to struggle with.

As the army increased in amount by the reinforcements sent out, and the distance from the point of debarkation increased by his advance towards the Spanish frontier, all the difficulties arising from total inexperience of service (and, perhaps, the erroneous nature of our military organisation) increased in an accumulated degree. It would not be fair to blame the Horse Guards for all these defects, which were now painfully brought to view nearly for the first time; but it is undeniable that the rules and customs of the Commander-in-chief's office at home were ill-calculated to abate the evil.

Sir Arthur writes a doleful letter to the Secretary of State, in June 1809, upon his advance towards Spain after the capture of Oporto. He points out most forcibly the total want of power in the hands of a commander to repress or to punish the outrages of which he complains; and he adds :—

“We all know that the discipline of armies must depend upon the diligence of regimental *officers*. I may order what I please : but if they do not execute what I order, I cannot expect that the *soldier* will be regular.

“There are two incitements to men of this description to make them do their duty as they ought : *fear of punishment*, and *hope of reward*.

“The first cannot be given *individually*, for these evils are committed by *whole corps*; and the only way they can be punished is by disgracing them. I may and shall do this to one or two, but I cannot venture to do it by more; and then there is an end to the fear of this punishment, even if those who received it were considered in England as disgraced persons rather than martyrs.” (iv. 406.)

This, perhaps, was attributable to the nature of our military law, which, as he says in the same letter, “is not strong enough to maintain discipline upon service.”

But the want of the alternative, viz. the *power of Reward*, was very much, if not altogether, attributable to the rules of our office and our officials.

“As to the other incitement to officers to do their duty zealously, there is no such thing. We who command have not the power of *rewarding*, or *promising a reward, for a single officer in the army*; and we deceive those who are placed under us, if we hold out to them that they shall derive advantage from the exertion of that power in their favour.

“You will say in answer to all this, that British armies have been in the field before, and that these complaints have not existed.”

This is exactly what we have already stated, that the rules of our office were founded upon old customs and habits inapplicable to the emergency of the times, and Sir Arthur reasons in the same way. He goes on to say :—

“I answer: first, that armies are larger, operations more extended, and the exertions required are greater; secondly, that our law, instead of being strong in proportion, has been weakened; and, finally, that it is only *within late years* that the Commanders-in-chief abroad have been *deprived of all patronage*, and, of course, of all power of incitement to the officers under their command.

“It may be supposed that I wish for the patronage to gratify my own favourites; but I declare most solemnly, that if I had it to-morrow there is not a soul in the army whom I should wish to promote, excepting for service performed.

“We are an excellent army on parade, an excellent one to fight; but take my own word for it, that either defeat or success would dissolve us.”

He seems to have had additional grounds of complaint; not only for being debarred (as we have seen) from conferring, by his own authority, reward for good service, but actually that, either from inadvertency or from a pertinacious determination to keep the authority

entirely in their own hands at home, men who had been sent to England in disgrace were sent out to him again.

In June, 1809, he writes home to the Military Secretary:—

“I enclose a letter received from Staff-surgeon —, not because I am apprehensive that the Commander-in-chief should listen to the reports of an inferior officer, to the prejudice of his superior; for if we are fit to be trusted, our characters are not to be injured by defamatory reports of this description: but there are not wanting in England channels for circulating defamation of this kind.

“Mr. Staff-surgeon — was sent home some time ago in consequence of a complaint against him, and because he is a person of a temper with which no one can agree. But, notwithstanding, he was *sent back here*; and considering that it was still desirable that he should not serve with the army in Portugal, I lately ordered that he should return to England with sick and wounded prisoners. This drew a remonstrance, to which I paid no attention, and then he commenced his inquiries into the conduct of his superior officer.

“I shall be obliged to the Commander-in-chief if he will prevent his being sent back to Portugal.” (iv. 424.)

The question of *Rank*, of officers serving in the Portuguese army, had been a source of much embarrassment from a very early period.

With a view to the formation of an *efficient* Portuguese army, deficient as that nation was in the class of persons suitable for *officers*, it was proposed to introduce British officers. As an inducement to gentlemen to accept the duty, it was agreed to give one step of British rank, to remain permanent when the foreign service might terminate, and again one step in advance in Portuguese rank during the continuance in that service.

This led to much inconvenience when the two armies were *acting* together. A junior British ensign received

his lieutenancy for going into the Portuguese service, in which he was then made a captain, and thus became senior to *all* British lieutenants. In the commencement, when the numbers were comparatively limited, this was not much felt, but it afterwards became very embarrassing. Sir Arthur had many communications with the home authorities, and made various suggestions with a view to remedy the evil. He was very long before he could obtain *any* decision, which at last was against the view which he had taken.

In a letter to Lord Castlereagh he says :—

“My opinion always has been, that the mode of applying the services of British officers has been erroneous : many (*all* in the inferior ranks) are useless. Besides, the selection of those sent out has been unlucky ; and the decision on the question I sent home has been made without reference to circumstances, or to the feelings or opinions of the individuals on whom it was to operate, and just like every other decision I have ever seen *from the same quarter*, as if men were stocks and stones.” (v. 87.)

Some months after this, to show the practical inconvenience of the working of this mode of transacting business, we have a letter to Marshal Beresford :—

“I never know to what regiment the Horse Guards will appoint an officer whom I recommend for a commission ; and I am, therefore, unwilling to send Mr. Dunlop to any particular regiment, lest he should not be posted to it.” (v. 306.)

With the peculiar delicacy that marked all Sir Arthur's communications, avoiding, in a marked manner, all personal allusions, we have no present means of knowing to whom reference is made in the following letter to Lord Liverpool ; but it indicates pretty clearly that he had not implicit confidence in the discretion or discrimination of those upon whom the selection depended :—

“I wrote to you the other day about general officers. I

only beg you not to send me any violent *party men*. We must keep the spirit of party out of the army, or we shall be in a bad way, indeed." (v. 393.)

There is no doubt that the enormous expenses of the war, including the immense advances of money, arms, and stores of every kind sent to the Allies, imposed very heavy duties upon the Government. It would be too much to say that they were inert or sluggish; they had their difficulties to contend with in Parliament and elsewhere: but, unquestionably, what might appear to be merely official routine, and the usual course of transacting business *at home*, created fearful anxiety, and caused the greatest inconvenience to those who were *abroad*, and who were entirely dependent upon England for *everything*!

Writing home to Lord Liverpool on the 15th January, 1810, Sir Arthur says:—

"We have received no intelligence of *any* kind from England since the 20th of last month. It would be very desirable if the packets were dispatched regularly, even though the Ministers should not write. The newspapers contain intelligence which it is desirable we should have.

"It would, also, be very desirable if an *early answer* were sent to our requisitions for supplies, stating *only* whether they would be complied with in the whole, or to what extent, and in what probable period. If we cannot have them we should know it, in order to make other arrangements, and narrow our system in proportion to the deficiency of our means in time." (v. 434.)

It really seems an extraordinary thing, that in executing the duties of a great empire like Great Britain, it should be necessary to impose upon the commander of its largest army the duty, in detail, of applying to the Secretary of State, and a member of the cabinet, upon the subject of how the soldiers were *to cook their dinners*. The subject did not come within the ordinary scope of

the Secretary of State's arrangements, but it had been properly referred to the proper office, that of the Commander-in-chief, and not acted upon: and reference to Lord Liverpool seemed to be Sir Arthur's only chance of getting a decision.

"I enclose a copy of a letter which I wrote many months ago [28th September, 1809—this letter being dated, 14th March, 1810] to the Commander-in-chief, and *no answer has yet been returned!*

"The inconveniences of this delay in giving an answer are daily increasing, and will be most severely felt by the troops, if they should be engaged with the enemy before arrangements are made for providing for the carriage of their *camp-kettles*, *discussed in that letter.*

"I beg only to mention, that *the soldiers cannot cook their food unless they have camp-kettles!*"

The solemn sarcasm in this last sentence, announcing an important truth to the Secretary of State, is invaluable, as showing the way in which business was done in those days in the office where such matters ought to be arranged.

The Government itself was in a very precarious condition soon after this time; and no doubt the firmness of his rulers, which would have tended greatly to maintain and encourage Lord Wellington in his trying position, was much wanting. He evidently felt it, for we find him writing to Admiral Berkeley in April,—

"The Government are terribly afraid that I shall get them and myself into a scrape. But what can be expected from men who are beaten in the House of Commons three times a-week? A great deal might be done now if there existed in England less party and more public sentiment, and if there was *any* Government." (vi. 21.)

The restricted power in his hands of rewarding those whom he might think deserving pressed upon him with increased force, as the exigencies of service, and the necessity for stimulating individual exertions, or rewarding individual merit, increased.

In a letter to the Military Secretary of the Commander-in-chief in August, 1810, after again urging the claim for promotion for different officers, he again adverts to the condition in which a commander of the forces on service was placed; with, at the same time, the same noble, disinterested statement of his own views, that we have seen on former occasions:—

“I am tempted to communicate my opinion upon the disposal of the patronage of the troops on foreign service. In all services excepting that of Great Britain (and in that in former times), the commander of an army employed against the enemy in the field had the power of promoting officers, at least to vacancies occasioned *by* the service.

“It was pretty nearly the case formerly in our own service, and I believe the greater number of the general officers of the higher ranks of the present day were made lieutenant-colonels by Sir William Howe, Sir Henry Clinton, Lord Cornwallis, &c. But how is it now? I, who command the largest army that has been employed against the enemy for many years, *have not even the power of making a corporal!*

“It is not known to the army and to strangers, and I am almost ashamed to acknowledge the small degree (I ought to say nullity) of power of reward which belongs to my situation.

“I do not entertain these opinions because there are any officers attached to me for whom I desire promotion. All my aides-de-camp have been promoted in their turn in their regiments, or are to be promoted for carrying home the account of victories. The consequence of the change of system to me, would be only to give me the power of rewarding the services of those who exerted themselves zealously.

“I have been induced to communicate these opinions from

a strong conviction of their truth, and not, I assure you, from any interest I feel in the result. *I would not give one pin to have the disposal of every commission in the army.*" (vi. 304.)

The irregularity of the arrangements respecting the sailing of the packets, both to and from England, was very great. We have already recorded his sense of the inconvenience of their not coming at fixed periods *from England* (p. 83), and we find that he suffered equally by the uncertainty of their being sent from *Lisbon*.

It arose, probably, from some considerations of economy at home, which, in the momentous condition of the Peninsula at that time, would seem to be misplaced.

"I am concerned to hear that the rule respecting the packets cannot be adhered to. It is most convenient to the army and to my public business, and I acknowledge that I do not see the necessity of breaking through a rule to send off a packet every Sunday, if there should be one in the Tagus.

"However," (he adds, with his usual willingness to submit to any personal inconvenience, and to make the best of it,) "*it is no business of mine, and I shall accommodate myself to any plan that may be adopted.*" (v. 295.)

It would have appeared most natural that the British officers employed with the Spanish armies, not as *Spanish* officers, but for the purpose of transmitting correct intelligence, upon which the British movements must be essentially dependent, should have been placed *under the control* of the Commander-in-chief of the British army, who would, in fact, be the surest and best medium of communication with the Government at home, as he would be in possession of information from all points. But the same spirit which pervaded every arrangement was equally shown in this; and those officers had been

made independent of him. He writes to Lord Liverpool:—

“Having observed a considerable difference in the reports transmitted of recent events in Castille, I have the honour to enclose a correspondence which I have had with Colonel Carroll.

“Although I have *no longer any control* over the officers thus employed to report the operations of the Spanish armies, I trust that my interference in the affair will be approved of; as it must be of the first importance to His Majesty that the information furnished to his Government, and his servants, and officers in the Peninsula, should be accurately correct.” (v. 402.)

He uses the expression of *no longer* having any control over these officers; but it does not appear from any former part of his correspondence that they had been *withdrawn* from him. It may have been so; but it is probable that, in the earlier stages, the persons so appointed had been officers connected with his own army, and employed under *his* orders to act with the Spaniards. As the service continued, it is probable that officers were sent out from home, under specific appointments from the Horse Guards or the Secretary of State, and were thus independent of *him*.

The custom of confining all promotion to the authorities at home was still adhered to; and we are not surprised to read the following almost indignant remonstrance from one who was smarting under the restriction.

He had expressed the same feelings before, and pointed out how injurious it was to the service at large, but no attention was paid to his suggestions; and it is only wonderful that any man under such overpowering circumstances, and who must have been aware, even with all the native modesty of his character, how really

important he was, should have been found who did not resent the treatment or quit the service :—

“ I enclose a letter which has been received by the Commissary-general, upon which I have only to observe, that if it is the desire of the Government to carry on extensive military operations, they must leave some power of reward for zeal, intelligence, activity, and ability, in the power of those who are to stimulate their inferiors ; and if the system proposed in the enclosed letter is to be adopted, it would be better that the heads of departments in England should take upon themselves the detailed management of concerns here, and make themselves responsible for them.

“ I cannot avoid drawing your Lordship’s attention to the mode of promoting, not only commissaries, but the officers of the army.

“ With the largest concern to manage that has lately [he might have said, *ever*] been entrusted to any officer in the British army, and with the heaviest responsibility that ever was placed upon any, *I have not the power* of promoting a man of *any rank or description whatever* ; and the trial will certainly have been made in my person (whether with success or not still remains to be ascertained), with how small a proportion of the power of reward, an officer in command of an army can carry on the service.

“ I assure your Lordship that I have no desire to possess the power of promoting officers of the Commissariat (which it is the design of the enclosed letter to retain in the hands of the Commissary-in-chief), or that of promoting officers of the army. I am not acquainted even with their names or their persons, excepting in the service ; and excepting to reward their services, or to stimulate their exertions, it must be a matter of indifference to me whether they are promoted or not.” (vi. 389.)

He had written to Colonel Torrens, the Military Secretary of the Commander-in-chief, repeating and strongly urging certain promotions, and expressing some surprise that the officers alluded to had not been noticed,

and adding his own observations upon the principles which seemed to regulate promotions.

This seems to have given umbrage, for in a letter soon after he says :—

“ I observe from some expressions in your letter of the 28th August, and the general tenor of your observations, that I trod upon tender ground. The sooner I quit it, therefore, the better. When I wrote to you, I had no intention of making any invidious statement of the advantages which any set of individuals had derived from the system of promotion which had been adopted. I adverted to what is generally understood in the army ; and as I purpose to drop the subject entirely, about the result of which *I do not care a pin*, I shall not enter into any proof of my statement.” (vi. 417.)

In another letter to Colonel Torrens he says :—

“ Let us drop the subject of army promotions altogether, for I assure you I feel no interest in it excepting with a view to the public good ; in which I may be mistaken. My opinions went against the system, not against the mode of carrying it on.

“ I am much obliged to you for relieving me of Major-general —— and Colonel —— . I have no public objection to make to the former, but he has been guilty of many little improprieties, which render him a discreditable person with the army ; and Major-general —— , who commands the division, had urged his removal so strenuously, that I had determined to send him word that he had my leave to quit the army.

“ Sir David Dundas will be the best judge whether this will be sufficient authority to hold the language which he proposes to hold to him. In these times I should prefer avoiding to employ him, and give no reason ; and I should have acted accordingly.” (vi. 458.)

In a letter to Colonel Gordon, Commissary-in-chief, Lord Wellington says :—

“ It may be very proper to frame rules for a department, and to conduct a department according to the rules : but that is not

the mode in which the service can be carried on; and if the attempt is persevered in, the army will be lost on some fine day, on account of the total incapacity of the officers.

"I may be wrong, but I have objections to all those rules which prevent the promotion of officers of merit. There is no power of rewarding extraordinary services or merit; and under circumstances which require unwearied exertion, we appear to be framing regulations to prevent ourselves from commanding it, by the only stimulus, honourable reward by promotion!

"These are my decided opinions. They go to the *principle* of our proceedings, and not to any particular case. I wish to know whether, in any service in the world, a man has been ever placed at the head of such a concern as I am now conducting, without having the power of selecting the person to fill such office? An *assistant* commissary is found the most capable in the whole department, and *he* cannot be made a *deputy* commissary because he has not served five years, and there are other assistants senior to him; who, though very good men, and able to do the duty of *assistant*, are not equal to the duty for which Mr. Ogilvie was selected, notwithstanding that there were many *deputy* commissaries with the army!!!

"I hope the gentlemen in London will be so kind as to be responsible for all that passes here, and bear all the abuse, misrepresentation, &c. &c., which he must make up his mind to who is honoured with the command of the British troops on foreign service." (vi. 566.)

The Board at home appear again to have had some objection to the course which had been pursued with the army, of appointing persons to act with the Commissariat. Lord Wellington indignantly writes:—

"I hope that I have not been induced (in the confidence that the King's Ministers would approve of my measures) to make temporary appointments, *required for the service*, of gentlemen, to whom *anybody* in London can by *his orders* prevent their salaries being paid. If this is the case, I am sincerely desirous that the Government would consider of the appointment of some other officer to conduct their concerns in this country,

as I am utterly *incapable* of managing them *if I am to be treated in such a manner.*" (vii. 262.)

The obstacles and impediments thrown in his way by the *military authorities*, the head of his profession, founded upon old rules and customs, and maintained in great measure for the gratification of personal power at home, were galling enough. But here was a department, (certainly most necessary, and indeed indispensable to the military branch, but) which was composed entirely of *civilians*; and though the head of it in England, at the moment we are treating of, was a military man (Colonel Gordon), it was essentially a *civil* department.

When Lord Wellington took the field, it is not too much to say, that there was hardly a commissary who knew or could execute the duties required *on service*. In a part of the letter from which we have quoted above, Lord Wellington says,—

"The only duty they learn in England is the superintendence of deliveries by a contractor, and comparing the accounts with the vouchers."

And yet this was the office setting up its narrow-minded rules against the only man who had ever seen service upon an extended scale; and whose knowledge was founded upon actual experience. For, though it is true that Lord Wellington's European fame was comparatively recent, he had served his apprenticeship with respect to *feeding his army* in a country where the number of mouths to be fed exceeded by many thousands those under his present command. His actual *soldiers* in India might not exceed his Peninsular army in numbers; but the habits of that country and that service, required that the camp-followers must live, and

the head which provided for the one had also to provide for the other.

From motives of economy at home, an order had been sent out forbidding the sending home any more prisoners; founded, in all probability, upon the assumption, that as they were taken in the Portuguese cause they were to be deemed Portuguese prisoners, but leaving out of consideration that the Portuguese had not means of bestowing them, or securing them:—

“I have received your Lordship’s letter respecting the French prisoners in this country, and the directions will, of course, be attended to; but I am apprehensive that we shall experience much inconvenience in having so many prisoners to take care of, at the same time that we have other important objects to attend to.

“It is in vain to expect any assistance from the Portuguese Government to provide for the removal of these prisoners, or for the care of them at Lisbon, or in any distant part of the world. That, *as well as everything else, must fall upon me*; and I must take the best care of them I can.” (vii. 105.)

The difficulties arising out of the relative rank of officers in the British and Portuguese services was still a source of much embarrassment. Lord Wellington had made urgent applications to have general officers sent out to him, and the following letter shows that though the Horse Guards must have been as well aware of the circumstances, and might have seen, without the necessity of his pointing it out, that objections might be urged against some whom they seem to have selected, they did not do so, but left the labour, and threw the odium, if such should arise, upon him:—

“I have received your letter regarding the generals who are to come. In respect to General Murray, I think him a very

able officer ; and there is no man whose assistance I should have been more desirous of retaining than his, *except in this country*. He is senior to Marshal Beresford, and *left us* on a question arising out of that seniority. I have hitherto gone on perfectly well, without having to decide one question of rank between the services.

“ I attribute this as well to the temper of the army as to my own management ; but if a general comes here who appeared, when he was here before, disposed not to avoid those questions, but to bring them into discussion unnecessarily, the difficulties of managing this intricate machine will be vastly increased. I would, therefore, prefer to pass *sub silentio* his desire to be employed.

“ General H. Clinton is also a very able officer, who would be very useful ; but why is a man to volunteer his services in a situation where he does not approve of what is going on ? I have men enough of this description here already.” (vii. 237.)

There still remained the original wish on the part of the office at the Horse Guards to retain the power over regiments in their own hands ; and orders were given by the Commander-in-chief that certain regiments should be sent home.

Lord Wellington writes to the Secretary of State, in Sept. 1811, saying :—

“ I have received orders from the Duke of York to send *regiments* home, &c. &c., upon which I should wish to be informed what is the practice of the service. If H. R. Highness directs me to draft two battalions into one, there is no material diminution of force here ; but he has lately directed me to send home *three regiments*, which would make a diminution of about 600 rank and file, which becomes a little important.

“ I do not know whether I am right or wrong, but I consider *you responsible for the force I have here* ; and although I should be sorry to be the cause of any unpleasant explanation on a subject of this kind, I think it right to inform you that I have received these orders, and that I consider that I must obey

them : but if it should be possible, it is desirable that you should come to an understanding with H. R. H. regarding the recall of troops from this country." (viii. 266.)

"Your Lordship and His Royal Highness are the best judges of what description of troops it is expedient that this army should be composed. I beg leave, however, to submit, that some of the best and most experienced soldiers, the most healthy and capable of bearing fatigue, are in the 2d battalions ; many of which are much more efficient, and have always more men for duty in proportion to their gross number, and fewer sick, than any of the 1st battalions recently arrived, which had been at Walcheren ; and it is certain that this army will not be so strong by the exchange of new for old soldiers.

"I have thought it proper to submit this matter, assuring you at the same time that it is entirely indifferent to me ; and that whatever *orders I receive* upon the subject will be *immediately obeyed*." (ix. 52.)

And in a subsequent letter he says :—

"I would strongly recommend you to try to prevail upon the Duke of York to order, that whenever a battalion (which has no second or first battalion at home) should fall below 350 men, these *men* should be formed into four companies ; and *the officers* and *non-commissioned officers* of six companies should be sent home to receive and form drafts. These will answer all the purposes of a second battalion.

"Two battalions so reduced, might with advantage be formed into one, upon service, till the six companies of each sent to England to be filled up, should return." (xi. 180.)

The Secretary of State was the medium of communication with the home authorities ; and if the nobleman filling that office had issued these orders, it might not have been so astonishing. A man might be an excellent minister, and an able member of a cabinet, without being a practical soldier ; and the idea of maintaining official regularity, or any other reason, might have appeared sufficient to *him* to order home second bat-

talions, weakened as they no doubt were by service : but the authorities from whom these orders *did* come *were* soldiers ; and it would not have appeared necessary to require a suggestion from the commander abroad to convince *them* that a *seasoned* man was of more value than a *new* one. But we suppose that the rules of office hampered the authorities at home, and certainly crippled those abroad.

Some rules of the same stringent nature, emanating from home, called for remonstrance six months later. Invalids were ordered not to be sent home till *their accounts were settled*.

“ In truth, my dear Torrens, the difficulties we labour under are but little known in England. How is it possible for any officer to come to a settlement, by a correspondence, with one who has to settle the accounts of probably 500 men going to England at the same moment ? It is quite impossible ! And the consequence is, that the poor men are detained three, four, or five months, to the loss of many, till the correspondence respecting their accounts is finished.

“ If a soldier makes a claim at Lisbon, the officer who has to settle the claims before they go to England must detain as many as one transport will contain, till the claims of one shall be inquired into by post ; every letter now requiring three weeks to get an answer.

“ I am convinced that it is impossible to attain H. R. H.’s object in this country without detaining men three or four months after the necessity of their going to England is pronounced.” (ix. 423.)

A letter to the Duke of York himself, proves that there was a very rigid adherence to *form* in that office. It might be very necessary, but no doubt it must at times have thrown much additional labour upon one who was already almost overburthened, like Lord Wellington. But his patient, enduring disposition, and

his strict sense of obedience to orders, shows itself as usual :—

“In regard to the subjects referred to in Y. R. H.’s letter, one of them was suggested to me by Colonel Gordon, who was my Quarter-master-general; and knowing that he possessed your confidence, and was in the habit of communication with the heads of departments at the Horse Guards, I consented to his writing to England on those subjects.

“It did not occur to me that they were *official* communications, and I allowed him to make them because he had suggested what was proposed, and appeared to understand the arrangements; and because I believed that he was in the habit of writing to your Royal Highness.

“I am aware that the staff-officers of the army are attached to me to communicate with my inferiors, but not to carry on my communications with my *superiors*; and, therefore, I should not have allowed Colonel Gordon to write, even upon the subjects referred to, if I had considered what he was writing at all of a nature of an official communication.” (ix. 488.)

We do not learn from anything in the Dispatches what were the subjects alluded to; but Lord Wellington accounts for what he acknowledges to be an infringement of *official* rules, so simply and so naturally, that it is difficult to divest one’s self of regret that it should have appeared necessary to the Commander-in-chief to take official notice of it.

In a letter soon after to the Military Secretary, Colonel Torrens, he states the difficulties to which he is subjected by the change of officers, which (though, perhaps, not entirely) were dependent, in great measure, upon the arrangements at home :—

“I have frequently mentioned the inconvenience from the constant change of officers in every important department, or filling every situation of rank or responsibility here. No man can be aware of the extent of this inconvenience, and the labour which these constant changes occasions is of a most distressing

description. No sooner is an arrangement made, the order given, and the whole in train, than a gentleman comes out, who has probably *but little knowledge* of the practical part of his duty in *any* country, and *none whatever in this* most difficult of all. Nobody in the British army ever reads an order or a regulation in any manner but as an amusing novel, and the consequence is, that when complicated arrangements are to be carried into execution, every gentleman proceeds according to his own fancy ; and then, when the arrangement fails (as it must if the order is not strictly obeyed), they come upon me to set matters to rights ; and thus my labour is increased tenfold." (ix. 602.)

He had occasion to write upon the same subject soon after :—

"It is no encouragement to those who are performing their duty in this country to see, that when they have attracted the notice of the officers under whom they are serving, and have been recommended for promotion, others are preferred who have *quitted the arduous* service, probably to solicit from the Medical Board the promotion these have deserved.

"I have frequently made you acquainted with the inconvenience felt by the constant change of the officers employed in every branch. One of the principal causes of these changes is the practice of *going to England to apply for promotion*, which ought to be acquired *by service here* : and I do not see the utility of my forwarding recommendations of the heads of departments of those officers whom they deem deserving of promotion, if to those recommendations are to be preferred the claims and applications of those who *quit the service to go home to make them*." (ix. 625.)

"I have proofs that every promotion by the Medical Board is a matter of application and intrigue. I shall send home papers which I have received from ———, in regard to his promotion ; in which you will see, that this gentleman was excited by * * * to *prevail upon Sir Thomas Graham, to prevail upon me*, to recommend him for a situation which * * * *did not think he ought to fill*, and to which he *refused to appoint him*. What is all this but intrigue and attention to private applications, instead of claims grounded upon public services ? Then can it be

supposed that I can be the victim of these doings without complaining? What interest can I have in these concerns, or what have I to say to any of these Medical Officers?" (x. 72.)

The question about sending home men, or drafting horses, upon orders received from the Horse Guards, was one which gave infinite trouble. It is impossible to say here what were the reasons at the office at home; but Lord Wellington did not conceive them to be applicable to the army abroad. There are many letters filled with details which it would be needless to recapitulate here; but it must be owned that his reasons against the orders are very substantial, at the same time that he says,—*"Give me orders and they shall be obeyed."* The following phrases occur in various places:—

"I prefer having one officer or soldier who has served one or two campaigns, to having two or three who have not; and I should be very unwilling to part with the officers of the 2d Hussars (German Legion).

"I wish the Secretary of State and the Commander-in-chief would send me *positive orders*. What they *order*, shall be *obeyed*, *coûte qui coûte*: but if they leave matters to my judgment, I shall never do anything which, in my judgment, may be prejudicial to the service here." (x. 75.)

"His Royal Highness and I, unfortunately, take a very different view: he, one referable to the whole army and the general service; I, to the particular service under my charge. H. R. H. must be right; but I wish that, being so, he would *give me a positive order*. He may depend upon it, *it shall be obeyed*; but when he conveys *wishes* and *suggestions*, and leaves it to *my discretion*, he must excuse me if I take my own view of the case.

"New soldiers not only do no service, but by filling the hospitals they are a burthen to us. For these reasons I am so unwilling to part with *the men* whom I have formed into provisional battalions, and I never will part with them as long as it is left to my discretion.

“The second battalions, some of which have now been four years in this army, are the best troops we have, and will render good service in the next campaign in the way that I have organised them. It could not be expected that I should send away nearly 2000 of these soldiers at a moment when every man is an object. But *let the orders* that they shall be sent *come*, and they *shall be obeyed with alacrity*; and you *shall hear no complaints*.

“The same is the case in regard to the cavalry; indeed stronger; and if I were now to choose, I should prefer by far to give the horses of the fine regiments of English hussars to the old regiments here, and keep the officers and soldiers of the latter.” (x. 76.)

“I am one of those who are incredulous respecting the difficulty of procuring horses in England. One thousand horses for the cavalry in this last winter would have given the army the service of three, if not four, regiments; from which, *by orders from the Horse Guards*, I have been obliged to draught their horses, very much against their will. Surely horses of five and six years old cannot be wanting in England!” (x. 175.)

“I do not mean to complain of the Duke of York’s decision to take from us four regiments of cavalry, but a remount of 700 horses at the end of last campaign, and permission to take 100 from each of the English hussars (which they would have been better without), would have given us now 1200 additional cavalry, would have enabled me to keep that number in reserve towards the close of the campaign, when a great effort will be made by the enemy; and all the dissatisfaction would have been avoided which has been the consequence of the drafting the horses from those regiments.” (x. 400.)

In a letter to the Duke of York himself, who had written to him in reference to some of the objections which we have quoted respecting the drafting or sending home battalions, we find that the question was still undecided as late as Dec. 1813, and that the Duke was apparently very reluctant to abide by Lord Wellington’s recommendations:—

"I had the honour of receiving Y. R. H.'s letter in regard to certain opinions regarding the weak battalions of this army. I assure Y. R. H. that I am perfectly ready to adopt any measure. It is a matter of perfect indifference to me personally whether the army is strong or weak; or whether I am to carry on operations in France, Spain, or Portugal; but I hope Y. R. H. will consider that if the public interests require that I should do so during the winter, it is expedient that the *veteran* soldiers should remain with the army. I certainly did not consider Y. R. H.'s letters to be *an order* to send back to England all these battalions; nor do I consider that they have been so understood by H. M.'s Government; and the correspondence on the subject shows they were not so considered by the Secretary of State. However, Y. R. H.'s *orders* shall be obeyed, as soon as I know *positively* what your wishes are; and I now beg to have Y. R. H.'s *orders* whether to draft these battalions or not, and under what regulations and restrictions; and whether to send them home or not, either after drafting them, or leaving in them their men." (xi. 372.)

In writing at the same time to Lord Bathurst, he says:—

"I enclose a letter from the Commander-in-chief on the subject of sending home three battalions of British infantry. I cannot pretend to hold the post I have taken, if there is any material diminution of our force. It is indifferent to me whether I carry on the war in France, Spain, or Portugal; and I only beg that I may not be expected to diminish the force under my command till I have *distinct orders* to do so."

Whether he ever did receive *distinct orders*, we do not learn. The whole management of the affair must strike a dispassionate observer at this remote period as singular. The measure had been in agitation since the early part of Sept. 1811 (p. 93), when we first read Lord Wellington's objections. The Commander-in-chief retained his opinion up to the middle of Dec. 1813, as we have just seen. Lord Wellington says, throughout

all his correspondence, "*Give me orders!*" and yet no *orders* are given!

If the Commander-in-chief was convinced of the propriety of his own arrangements, he might have enforced them by a word; if his Royal Highness felt the weight of Lord Wellington's arguments, he would have relieved the mind of the latter by abandoning the project, and the army would have been benefitted by adopting the plan suggested of consolidating two weak battalions, as in p. 94.

Most of these remonstrances to the powers at home of one branch of the service were before he moved, and with reference to the means and efficiency of the *army* itself; but the parts of Spain to which his efforts were soon directed were connected with the coast, and involved a connexion with the navy, for the protection of his communication by sea. He had written to the naval commanders, stating his wants and wishes; but, unfortunately, the regulations of the service under the home authorities divided their commands; and however willing or able either of them might be, his authority only extended to a certain point, and he could give no *orders* to the officer in command beyond it.

Lord Wellington had adverted to this difficulty in letters to the Government before, but apparently without effect, as we find by a letter to Mr. Stuart at Lisbon, in which he says:—

"It will be very inconvenient, and increase the difficulties of my situation very much, if the communication by sea along the coasts of Portugal and Galicia should not be secure. I had written to ——— on the subject, and have received an answer which proves that, in our country, it is better to suffer any

public inconvenience than to venture to suggest a measure as a remedy which is to be carried into execution by another public department. In future, therefore, I shall complain of inconveniences when they are severely felt, and *shall not trouble Government with suggestions of remedies or preventatives.*" (ix. 456.)

Writing to the Secretary of State, he makes frequent and repeated remonstrances about maritime co-operation : —

"I am afraid you will think me very troublesome about our want of ships of war on these coasts.

"I am certain it will not be denied, that since Great Britain has been a naval power, a British army has never been left in such a situation, and that at a moment when it is most important to us to preserve, and to the enemy to interrupt the communication by the coast. If they only take *the ship with our shoes*, we must *halt for six weeks* !

"I hope it will not be deemed unreasonable to request to have the navigation of the coast secured for me, without which you must not expect success." (x. 522.)

"The supplies of all kinds from Lisbon and Coruña are delayed for want of convoy ; the blockade of San Sebastian is not kept at all, and the enemy have introduced supplies of different kinds.

"In the attack of a maritime place, some assistance has generally been received from the navy ; but the soldiers are obliged to work in the transports to unload the vessels, because no seamen can be furnished.

"I have never been in the habit of troubling Government with requisitions for force, but have carried on the service to the best of my ability with what was placed at my disposal ; and if the navy of Great Britain cannot afford more than *one frigate* and a *few brigs and cutters*, I must be satisfied, and do the best I can : but I hope you will let me know positively whether I am or not to have further naval means." (xi. 17.)

"I complain of an actual want of naval assistance. I know nothing about the cause of the evil ; I state the fact, which

nobody will deny, and leave it to Government to apply the remedy or not as they may think proper. I assure you that there is not an hour in the day in which some statement does not come before me of the inconvenience resulting from the want of naval means; and even while writing this letter, the Commissary-general has been here to complain that his empty provision-ships are detained at Santander for *want of convoy*." (xi. 118.)

"It is very desirable that some arrangement should be fixed and made known, under which officers will be able to get from England those equipments which they want. We can get nothing in these countries; and those who have been here as long as I have, feel very uncomfortable for the want of a variety of articles which they can only get from England.

"I cannot understand why the rule regarding the packets should have been made more strict lately; and I know that I, among others, am suffering from it, not having even a second saddle." (xi. 123.)

"It appears to be the opinion of Admiral Lord Keith that there is a want of regularity and system in the application for convoys: which opinion his lordship states to be confirmed by his experience of similar want of regularity in former joint services of navy and army in which his lordship had been employed. I wish his lordship had stated his reasons for believing that there was irregularity (independent of his *suspensions*, founded on experience of former services). I believe there is a great difference between the service in this country and those on which he has heretofore been employed with the army. This is no *joint service*. All that is required is to give convoy to the supplies for the army coming from England and elsewhere, and to convoy back the empty transports.

"That which an army wants does not always require *many* ships to carry; for instance, the *great coats* were ordered round early in *August*, and are *now* (Nov. 1) in *one ship* at Oporto, *waiting for convoy*. All the stores wanted at particular seasons, such as at this moment *tents*, are supplied in general by one, or at most, two ships.

"I beg once more to impress the absolute necessity that we

should have the maritime communication constant and secure, if it is intended that I should maintain a large army on this frontier; and it is obvious that stinted naval means will not answer." (xi. 239.)

It may be quite true that the exigencies of the service in all parts of the world rendered the task of the Admiralty in making arrangements to meet them a very difficult one. But the present difficulty, which is so repeatedly and forcibly urged, would have required *little* (indeed it may fairly be said, *no*) *additional* force; a better distribution of what was already there, or some modification of the technical etiquette of the service, would have done everything.

Here again, as we have pointed out before in reference to other departments, the *old existing rules of office* were the obstacle. The north coast of Spain and the west coast of Portugal were *two separate naval commands!* A ship sent from Lisbon or Oporto was under the orders of one commander; when she reached Coruña she came under another. Whether more could have been done by any better system or arrangement between these naval commanders it is not now easy to pronounce, but hence arose the evils and delays complained of.

This does appear to be an inconvenience of a nature which *might* have been remedied by the authorities *at home*, if they had thought fit; but it remained to the last!

Many of these obstacles and impediments might, perhaps, have been unavoidable; but it is clear that Lord Wellington suffered much under the weight of them. They are not adduced here with a view to animadvert upon the rules or habits of the service, or to insinuate that there was any reluctance to act for the

best ; but we lay them before the reader to prove, what we set out with stating, that he had an extraordinary power of submitting with patience to what he could not avert or amend.

“ *Give me orders and they shall be obeyed !*” was his maxim and his practice, at whatever cost to his own private convictions.

FOREIGN ANNOYANCES.

IN the commencement of our remarks upon the subject of annoyances, we divided them under two heads, Home and Foreign. The former have furnished so very extensive a field, and one so much more prolific in proofs of what he had to submit to than we had anticipated, that we have thought it better to collect the remarks upon his foreign impediments under a separate head.

In the very early stage of his connexion with the Portuguese Government he had no special ground of complaint. We find one letter, in consequence of the refusal of General Freire, commanding the Portuguese army, to co-operate with him in his first advance ; but that was merely the act of an individual :—

“ I have written to General Freire : as to his plan of operations, I do not see what purpose it is to answer ; and I certainly can never give my sanction to anything so useless, and so crudely digested, so far as even to promise to communicate with or aid the person who is carrying it into execution.

“ I shall execute the orders which I have received from my Government without the assistance of the Portuguese ; and General Freire will have to justify himself with his prince and the world for having declined to stand forward upon this interesting occasion, and for having refused to send me the assistance which it is in his power to give.” (iv. 72.)

It will be almost impossible to separate the Portuguese from the Spanish grievances. They proceeded, certainly,

from totally different parties, and influenced possibly by very different motives ; but they often arose at the very same time, and were injurious to the operations in which he was engaged, whether he were on one side of the frontier or the other.

The Spanish difficulties were generally more of a *military* nature, arising from the ignorance, the caprice, or vanity and incapacity of their officers,—not unaccompanied by the most gross falsehood in almost every statement respecting their own force, or their promises of supplies to the British, and the most infamous failure in fulfilling any one of them.

The Portuguese were different, but equally embarrassing. The neglect was universal, from the highest officer of state to the lowest *juiz da fora*. Every promise was violated—every suggestion was disregarded ; the means of carrying up stores and food to his army were in many cases so scandalously neglected, as nearly to reduce them to starvation ; the means of removing his wounded were not provided ; and yet, so great was his regard for constituted authority in the territories of an *ally*, that he never attempted to rectify the abuses by the physical power which he had in his own hands, but invariably confined himself to remonstrance, passing through the minister of his own country.

The Government, during the absence of the Prince Regent in the Brazils, was in the hands of a Council of Regency ; many of whom, no doubt, were persons more actuated by views of personal interest or importance than by any more patriotic motive.

Sir Arthur very early became conscious of the total incapacity (to say nothing worse) of many of them ; but, however desirable he might have felt it to recommend,

or even to force a change, by putting out or substituting any member, he recommended the British Minister at Lisbon not to shake their authority, which depended upon the soundness of their appointment from the Brazils.

After his successful expedition against Soult at Oporto, he moved to the frontier of Spain, with the intention of co-operating with Cuesta. Even at that early period his grounds of complaint began, and from the very first place where he halted after crossing the frontier he writes to Mr. Villiers at Lisbon :—

“I shall be obliged to you to mention to the Government the great inconvenience which the army has felt ever since its arrival in Portugal, for the want of the assistance of the civil government to procure the supplies it has required, particularly of carriages and mules. For the latter I have written to you, I believe, not less than ten letters : but they have not yet assisted the British army with *one* ; and the magistrates of the country have rather prevented than aided us in procuring carts.” (iv. 472.)

Previous to his advance into Spain he had a foretaste of the people whom he was going to assist. He tells Mr. Frere,—

“I can only say, that the obstinacy of this old gentleman [Cuesta] is throwing out of our hands the finest game that any armies ever had.”

And again he says to Lord Castlereagh :—

“My correspondence with General Cuesta has been a very curious one, and proves him to be as obstinate as any gentleman at the head of an army need be. He would not alter his position, even to insure the safety of his army, because it might be injurious to himself.”

With the contempt which he must have felt for the military (and, indeed, private) character of his intended

coadjutor, he yet gives way upon principle, and thus modestly concludes his letter to his own Government :—

“I hope I acted right in giving way, more particularly as the operation was to be carried on in Spain ; and the argument used to me was, that the safety of Cuesta’s army depended upon my compliance.”

A little later he writes to Mr. Frere :—

“It is impossible to express to you the inconvenience and risk we incur from the want of means of conveyance, which I cannot believe the country would not furnish, if there existed any inclination.

“Though to me, personally, there has been much civility from all classes, it has not been the case with the army in general. The officers complain that the country gives unwillingly the supplies we have required ; and we have not procured a cart or a mule for the service of the army. This does not look promising, and I shall certainly not persevere if our prospect of good treatment does not improve.

“We really should not be so ill off *in an enemy’s country*, as we should *there take by force* what we should require.” (iv. 488.)

“I have been obliged to intimate to Cuesta that I could attempt no further operation till I should be made certain of my supplies for transport, and regular provisions from the country.

“I lament the necessity which obliges me to halt, and will oblige me to withdraw from Spain if it should continue. I can only say I never have seen an army *so ill-treated* in any country.

“It is ridiculous to pretend that the country cannot supply our wants. The French army is well fed ; the Spanish army has plenty of everything ; and we alone, upon whom everything depends, are actually starving.” (iv. 496.)

“I find General Cuesta more and more impracticable every day. It is impossible to do business with him, and very uncertain that any operation will succeed in which he has any concern. He contrived to lose the whole of yesterday (July 23), in which, although his troops were under arms and mine in

march, we did nothing, owing to the whimsical perverseness of his disposition. His want of communication with his officers of the plan settled with me for the 22d (July), and his absence from the field, were the cause that we did the French but little mischief on that day." (iv. 498.)

"I have not been able to follow the enemy as I could wish, on account of the great deficiency of the means of transport, owing to my having found it impossible to procure even one mule or a cart in Spain." (iv. 499.)

With the little confidence which he had in the real honest integrity of the Spanish authorities, he felt it necessary to be very punctilious in his dealings with them.

Don Martin de Garay (the Spanish War Minister) had addressed him upon some subject, and the following is his letter to Mr. Frere, conveying, in the most civil terms that official correspondence would permit, his plain and unequivocal opinion that Don Martin had *told a falsehood!*—

"I shall be very much obliged to him if he will understand that I have no authority—nay, that I have been directed not—to correspond with any of the Spanish Ministers; and I request that he will, in future, convey to me, *through you*, the commands which he may have for me. I shall thus avoid the injurious and uncandid misrepresentations of what passes, which D. Martin has more than once sent to me, apparently with a view of placing on the records of his government, statements of my actions and conduct which are entirely *inconsistent with the truth*, and *to which I have no regular means of replying*.

"It is an *unfounded assertion*, that the first account the Government received of my intention not to undertake any new operation was when they heard that I had left Cuesta alone to pursue the enemy. The *statement is not true!* And supposing it to be true, and that Cuesta was exposed when alone, it was *his* fault and *not mine*. I had given him fair notice.

"It is not a difficult matter for a gentleman in the situa-

tion of D. Martin de Garay to sit down in his cabinet and write his ideas of the glory which would result from driving the French through the Pyrenees ; and I believe there is no man in Spain who has wished so much, or sacrificed so much, to effect that object as I have.

“It is a positive fact, that during the last seven days the British army have not received one-third of their provisions ; that at this moment there are nearly 4000 wounded soldiers dying in the hospital for want of common assistance and necessaries ; and that I can get no assistance of any description from the country.

“I positively will not move, nay more, I will disperse my army, till I am supplied with provisions and means of transport as I ought to be.”

At this time the Marquis Wellesley had relieved Mr. Frere as British Minister to the Central Junta.

Sir Arthur gives him a general statement of the military affairs, the position and condition of the British army, and the state of the Spanish troops, which was wretched.

He repeats his complaints of the wants of his army, and says :—

“If the Government have not already made great exertions to supply us, and if we do not immediately experience the effects by receiving a plentiful supply of provisions and forage, we must move away. There is this day, again, no bread for the soldiers.”
(v. 13.)

And yet, with all these exasperating circumstances, he tries to make the best of it, and concludes his letter thus :—

“I must do the late British Minister the justice to declare, that this deficiency is not to be at all attributed to any neglect or omission on his part. It is to be attributed to the poverty

and exhausted state of the country; to the inactivity of the magistrates and people; to their disinclination to take any trouble, excepting that of packing up their property and *running away* when they hear of the approach of a French patrol; and to their habits of insubordination, and disobedience of, and to the want of power in, the Government and their officers."

The picture was, alas! an accurate likeness, calculated to excite nothing but contempt for all classes!

The following contemptuous letter to General Cuesta was, apparently, well-deserved:—

"In regard to the assertion in your Excellency's letter, that the British troops *sell their bread* to the Spanish soldiers, it is beneath the dignity of your Excellency's situation for you to notice such things, or for me to reply to them. The *British troops could not sell that which they had not*; and the reverse of the statement of your Excellency is *the fact* at the time the armies were at Talavera, as I have myself witnessed frequently in the streets of that town." (v. 25.)

In another letter to Cuesta he says:—

"Since I joined your army, the troops have not received upon an average half a ration, and on some days nothing at all. I can procure no means of transport; and I have not received *even an answer* to a request I made, to have a remount for the cavalry of only 100 *mares*, which would be entirely useless to the Spanish cavalry.

"Under these circumstances, your Excellency cannot be surprised that I should think that the British army has been neglected and ill-treated; or at the determination which I now communicate to you, that if they are not more regularly supplied I shall march them back to Portugal." (v. 33.)

His resolution was at length taken, and on the 18th August he writes:—

"I hope your Excellency [General Eguia, who had succeeded General Cuesta,] will occupy the posts on the Tagus this

night. But if you should not do so, I can only say that my troops shall be withdrawn to-morrow night, whether relieved or not." (v. 50.)

General Eguia had an interview with Sir Arthur, and promised redress for all the evils; but, as usual, nothing was done. Similar complaints, which had been laid before General Cuesta more than a month before, had been transmitted by him (as he averred) to the Supreme Central Junta at Seville; and if any measures had been taken, supplies might have been forwarded, even from a distance: but nothing was received.

The Government might have given orders; but, as Sir Arthur observed,—

"Orders are not sufficient. The Junta *may have issued orders* to supply the deficiencies, but, from want of arrangement, there are no persons to obey, and this army would perish."

He writes again to General Eguia, who had forwarded to him some of the evasive subterfuges from the Central Junta, and probably containing some of their gasconading projects of *active operation*:—

"I have received your Excellency's letter, enclosing one from the Minister of War at Seville. He has been entirely misinformed.

"He forgets that we have no food; our cavalry, from want, were scarcely able to move from their ground; artillery-horses unable to draw the guns; that I have no means of moving, and my soldiers are worn down by want of every description.

"It is extraordinary that the minister did not advert to these circumstances, which have been frequently laid before him, or that he should have proposed to me any operation of any description, to which he *must have known* that I was unequal; but *his having omitted to advert to them, sufficiently accounts for their continued existence.*" (v. 54.)

A Señor Don Luis de Calvo had been appointed

Commissary-general to the Spanish army. Who or what he was we have no means here of ascertaining, and many may be of opinion that it is of little consequence, and that he is unworthy of further notice. But, unfortunately, he was now in a situation of great importance, deeply affecting the interests, if not the existence of the British General and his army; and it illustrates forcibly the difficulties of Sir Arthur's position, in being placed at the mercy of such men.

In reply to his first communication to Sir Arthur, *promising abundant supplies in three days*, and that in the mean time the magazine at Truxillo should be given to him, the latter replies with some bluntness:—

“I have received the same assurances from every Spanish Commissioner who has been employed with us; and although your rank is higher and your powers are greater than those of the other Spanish officers who have been with me, I acknowledge that I feel *no confidence in your assurances*; and I *give no credit* to the accounts of resources on the road [in what place is not known], or of the magazine at Truxillo.” (v. 57.)

In a letter very shortly after to Marquis Wellesley he notices

“an injurious and unfounded assertion of this said Don Luis de Calvo, who had said, that ‘the want of provisions was a mere pretext for withdrawing from Spain; and that it was false, for that there was plenty.’” (v. 64.)

And in proof of De Calvo's *falsehood*, Sir Arthur sends a copy of a letter (of which the original was in his possession), from an alcalde in one of the towns to Mr. Downie, a British Commissary, stating that he had received *directions from DON L. DE CALVO to send to the Spanish head-quarters the very provisions which Downie had procured for the British.*

“ And this,” adds Sir Arthur, indignantly, “ is *the honour and good faith*, and this Don L. de Calvo is *the gentleman in whose assurances I was to place confidence* !!

“ These reports and insinuations against me may do very well for the people of Seville, but the British army will not soon forget the treatment it has received.” (v. 64.)

General Eguia had also descended so low as to put forward the same insinuation, as to the *pretended* grounds for withdrawing the British. Sir Arthur replied to his letter, but in reporting the fact to Marquis Wellesley he says :—

“ Until the insulting assertion was withdrawn, it was impossible for me to continue any correspondence with General Eguia after I had replied to his letter, *which I hope I did with the TEMPER which became my situation and character*. In his reply he has left the charge of making use of a false pretext where it stood ; and I have, therefore, not given him any reply upon that or any other subject on which he has addressed me.” (v. 63.)

Notwithstanding the boasting and vapouring which seemed to be inherent in the Spanish character (though at a later period the *peasantry* showed much more perseverance and personal courage), it is undeniable that at this period of the war Sir Arthur formed a most just opinion of their value as soldiers.

It was clear, from what we have seen, that he had no reason to estimate very highly the talent or the character of those in authority ; and in justice to the lower orders it may be fair to assume, that *want of confidence* in their superiors might lead to the character which he ascribed to them.

In a long and most able dispatch to Marquis Wellesley, after the British had retired beyond the Spanish

frontier, and giving his reasons for so doing in detail, he proceeds to a most dispassionate consideration of future plans and projects :—

“ 1st. Shall I again join in co-operation with the Spaniards ? ”

He argues the question in all its bearings, and concludes by saying,—

“ It does not appear to be necessary, and not very desirable.

“ 2d. Is there no chance of resuming the offensive ? At *present*, I see none ; and *hereafter*, *certainly* none. The same causes which changed the late operations from offensive after a victory to defensive, would still exist.

“ But I come now to another topic, of serious consideration, and that is the *frequent*—I ought to say, *constant* and shameful misbehaviour of the Spanish troops before the enemy. We in England never hear of their defeats and flights. In the battle of Talavera whole corps threw away their arms, and ran off *in my presence*, when they were neither attacked nor threatened, but frightened, I believe, by their own fire.

“ I refer for evidence upon this subject to General Cuesta’s own orders, in which, after extolling *the gallantry of his army in general*, he declares his intention to decimate the runaways ; which he did !

“ I can easily conceive the unwillingness of officers in command to report their misbehaviour in presence of the enemy, for no honour can be acquired ; and in this way I account for the numerous histories we have of the *bravery* of the Spanish troops !

“ I have found, from experience, the instances of misbehaviour to be so numerous, and those of good behaviour so few, that I must conclude that they are troops by no means to be depended upon.

“ Upon every ground, therefore, it is my opinion, that I ought to avoid entering into any further co-operation with the Spanish armies.” (v. 78.)

In pursuance of the same subject he writes to Lord Castlereagh :—

“ It is lamentable to see how bad the Spanish infantry is. It is impossible to calculate upon any operation with them. It is said that *sometimes* they behave well, though I acknowledge that I have *never* seen them behave otherwise than ill. The practice of running away, and throwing off arms, accoutrements, and clothing, is fatal to everything, excepting a re-assembling of the men in a state of nature, who as regularly perform the same manœuvre the next time an occasion offers.

“ Nothing can be worse than the officers; and it is extraordinary that when a nation has devoted itself to war, as this nation has, by the measures it has adopted in the last two years, so little progress has been made in any one branch of the military profession by any individual.

“ I really believe that much of this deficiency of numbers, composition, discipline, and efficiency, is to be attributed to the existing *Government*. They have attempted to govern the kingdom in a state of revolution, by an adherence to old rules and systems, with the aid of what is called *enthusiasm*, which is no aid to accomplish anything, and is only an excuse for irregularity in everything, and the want of discipline and subordination of the armies.” (v. 84.)

Sir Arthur was created Viscount Wellington, and assumed his title on the 16th of September.

He had occasion to communicate with the officers in command of the French army, respecting prisoners, and wounded men. Latterly General Eguia had detained a French officer, who had come to the Spanish lines with an answer. Eguia had been apprised of the contents of the letter, and in order to avoid all suspicion, had been requested to open any which might be sealed. But he still detained the officer. Lord Wellington reports this :—

“ The consequence of this unwarrantable act must be a cessation of all intercourse between me and the French on the subject of our prisoners, and the consequent aggravation of their captivity. I would write to you *officially*, only that I think it is

too bad to be made the subject of a *dispatch*, and that if it were to be known in England it would create such an irritation against Eguia and the Spaniards in general that they would not easily remove." (v. 182.)

"I acknowledge that the refusal to send back le Capitaine Thévenon (the officer above alluded to) surprised me; as I imagined that *I* had some claim to the favourable consideration of the Spanish Government. But when I consider that this officer came into the Spanish lines under *my* protection, to bring *me* a letter, on a subject equally interesting to the Spanish Government, and as I have a *right* to claim him, I am still more astonished. The pretences for detaining him are as idle as the detention of him is improper, and ungracious to me personally. In respect to the subject of the correspondence, no suspicion could have been entertained, as I desired the Spanish Commander-in-chief to open and read *all letters*.

"If this principle is to be adopted, it will be more difficult than it is for a British army to give assistance to Spain. The temper manifested may perhaps only be *personal to me*, though I had hoped I had established some claim for consideration from the Spanish Government." (v. 221.)

The Spaniards were again defeated in the beginning of December, in La Mancha and in Old Castille.

Mr. Frere (brother to the former minister) had been appointed as Minister to the Spanish Government upon Marquis Wellesley's departure, and Lord Wellington writes to him:—

"I lament that a cause which promised so well a few weeks ago should have been so completely lost by the ignorance, folly, presumption, and mismanagement of those to whom it was intrusted.

"If they had preserved their two armies (or even one of them), the cause was safe. But no! nothing will answer excepting to fight great battles in plains, in which their defeat is *certain*. They will not credit the accounts I have repeatedly given them of the superior number of the French: they will

seek them out, and find them in all parts superior to themselves." (v. 324.)

His Spanish embarrassments were now in some degree diminished, as he had left the country and given up everything like military co-operation.

His Portuguese difficulties, however, increased. As yet they had been mainly confined to the inefficiency or want of energy of *inferiors*, now they began to show themselves in the constitution of the *Government* itself.

Some arrangements had been made by the Prince Regent in the Brazils connected with the formation of the Regency at home, which Lord Wellington did not approve of. He writes to Mr. Villiers:—

"I can account for the arrangement of the Regency as far as I am concerned, only by the desire in the Government of Brazil to weaken the *British* influence over the army in this country, by a division of the authority placed over it. However, the persons who formed this arrangement appear to me to be entirely ignorant of the national character of Englishmen, and particularly of those who were the objects of the arrangements, in thinking that by such means they could obtain their views." (v. 199.)

The Government thus formed, working through the medium of the British Minister, urged measures respecting pay, provisions, &c. for the Portuguese army. Lord Wellington offered various suggestions to meet the difficulties, but they were not acceded to; and at length worn out, he writes to Mr. Villiers:—

"*I have done with the Portuguese Government!* I have performed my duty by suggesting measures for the relief of the great distress under which they labour. My letters will relieve me from any blame for the misfortunes which must be the consequence of this mode of proceeding; and from this time forward I shall not write a line excepting in answer to questions

put to me, or to propositions which may be forwarded for my consideration." (v. 243.)

Upon the same subject, writing to Admiral Berkeley, he says :—

"I do not know what to make of the Portuguese Government. I cannot bring my mind to doubt their good intentions; but you will scarcely believe, that although their army is starving, and they have no money to buy provisions, they have hesitated, and indeed refused, to adopt two propositions made by me, which would have relieved all their difficulties, and would have given them magazines. *I have done with them.*" (v. 445.)

We now begin to feel the influence that exerted itself against him. For some reason the Senhor de Souza, in the Brazils, whose brother was the Portuguese Minister in England, seems to have had a hostile feeling towards him. The Patriarch (the Bishop of Oporto), and Dom Miguel de Forjaz, though they disliked each other, probably from a jealousy of their respective weight in the country, seemed to have believed that Lord Wellington and the British Ministers at Lisbon had combined with the De Souzas against them.

Lord Wellington writes to Mr. Stuart :—

"The Patriarch and De Forjaz have their faults, but I am convinced that we cannot change either, excepting for the worse; and I shall be obliged if you will assure them, not only that I will not be any party to the promotion of any change in the Government, but that I shall do everything in my power to support their authority and the continuance of the Government in their hands." (vi. 21.)

"The principal strength of the Regency consists in the regularity and legality of their appointment by the Prince Regent; and I know of no person whose assistance as a colleague would compensate for the loss of this advantage, by their

making any addition or alteration by their own assumed and illegal authority." (vi. 60.)

In his communications to the Government at home he says :—

"The Local Government do not feel themselves sufficiently strong in the support of the Government in the Brazils.

"The King's Minister will have acquainted you of the existing party in Portugal, not favourable to the French, nor hostile to the British influence over the Portuguese councils, but jealous of the authority of the local Government, and undermining its influence, and paralyzing its power, by private intrigues through friends and relations in the Brazils.

"This party can only be resisted by cordial support to the local Government in Portugal, and till that is done *our* efforts must fail." (vi. 318.)

Senhor de Souza was, however, appointed a Member of the Council of Regency. The anti-British feeling was apparent, and the measures proposed by them were such that Lord Wellington wrote to Mr. Stuart :—

"In order to put an end to these miserable intrigues, I beg that you will inform the Government that I will not stay in this country, and that I shall advise the King's Government to withdraw the assistance which His Majesty affords them if they interfere in any manner with the appointments of Marshal Beresford's staff, for which he is responsible, or with the operations of the army, or with any of the points which under the original arrangement were referred exclusively to him.

"It appears that the Government have lately discovered that *we* are all wrong; they are impatient for the defeat of the enemy, and, like the Central Junta in Spain, call out for a battle. If I had had the power I would have prevented the Spaniards, and the cause would now have been safe; but now, having the power, I will not lose the only chance which remains of saving the cause, by paying the smallest attention to the senseless suggestions of the Portuguese Government.

"I am much hurt at this change of conduct of the Regency, which I must attribute to the persons recently introduced into the Government." (vi. 387.)

"I can only declare this, that if I find the Government hesitating, and alarmed by the mob of Lisbon, I shall forthwith embark the army, and the Portuguese nation will have the satisfaction of losing itself by the pusillanimity of the Government.

"I attribute much to the conduct of the Government, and particularly of the new members of it. If these foolish fellows cannot be kept in order we must get rid of them; and one mode is, that I shall insist upon Souza's being sent away." (vi. 398.)

"At all times, and under all circumstances, I have possessed the confidence of the Government, and their object has been to forward my views for the public service. And till the late change, I never received any observation except of confidence in the measures which I recommended. But the Principal Souza is of that impatient, meddling, and mischievous disposition, that we cannot go on as we have hitherto as long as he continues a member of the Government.

His Majesty's Government will be the best judges of what measures ought to be adopted. I have already desired Mr. Stuart to give notice to the Regency, that if they continued to interfere with the *military* operations I should recommend to His Majesty *to withdraw the army*." (v. 410.)

The same system of interference went on, and he writes to Mr. Stuart,—

"I beg you will inform the Regency, and above all Principal Souza, that His Majesty has entrusted me with the command of the army; I will not suffer them or anybody else to interfere: that I know best where to station my troops, and I shall not alter my system upon any suggestion of theirs.

"I am responsible for what I do, and they are not. As for Principal Souza, I beg you to tell him from me, that I have had no satisfaction in transacting the business of this country since he has been a member of the Government; and that no power on earth shall induce me to remain in the Peninsula for one moment after I shall have obtained His Majesty's leave to resign, if Prin-

cial Souza is to remain either a member of the Government or to remain at Lisbon. Either he must quit the country or I shall; and I will take care that the world shall be made acquainted with my reasons." (vi. 466.)

Much of the conduct which was pursued by the leading members of the local Government from this time, October 1810, till he finally marched out of the country, though most injurious to the army, partook so much of *personal* hostility to himself, that the notice which justice to him requires us to take of it is more appropriately classed, and has been stated, in that portion of our remarks which refer to his personal Forgiveness of Injustice.

But the general bitterness of feeling against the British continued to display itself more extensively. All the subordinate magistrates and the executive officers of police, &c. were quite aware of the sentiments of their superiors, and ready to take advantage; and we may probably concede, without injustice, that British officers (particularly the juniors) were not likely to smooth the difficulties arising from Portuguese arrogance and impertinence.

A complaint had been forwarded to him of an officer (not named) for violence in enforcing a billet at Lisbon. He writes to Mr Stuart:—

"Having read the inflammatory report of the *Judge of Police*, and of the *Juiz dos Barrios*, and of the *Secretary of State*, on the complaint, I am not astonished that complaints on this subject should be frequent at Lisbon, where, if they did not receive encouragement from *these high authorities*, there ought and would be none.

"I have long seen the inutility of complaining to the Government on the conduct of any of the public servants, or on any subject whatever. I shall therefore not make any complaint of the Judge of Police, who, instead of endeavouring to conciliate,

or, as was his duty, enforcing the necessary law of billets, has done everything in his power to aggravate.

"The case is so flagrant, and the conduct of the magistrate has been so improper, that if I could entertain any hopes that the truth would reach the Prince Regent of Portugal, I would address his R. Highness on the subject.

"I only hope that the time is not far distant when the British army, tired of such conduct, will impart to the British nation the disgust which it must occasion, as well as the desire to leave to its fate a country in which, by *the Government and the higher orders*, they have been so unworthily treated." (viii. 134.)

"It is my opinion, that a change in the Government in Portugal is become absolutely necessary. The Prince Regent's servants have, in fact, no influence over the proceedings of the local Government, who have done everything to defeat their measures.

"It is a matter of astonishment that such a spirit should exist among people who absolutely depend for their existence upon the continuance of H. R. Highness's protection of their country; but so it is! The truth is, that they have been ashamed of the influence and power which they had been induced to give to British officers in their army. The contrast of the conduct of the Spaniards is perpetually occurring to them: the Spaniards reproach them that they have no country, and that there are *no Portuguese*; and the object of the local Government appears to be, to diminish the reputation and the influence of *British* officers as much as they can: and with this view they oppose every measure proposed by us." (viii. 270.)

We have already noticed as a peculiar characteristic, his *power* and his *willingness to forget and forgive*; and a part of his correspondence at this period strongly exemplifies it.

After all the indignities to which he had been exposed personally, and after all the injuries inflicted on his army, by neglect and wilfulness, it is not every man who would have been willing to hold out the hand

of reconciliation in the manner which we now see respecting the Principal Souza.

He had expressed himself in the strongest terms as far back as Oct. 1810, declaring, as we have seen (p. 122), that nothing should induce him to remain in the country if the Principal continued at Lisbon. The Principal, however, still remained, and we find Lord Wellington again repeating (Sept. 1811), as we have just read, "that a change in the Portuguese Government was absolutely necessary."

Reference to the Brazils led to no improvement; indeed the local Government at Lisbon were in reality supported from thence. Lord Wellington, with his usual placability and forbearance, writes to Lord Liverpool:—

"Unless the British Government take up the subject, and bring these gentlemen to a proper understanding of the nature of their situation and their duties, *we must only jog on as we can*. If Government would follow my advice, they would make the Prince of Brazils understand, that if he and his ministers and his servants in this country did not exert themselves, the assistance of the British, both in money and troops, should be withdrawn."

The Prince of Brazils, however, would not dismiss the Principal: but as he expressed a willingness to receive with more favour the services of Dom Miguel de Forjaz, towards whom he had for some reason a dislike, and who was esteemed by Lord Wellington the best member of the local Government; the latter, writing to Mr. Stuart, says:—

"It is obvious to me, from everything that has passed, that the Prince will not dismiss Principal Souza; but the orders which have been lately received here, and the promise which the Prince makes to receive favourably the services of Dom M. de

Forjaz, render the dismissal of the Principal an object of less importance.

"I have therefore taken advantage of the receipt of the Prince's letter to *put an end* to the *uncomfortable state in which I have so long stood* in respect of the Government.

"We *shall now start afresh*, and must endeavour to carry the business on as well as we can!" (viii. 346.)

The above letter was written in October 1811. His old enemy, Principal Souza, was still continued in power, and probably (notwithstanding Lord Wellington's magnanimity) was as troublesome as ever; but we have no further mention of him till the following February.

The Marquis Wellesley was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at this time, and no doubt the daily difficulties arising from the temper of the Portuguese Regency had induced the British Government to lay the case strongly before the Prince Regent in the Brazils.

Mr. Sydenham, a confidential friend of Marquis Wellesley's, had been in Portugal, and had had much communication with Lord Wellington; in the course of which the latter says that "he may have expressed his feelings;" but in a letter to Mr. Stuart, of Feb. 1812, he says:—

"I am positively certain, not only that I did not desire Sydenham to make *any complaint* to Lord Wellesley; but I will go further, and declare positively, that I desired him to tell Lord Wellesley that it was, in my opinion, best to take *no further steps* to endeavour to remove the *Principal*; as it appeared from the Prince's letter to me that his removal was so very repugnant to his feelings, that the matters which had been in dispute were at an end, and that I should endeavour to work on as well as I could.

"I do not know what to say to the *order* for the removal of the Principal. If it were to come direct to Portugal, I should say it ought to be obeyed; for the same reason that I said the order for his appointment should be obeyed. But it appears that

it is sent to England, and entrusted to Lord Wellesley's discretion, who, I think likely, will entrust it to *ours*.

"We should certainly do better without the Principal. The truth is, the man is mad, and he cannot act with common sense upon any occasion. But if he were removed, though we should go on better, as we should get rid of the perpetual talkings about affairs and doing nothing, things would still not go on as we would wish.

"However, upon the whole, I am rather inclined to remove him; but I shall not decide till I have considered the matter." (viii. 561.)

The consent to his removal had, however, been given from the Brazils, and had apparently been referred to the British Government. They had written to our Minister at Lisbon, who in his turn had communicated with Lord Wellington, who writes in reply:—

"It is not necessary to enter upon the natural defects of his mind and character. My objections to him, and my recommendation that he should be removed, were founded upon his opposition to the measures which I proposed.

"The Prince Regent refused, however; and although the determination was not communicated to me in very gracious terms, I determined not to press it. I afterwards, in October 1811, received a letter from the Prince, which appeared to offer a favourable opportunity of being reconciled to the local Government; and *I offered and requested that everything might be buried in oblivion.*

"In the meantime, His Majesty's Government having interfered with their influence, His Royal Highness has consented that he should be removed; and the question is, whether we should avail ourselves of it.

"It is obvious that the consent of the Prince has been extorted from him; and though Principal Souza should be removed, he would retain the influence which he possesses. Nothing would be gained; and he would be considered as a martyr to English influence, and his popularity would increase.

"I cannot but admit that it would be desirable that he

should be removed ; but upon the same principle that on the last occasion I would not urge the Prince to remove him, I do not recommend that advantage should be *now* taken of H. R. H.'s letter." (ix. 91.)

Having, as we have seen, determined to *forget* and *forgive* the former want of cordiality between himself and the Principal, and endeavoured to *jog on* (as he expressed it), he had no wish after such a lapse of time to avail himself of the present opening to remove him. He was too generous an opponent to take advantage, and *now* to resent what he had *already* forgiven.

How far such good feeling was appreciated we cannot say, but we hear no more of the Principal.

A project had been offered for his consideration, as to the possibility of organizing the Spanish army upon the same principle as the Portuguese. He replies :—

"I am quite convinced, that the majority of the Spanish officers would prefer submitting to the French to allowing us to have anything to say to their troops. In truth, they are by no means convinced, or, at all events, will not allow, that our officers know any more of their profession than they do themselves ; and *we may depend upon it that we should always have them acting against us*, and that all their class would follow their example.

"I think it probable (but I am not certain) that we should get some of the lower orders to serve in regiments officered by British officers ; but I am convinced that if the authorities set their faces against the measure, we should get but few." (viii. 237.)

At a later period, upon some renewed proposals of raising regiments to be officered by British, he gives his reasons for believing that it would not answer, de-

pending greatly on the natural prejudices of the men ; but he adds :—

“ I must observe that British officers require to be kept in order as well as the soldiers under their command, particularly in foreign service. The experience which I have had of their conduct in the Portuguese service, has shown me that there must be *an authority*, and *that a strong one*, to keep them within due bounds ; otherwise, they would only disgust the soldiers over whom they were placed, the officers whom they were destined to assist, and the country in whose service they were employed.” (viii. 309.)

Referring again to the proposition respecting the amendment of the Spanish army, he says to Mr. Wellesley :—

“ In regard to the employment of British officers, I entertain the same opinion that I always have. They will be worse than useless if they have not the support of the Commander-in-chief, who must have the cordial support of the Government, or *he* will have no authority.

“ I retain likewise the same opinion regarding *my* having the command of the Spanish armies. I consider troops that are neither paid, fed, nor disciplined, to be dangerous only to their friends, when assembled in large bodies.

“ I never will voluntarily command troops who cannot and will not obey ; and therefore I am not desirous of having anything to say to the command of the Spanish troops.

“ Upon this subject of the employment of British officers, and of the command being given to me, I may be wrong ; but I entertain an opinion which I have not heard from others. It is my opinion that the *officers* of the Spanish armies are the principal excitors of the general sentiment which prevails against the French. They all consider themselves deprived of their profession by the government of Buonaparte ; and therefore, if we mean to encourage the resistance of the *people*, we ought not to disgust the Spanish *officers*, and so far deprive them of their profession as to give to British officers the effectual control over the army.

“ Although there are many difficulties in introducing our officers into the Spanish service, and in giving the Commander-in-chief the command of the whole, many of the advantages might be obtained. I think that I have already acquired such an influence over the Spanish officers that they would do anything I should desire, excepting, perhaps, to discipline their troops and establish subordination amongst them.

“ It has always been my opinion, that much might be done by the British Government to increase the authority and influence of the Commander-in-chief in this country. But all propositions for increase and extension of authority are received in England with jealousy; and I have, therefore, never made any direct proposition. I might have hoped, that the desire which I have always expressed to be allowed to confine my attention to my own army might have satisfied the King's Government that I want no extension of authority, and that I deprecate it, as throwing upon me additional responsibility and trouble.

“ But I have no hesitation in saying, that the only remedy for the existing evils is to *increase to the utmost* the power and *authority of the Commander-in-chief*, and to *leave to his discretion* the distribution of all the aids to the Peninsula.” (ix. 112.)

A little later, with reference to an appointment which the Spanish Government had made, he expresses himself rather warmly :—

“ I am certain that the *existing* Spanish Government have no intention of doing anything offensive to me, but I should be inclined to entertain doubts in consequence of this appointment.

“ Senhor —— is the person who was employed by the Central Junta to attend this army (p. 114). He is not only the most useless and inefficient of God's creatures, but is an impediment to all business, and he cannot *speak a word of truth*.

“ After knowing the truth of all my complaints of those days, and, as he assured me, reporting them to his employers, he suddenly turned round, when the Junta sent a sum of money, and swore ‘ that we wanted nothing, and were amply supplied.’ He had the impudence to tell me so at Truxillo; and after I had

forced him *to acknowledge that he told a falsehood*, I turned him out of the room, and desired that I might never see his face again. I shall hold no communication with him; and it will remain for the Government to consider whether such a man should be appointed in connection with this army." (ix. 360.)

"I do not expect much from the Spaniards, notwithstanding all that we have done for them. They cry '*Viva*,' and are very fond of *us*, and hate the *French*; but they are, in general, the most incapable of useful exertion of any nation that I have known: the most vain, the most ignorant, particularly of military affairs. The utmost we can hope for is, to teach them how to avoid being beat." (ix. 366.)

"It is extraordinary that the revolution in Spain should not have produced *one man* with any knowledge of the real situation of the country. It really appears as if they were all drunk, and thinking and talking of any other subject than Spain." (ix. 524.)

He accepted the command of the Spanish army in October 1812, and had given his utmost attention with a view to put it into a state of efficiency; but in all his letters he expressed his doubts as to what it might be in his power to effect, in consequence of the national character and the general incapacity of the Government.

Towards the end of December he writes to the Minister at War:—

"The Cortes have done me the honour to confer upon me the command of their armies, and have thus manifested to the world the confidence they repose in me.

"It is impossible to perform the duties as they ought, unless I possess sufficient powers; and I request that you will inform the Government, that if they do not feel themselves authorised, or have not confidence in me, to trust me with those powers, I beg leave to decline the command.

"I stated distinctly what the powers are which I require. [He then recapitulates them, and adds:] I beg to have *a decided answer* on all these points. Whatever may be the decision of

the Government, my desire to serve the cause of Spain will remain the same." (x. 1.)

In March following he writes,—

"I have been doing everything in my power to get on the Spanish army, and I must do the officers the justice to say that they do everything in their power. I have much reason, however, to complain of the Government." (x. 164.)

"I wish you would see whoever is really at the head of affairs, and represent to him how desirous I am to carry on the service in the most honourable, advantageous, and agreeable manner; but that the engagements with me *must be strictly carried into execution*, if it is wished that I should retain the command. It is only necessary to express a hint, or desire, that I should resign, or fail to perform their engagements entered into with me, and *I shall resign with much more pleasure than I ever accepted.*" (x. 216.)

The campaign commenced in May. The Spanish Government was entirely under the domination of the newspapers at Cadiz, and the greatest difficulty was found in respect to pay for their troops. Lord Wellington wrote to some of their generals as to their difficulty of moving. To one he says:—

"Whether you march now, or at a future period, I consider it to be more important to have a *small* body well paid and appointed, than a *larger* one which there did not exist means of paying and feeding. The former may render some service, the latter cannot." (x. 339.)

He says afterwards to the Spanish Minister of War:—

"It is impossible to maintain a Spanish army in the field, excepting by the resources of Spain itself. The campaign is about to open, and I foretell what will happen. For a short time the troops will be maintained, whilst the harvest is on the ground. This will last but a short time, and the Spanish troops *must be dispersed, or sent to the rear.* Resources for the army I know the country *can* afford, which require only due care to be realised." (x. 380.)

He complains, after the army had advanced, of the neglect and misconduct of the Intendants and civil authorities of the province of Andalusia; whereby the Spaniards, who were joined to the allied British and Portuguese, were unfurnished with mules and means of transport, and

“though clothed, armed, and disciplined, were obliged to be kept in the rear, so that the campaign would be fought without a single Spanish corps, although it was supposed that 160,000 men were in arms.” (x. 415.)

He received a most unfavourable reply to his remonstrance, and very soon after they removed generals from their commands, and appointed others, in breach of the agreements with him.

He writes to Mr. Wellesley, begging him to call together any of

“the persons who had been concerned in nominating him to the command, and to tell them that if he did not receive some satisfaction for the *insults* offered by those arrangements, it would be impossible for him to hold the command.” (x. 491.)

In another letter to Mr. Wellesley he says:—

“Although I think the conduct towards General Castaños and Giron is harsh and unjust, I do not complain of *it* as a breach of engagement with me. Neither do I complain of their refusal to promote the officers whom I recommend. It was ungracious. But what I complain of is, that having made engagements with me, without which I neither can nor will hold the command, they have broken them, not in one, but in an hundred instances; and that they do it wantonly, because they know my disinclination to relinquish the command, on *account of the bad effect it would have in Spain and throughout Europe*. Their conduct, therefore, is *injurious and an indignity*, and I *must have satisfaction!*” (x. 564.)

At last he says to the Minister at War :—

“ I shall be much concerned, for many reasons, if I should be obliged to relinquish the command ; but if I should, I can assure your Excellency that *I will do it at the period and in the mode* which may be most *convenient and agreeable* to the Regency.” (x. 611.)

He tells the Government at home :—

“ The Spanish Government have behaved very ill in this, as they have in every other transaction ; but in the existing state of affairs, I do not think it wise to push them to extremities. The Cortes and the people of Cadiz are making an intrigue of it ; and I have, therefore, thought it best to act on my own grounds, according to my own judgment of what is *most for the public interest*, and keeping myself clear of the *intrigues and cabals of others*.”

Here is a further illustration of his power of overcoming all *personal* feelings upon *public* grounds.

We have seen in the last extracts how disgusted he was with their conduct towards him : that “ he would resign the command with much more pleasure than he had accepted ;” but he had reason to know that the question of getting rid of him had become a matter of party and intrigue. The ostensible *Government* was weak ; the *people* were factious : and if he had now pressed the former, however they might have deserved it from their wretched and pusillanimous conduct towards him, it would have afforded a triumph to the latter : which he considered more dangerous to the State.

He had now quitted *Portugal*, not to return ! A good deal of correspondence had been maintained during the whole of his stay at Frenada, from the month of

January, and after his advance into Spain, relating, as usual, to finance, or to neglect on the part of the authorities. The last letter, dated July 20, 1813, to Sir Charles Stuart, is upon the misconduct of a Juiz da Fora, and concludes with the following sentence:—

“ I must say that the British army have met with nothing but ingratitude from the Government and authorities of Portugal for their services; and that everything that could be done, has been done by the civil authorities lately, to oppress the officers and soldiers on every occasion in which it has, by any accident, been in their power. *I hope, however, that we have seen the last of Portugal!*” (x. 557.)

We find one more letter respecting Portugal, which it is interesting to insert, as expressing his feelings, though, fortunately, no necessity arose for acting upon it:—

“ In regard to the appointment of General —— to command the army when Marshal Beresford goes to England, I shall be obliged to you to remind the Government, that they are *ordered* by the Prince Regent *to consult my opinion* on matters of finance and military affairs; and I recommend to them not to adopt such a measure as to appoint a commanding officer to the army *without consulting* with me.

“ I was prejudiced in favour of General ——, and I believe I was the cause of his being employed with the army in this campaign. My opinion is very much altered. He possesses no one military quality, and he has been repeatedly guilty of that worst of all tricks, which invariably defeats its own ends, viz. courting popularity with the common soldiers, by flattering their vices, and by impunity for their misconduct. Such a man will not do in this army.” (ix. 263.)

Here we take leave of his *Portuguese* annoyances. Those from the *Spaniards* continued in full force. Some of the instances were, perhaps, prior in date to the letter which we have just quoted, and which we have done for

the purpose of keeping the affairs distinct and clear of each other.

The Spanish Government had been altered. Lord Wellington had been appointed by the *former* Government with certain powers, and under certain stipulations on their parts, which, with the bad faith that distinguished them throughout, the *new* Government broke through in many instances; and the Minister at War, in his correspondence with the British Ambassador, endeavoured to show that the "existing *Regents* could only agree to what was directed by the *Cortes*, and could not confirm any agreement made by their predecessors."

Lord Wellington proved, by original letters, that the existing Government *had*, after full consideration, confirmed all the agreements of their predecessors; and in regard to any alteration of what was agreed with him, he did not see how it could be done, "so as to enable him to hold the command with advantage to the public or honour to himself." He adds:—

"Matters cannot go on much longer as they are: either I must possess the confidence and support of the Government and the Minister at War, whatever may be the nature of the agreement with me, or I must resign the command, notwithstanding the consequences, of which I am as well aware as any man." (xi. 22.)

But even then he subdues his feelings and adds:—

"Tell the gentlemen, that if I am obliged to take this step I will do it in the manner *most agreeable to them* (!!), and least injurious to the public service."

Notwithstanding his private conviction of the worthlessness of *the man*, he still continues his official correspondence with *the minister*:—

"I concur with your Excellency in thinking that the union of the command of the armies of the allied nations in one hand, is the only mode by which great successes can be acquired: but I do not despair of being still able to acquire such as will be satisfactory.

"I propose to continue to exercise the command as usual, and I shall omit to announce to the army my resignation, till I receive those further orders which your Excellency announces to me." (xi. 164.)

In his letter to the Secretary of State at the end of November he says:—

"Matters are becoming so bad between us and the Spaniards, that I think it necessary to draw your attention seriously.

"You will have seen the libels about San Sebastian, which I *know* were written and published by an officer of the War Department, and, I *believe*, under the direction of the Minister at War, Don Juan O'Donoju. I believe these libels all to proceed from the same source—the *Government, their immediate servants, and officers*; and although I have no reason to believe that they have as yet made any impression on the nation at large, they certainly have upon the principal officers of the army. They must see that, if they are not written by the Government, they are, at least, not discouraged: they know that *we* are odious to the Government, and they treat us accordingly.

"The Spanish troops plunder everything. Till lately there was some semblance of inquiry, and a desire to punish: lately these acts have been left entirely unnoticed, till I have interfered with my authority as Commander-in-chief of the Spanish army.

"I will now request you to consider what will be the consequence if any reverse were to happen, or that you were to think fit to withdraw your army." (xi. 325.)

He then proceeds to suggest the course to pursue, and adds:—

"I recommend you to withdraw the troops if these demands

are not complied with. You may rely upon this, that if you take a *firm, decided line*, and show your *determination* to go through with it, you will have the Spanish *nation* with you, you will bring the Government to their senses, and you will put an end at once to all the petty cabals existing at this moment, and you will not be under the necessity of bringing matters to extremities. If you take any other than a decided line (which in its consequences will involve them in ruin), you may depend upon it you will gain nothing, and will only make matters worse.

“I recommend this, whatever may be the decision respecting my command of the [Spanish] army. They are, probably, the more necessary if I should keep the command. The truth is, that a crisis is approaching in our connexion with Spain; and if you do not bring the nation to their senses before they go too far, you will inevitably lose all the advantages which you might expect from the services rendered to them.

“Although I am quite certain that nothing can ever be done with the Spaniards, excepting by coming to extremities with them, I am very averse that there should be the appearance of difference of opinion just at this moment here, if it can be avoided.” (xi. 338.)

Here was the exemplification of a great man with a great mind. This counsel was not the result of the working of a petulant temper, justly irritated by studied insult. We have seen, a few pages back, how nobly he disregarded all that was merely *personal*, and how conscious he was of the public injury which would arise from yielding to any personal exasperation. But here he shows how injurious too much subserviency would be; and with the warmth of a bold, but not a passionate mind, he recommends bringing matters to a crisis as the only remedy.

He afterwards had reason to believe that there was an inclination in the Cortes to get rid of the existing

Government, principally on account of their treatment of the British ; and says :—

“I believe the effect in the Cortes has been produced very much by the language I held about the San Sebastian libels.”
(xi. 338.)

Fortunately, the events of the campaign speedily removed him from the country, and thus terminated the series of his Foreign Annoyances.

SECRECY AND CAUTION.

SECRECY, or the power of keeping to himself his opinions and intentions, was undoubtedly a prominent feature of the Duke's character. It seems to have been adopted upon principle, from the very earliest period of his public career.

A letter of his own in these Dispatches, written in 1804, exemplifies, in the shortest and most explicit manner, the nature of his feelings on the subject.

In virtue of the authority vested in him during the campaigns in the Deccan in 1804, previous to the breaking up that army, he had appointed Lieutenant-colonel Wallace to the command of the subsidiary force, which was to be stationed with the Peshwah at Poonah. Colonel Wallace was an officer who had justly obtained a *military* reputation by the zealous manner in which he had executed the duties confided to him; but he had not hitherto had any independent charge entrusted to him, involving other considerations as well as the strict duty of the soldier.

General Wellesley, after he had left Lieutenant-colonel Wallace at his destined post, writes to him; and we believe it will be difficult to find more sensible principles explained in more simple terms:—

“I believe that in my public dispatch I have alluded to every point to which I wish to draw your attention, excepting

one, which I will mention to you, that is, the *secrecy* of your proceedings. Ninety-nine cases out of a hundred might be posted up at the market-cross, without injury to the public interests ; but when the public business is the subject of general conversation, and is not kept secret, *as a matter of course*, upon every occasion, it is very difficult to keep it secret upon *that* occasion where it is necessary. There is an awkwardness about a secret, which enables observant men invariably to find it out.

“Secrecy is always best. Those who have been long trusted with the conduct of public affairs, are in the habit of never making public *any business* of any description which it is not necessary for the public to know. Secrecy becomes natural to them, and as much a habit to them as it is to others to talk ; and they have it in their power to keep things secret or not, as they may think proper. I mention this, because, in fact, I have been the means of throwing the public affairs into your hands, and I am anxious that you should conduct them as you ought. This is a matter which would never occur to you, but it is *essentially necessary*.”

“Remember, what I recommend is far removed from mystery : in fact, I recommend *silence* upon *all* occasions, to avoid the necessity of *mystery* upon *any*.” (xi. 562.)

It has been professed in our introductory observations, that all the statements, and the deductions from them, would be founded solely upon the contents of the Dispatches, subjected as they had been before publication to strict examination from the Duke himself.

The following anecdote, it is true, is not contained in any one of the Duke's letters ; but it is published in vol. i., and must have been seen by him, and, therefore, is as much to be relied upon as if it had been stated by himself. The event recorded took place at an earlier date than that of the letter which we have quoted above ; but precedence has been given to the latter, because it states in the Duke's own words his own

feelings and principles, upon which he invariably acted, and which are illustrated in the anecdote itself.

It is not intended to insinuate that any British officer would have been open to the bribery which an Oriental might feel himself warranted in offering, and which the latter would, probably, regard as too much a matter of custom to consider in any way disgraceful. We do not, therefore, put it forward as a proof of General Wellesley's disinterestedness respecting money; but it is told in an amusing way, strongly exemplifying his curt and abrupt style, and at least illustrates his general adherence to the practice of *secrecy* :—

“At a conference in camp on December 24, 1803, Mohiput Ram, the Vakeel, or Resident, from the Nizam, was very anxious to ascertain from General Wellesley what districts were likely to be assigned to his master. The General declined giving any information, when Mohiput offered him seven lacs of rupees for it (about 70,000*l.*). General Wellesley said, ‘Can you keep a secret?’ Mohiput, hoping that he had touched the right chord, eagerly answered, ‘Yes.’ ‘*And so can I,*’ said the General.

“Mohiput was supposed to have obtained the information afterwards, as the messenger who carried the dispatches was waylaid and murdered.” (i. 522.)

Sir Arthur Wellesley (as he had then been made) left India in March 1805, and reached England in September.

He was in no public situation from that time, in which the particular characteristic we are now considering was called for, until he was sent for the second time to Portugal in 1809.

The French, under Soult, were in possession of Oporto, and the whole of the kingdom north of the

Douro ; and Sir Arthur made immediate preparations to attack him.

It appeared that much discontent prevailed in Soult's army, and arrangements were made for one of the disaffected French officers to have an interview with Sir Arthur. He might naturally feel a little suspicious of such persons, and his natural *caution* (allied as it was to his general principle of *secrecy*) shows itself upon the occasion, as we see by the following letter to Colonel Tramt, who commanded the Portuguese troops in that district, and by whom the interview was to be managed :—

“ We shall have troops on the march to-morrow towards Vizeu ; and as it is desirable that your friends [alluding to the French officers] *should not see more of our troops than is absolutely necessary*, and *should know nothing of our operations*, I request you to bring or send them word to Murtede, three leagues from hence, and let me know at what hour they will be there.” (iv. 275.)

It is not our object to follow the military details, and we find nothing to illustrate the characteristic we are considering, till July, when he writes the following letter, in answer to one in which Mr. Frere, then the British Minister in Spain, had probably recommended the gentleman alluded to to his favourable notice.

Sir Arthur, apparently, had received a contradictory account. He says :—

“ I conclude that Colonel Bourke [one of the British officers attached to the Spanish armies] has given me the character which he has heard of Señor —— ; but I beg you will believe that if I should find it correct, I shall be convinced you had no knowledge of this character when he was sent ; and, at all events, I shall have no prejudice against Señor ——.” (iv. 437.)

The following letter, three weeks after, probably refers to the same person :—

“ I have no reason to complain of Señor ———. He only appears to me to be too anxious to obtain a knowledge of our plans; but I do not know whether I ought to attribute this appearance of anxiety in him to my prejudices against him, or to his desire to make his own employment of more importance, or to his curiosity, or to his wish to make himself useful. A man in his situation, if he is not honest, has it in his power to do us much mischief. He has certainly the mind and manner of an *intrigant*, and comes from a part of Spain of which the people are most likely not to be inimical to the French.

“ Besides his anxiety to obtain a knowledge of our plans *from me*, I have heard him making inquiries respecting the strength of corps from others, with which he had certainly no concern.” (iv. 478.)

We do not suppose that he learned much from Sir Arthur, who evidently could not divest himself of grave doubts respecting him.

When he was compelled, by the want of all supplies for his army, to fall back into Portugal, after Talavera, the question of the defence of that country became pressing.

Sir Arthur considers the subject in all its bearings, in a very full exposition of his views to Lord Castlereagh (August 25, 1809), and here we find the first intimation respecting the celebrated Lines of Torres Vedras, though in vague and indefinite terms:—

“ The difficulty lies in the embarkation of the British army. It is difficult, if not impossible, to bring the contest for the capital to extremities, and afterwards to embark. You will see by the map, that Lisbon is so high up the Tagus that no army that we could collect would be able at the same time to secure the navigation of the river, by the occupation of both banks, and the possession of the capital. One of the objects must, I fear, be given up. However, I have not entirely made up my mind. I have a great deal of information, but I should wish to have more before I decide.” (v. 89.)

He went to Lisbon early in October, for the purpose of a personal reconnoissance; but his only announcement of that move in his private letter to Lord Castlereagh is,—

“ I am going to Lisbon on Sunday, all being quiet; and I hope in a short time to be able to make a report on the defence of Portugal, which I hope will be satisfactory to Government.”
(v. 210.)

The first instructions for the engineers were drawn up during this visit, though they were subsequently modified and improved.

He did not anticipate an early attack, but he looked to every possible contingency, and his instructions entered into the most minute details. But they were confined *solely* to those who were to carry them into execution. It is impossible to say how far he may have divulged his scheme to those about him, in the course of conversation: but the principle of *secrecy*, which he had so ably inculcated early in his career to his friend Colonel Wallace, in India (p. 141), probably influenced him still; and we find no indication of it, in any letter or dispatch *even to the Government*, till much later.

Upon an occasion, in January 1810, when he had reason to feel that his own personal inspection of the works was necessary, he merely says in his letters to Generals Sir L. Cole and R. Crawford (who were commanding on the frontier), that he was going “for a few days upon a reconnoissance towards Torres Vedras;” and, in fact, though no doubt the execution of such works must have been, and was, known to thousands, they were completed with so little *éclat* or display, that the public in England, the greater number of our own army, and certainly the whole of the French army, were

taken by surprise when we occupied them, after the battle of Busaco.

His caution and forethought, and the avoiding of every public or outward demonstration which might excite suspicion or alarm, or convey any intimation of what *his* views might be, seemed to extend to every point. If matters should be brought to extremities, the final embarkation of the army, notwithstanding every previous precaution, must have been a hurried and hazardous operation, and if not well considered beforehand, must have been attended with immense loss of baggage, &c., even if the troops themselves were saved; and the following letter to Sir George Berkeley, who commanded the fleet in the Tagus, is in reference to that object:—

“With a view to the possible necessity of evacuating Portugal, I have considered it desirable that the baggage of the army (left in store at Lisbon) should be embarked in the transports; and it has occurred to me, that the moment at which this measure can be adopted *without being misunderstood* by the public, and *without creating alarm*, is that at which reinforcements arrive from England.” (v. 429.)

A formal public embarkation of stores and baggage, when the enemy were still beyond the frontier, would naturally have conveyed an impression that *he* anticipated danger, though remote; but the passage of boats, whether to or from the ships, at such a time as he points out, would be no novelty—it would hardly be noticed; and the idea that the embarkation going on was a long-sighted measure of precaution, would not strike the mind of the Lisbon people, and be by them disseminated far and wide.

“I have accordingly ordered that the baggage of the several

regiments may be embarked as soon as the reinforcements shall arrive, in the ships in which the regiments would be placed; and that the baggage of the regiments expected from England should be left in one of the ships which have brought each of them."

But with all this careful forethought as to the effect which premature demonstration might produce upon the public mind, we find on other occasions the exercise of sound, good sense, which made him feel the inexpediency of attempting concealment. *Intentions* might be concealed; *events* could not.

After his advance to the frontier, in June 1810, he writes from Celerico to Mr. Stuart:—

"I do not think that any measure can be adopted to prevent false reports, or to remedy the evils which result from them. False reports respecting the operations of armies are always circulated, particularly where British officers are concerned. These reports are circulated even in this town, where there is no reserve, and where every person who chooses sees the reports of intelligence received. Then we are the most indefatigable writers of letters and news that exist in the world, and the fashion of the times gives encouragement to lies. I know no mode of getting the better of the inconvenience, which is the consequence of the circulation of these false reports, excepting to have *no reserve* on the *real and well-founded* intelligence. I would not recommend publication, as it might lead to inconveniences of another description; nor would I, as Col. Peacocke very innocently but indiscreetly did last year, check, by any public order, the circulation of every description of report." (vi. 193.)

In corroboration of the danger and inconvenience resulting from the gossiping propensity which he felt was inherent in British correspondents upon foreign service, he writes to Lord Liverpool:—

"I enclose a paper which purports to be a translation of a letter from one French marshal to another, which had been

intercepted, conveying information of the strength of the Allies, extracted from the *English newspapers*. It may be satisfactory to have the reasons which this paper affords for believing that the enemy have no better means of acquiring intelligence. Very recently all the newspapers contained accounts, not only of the numbers, but of the positions occupied by this army." (vi. 232.)

An affair of outposts had taken place in Gen. R. Crawfurd's division, quite in the advanced position beyond the Coa, in which it was supposed that the 16th Light Dragoons had got into some scrape. It was suggested to Lord Wellington to have an inquiry into their conduct ; which he refused, saying that he was perfectly satisfied, and that the very fact of instituting the inquiry would imply some misconduct ; and he ends his letter to Gen. Crawfurd with his customary attack upon *gossip* :—

"All this would not much signify if our staff, and other officers, would mind their business, instead of writing news and keeping coffee-houses." [He no doubt had somebody in view.] "But as soon as an accident happens, *every man who can write*, and who *has a friend who can read*, sits down to write his account of what he does not know, and his comments on what he does not understand ; and those are circulated by the idle and malicious, of whom there are plenty in all armies ; and it would be cruel to allow the reputation of this regiment to be whispered away by ignorance, idleness, and slander." (vi. 276.)

In a letter to Sir Thomas Graham, then commanding at Cadiz, he again adverts to the mischief and danger arising from the private correspondence of officers :—

"I was astonished to see in the English newspapers an accurate account of the batteries and works erecting at Cadiz, with the number of guns and what calibre each was to contain, and their distance from each other, and from the enemy. This must have been extracted from the letter of an officer. If officers wish to give their friends this description of information,

they should request them not to publish their letters in the newspapers." (vi. 325.)

In a letter to Marshal Beresford, of September 8th, 1810, dated Gouveia, he says :—

"Upon considering the subject which you mentioned last night, I do not think it so important as it appeared upon first hearing.

"I beg you, however, *not to mention the subject* to anybody. The croaking which already prevails in the army, and particularly about head-quarters, is disgraceful to us as a nation, and does infinite mischief ; and it would become worse if this story were known." (vi. 392.)

We have no means of knowing what is alluded to. It may have been trifling, whether it related to public affairs, or to any private person or transaction ; but it is a continued illustration of his horror of gossip.

In a letter to Lord Liverpool, again adverting to the intelligence contained in the English newspapers, he says :—

"I did not mean to say that the information in the newspapers was received from your Lordship's office, or from that of the Commander-in-chief, for I know that neither have the information from *me* ; but I wished to point out the disadvantages under which we carried on our operations. Gen. Foy brought from Paris, not only the paper containing the information, but copies of all my dispatches, and Massena knew all that I intended to do, and knew accurately every inch of my position, by how many guns defended, for what purpose, &c. It may be right to give the British public this information, but they ought to know the price they pay for it, and the advantage which it gives the enemy.

"Neither I, nor any other officer in command of a British army, can prevent the correspondence of the officers. I have done everything in my power by way of remonstrance, and have been very handsomely abused for it. This intelligence must certainly have gone from some officer of this army, by whom it

was confidentially communicated to his friends in England ; and I have heard that it was circulated from one of the offices with a plan !” (vii. 357.)

With a reference to the *unlimited* publication of his dispatches in England, to which some of these remarks may have pointed, and to which he has already said there might be consequent disadvantages, we find a letter :—

“ I generally confine myself to a relation of *facts*, and seldom give any opinion upon them, and always send the same to the Portuguese Government ; marking in the Portuguese dispatch those facts which, in my opinion, *ought not to be published*, and which it would be inconvenient for the enemy to know.

“ I will, with your Lordship’s permission, adopt the same practice with my dispatches to you, and mark with a pencil in the margin those parts which, in my opinion, ought not to be published.”

So suspicious was he of the schemes of the enemy to procure information, that he regarded many things in that light which might not have struck other persons. He writes to General Campbell :—

“ I received the enclosed from the French Governor of Almeida. I beg you will tell him that we generally send off immediately any prisoners ; but I beg him to let me know his wish for any particular men, or belonging to any particular corps, recently made prisoners.

“ The truth is, that this gentleman *wants to get a little news*. He has found out that our men know little, or are but little communicative, and he wants to get some Frenchmen in exchange for them, from whom he thinks he will find out what is going on. It is as well to let him believe that we are good-natured gulls, who will easily swallow.” (vii. 297.)

The numbers of French prisoners at Lisbon became

very embarrassing, and a proposition was made by Admiral Berkeley that *disabled* men should be sent back. Lord Wellington gives the following reasons for not concurring :—

“I am sorry to say that no confidence can be placed in the parole of any French officer. I know many, who have been allowed to quit England on parole not to serve till exchanged, who are now serving in Spain.

“I have invariably experienced the greatest inconvenience from allowing any person to return to the enemy’s army. It is not believed in England that the generals commanding the French armies have no communication, and are *entirely ignorant of all that is passing around them, excepting what they derive from deserters, and from prisoners* occasionally sent back in exchange for some of our officers or soldiers.

“I attribute the success which we have had, in a great degree, to the want of information by the French generals.

“At this moment, though this whole army is within a few miles of them, they do not know where they are ; but if disabled prisoners are to be sent to them, they will get all the information they require. The disabled, as well as other prisoners, ought to be sent to England.” (viii. 62.)

Animadverting upon the gross mismanagement of their cause by the Spaniards in one of his letters to Mr. Wellesley, he says :—

“Let any one Spanish transaction be examined, and the folly of the principal people will be manifest. I apprized ——— of my intention and plan for attacking Ciudad Rodrigo, and him alone, the success of which depends principally upon the length of time during which I can keep it concealed from the enemy. Some *Spanish women* were apprized of the plan *by him*, and it must reach the enemy ! Yet he is one of the best of them.” (viii. 159.)

In a letter to some person, who was probably employed in collecting intelligence by means of communication with the French army, he says :—

“I beg you to take care how you communicate with the Portuguese in the French army. Do not let any one of them know where you are on any account, and be particularly cautious that a second individual of them does not discover that you are in correspondence with one of them; be assured that those who have betrayed their country are not to be trusted.” (viii. 403.)

The following letter is a striking proof of his caution and forethought as to the effect which even *trifling* circumstances might produce upon the enemy. We have seen that he had a conviction of the very little real knowledge which the French generally possessed respecting him; but he was conscious that, with all his care, some intelligence might reach them:—

“As I am about to undertake an important operation in Estremadura, which will require some time to complete it, I am anxious to take advantage, as much as possible, of the difficulties which the enemy experience in obtaining intelligence to gain time. With this view I have remained so long in this part of the country after the body of the army had marched; and I have detained the 5th Division here, and am desirous that you should remain in this part of the country for some time longer. I beg you to circulate in the country that I am going to *hunt on the banks of the Huelva and Yeltes*; and you might even have a house arranged FOR THE HOUNDS at Aldea de Yeltes!” (ix. 3.)

The concealment of his actual or intended movements, by remaining to the last at the quarters where he was known to have been, might have struck even a common mind; but we believe it is not every general who would have suggested the latter part of the letter, and have made *his hounds* of use in the *public* service of his country.

DISINTERESTEDNESS ABOUT MONEY AND RANK.

WE know little of the Duke's private circumstances in early life. It is not possible that he could have had much fortune ; and though we have no reason to believe that the habits of his youth were expensive, yet we may fairly presume that one brought up at Eton, introduced at an early age into the army, and made one of the aides-de-camp to the Lord-lieutenant of Ireland, would not have been without those temptations which beset other young men of his standing and position ; and, consequently, that if circumstances connected with the honourable exercise of his profession should afterwards throw favourable chances in his way, he would naturally, and, indeed, properly, take advantage of them.

A high and advanced position in India was always considered a *lucrative* one. Colonel Wellesley, though not holding at that time high military rank, was placed in a prominent position, from which he could hardly derive very great advantage, in consequence of his junior standing. We have, indeed, his own statement, in a letter to the Governor-general, of the expenses attendant upon the extra staff which he had been obliged to maintain, and the extended scale of an establishment consistent with his position, and the cost to which he had

been subjected when he was Commander-in-chief in the Deccan :—

“I take the liberty of drawing your Excellency’s attention to the inadequacy of the allowances which I received as a Major-general of the Staff of the Army ; or to the increased expenses which I was obliged to incur by the necessity of augmenting all my establishments, and of forming them upon a scale more consistent with the character with which I was invested by your Excellency, than with the situation of a Major-general commanding a division of the army.” (iii. 310.)

And yet, though he must have felt this pressure upon his finances during the whole of that service, we find that, only the preceding year (Sept. 28, 1803), when referred to respecting a claim of prize-money for the capture of Baroach, of which he, as the commander of the army engaged, would *have had a share*, he had the delicacy to decline giving an opinion. In reply to the Secretary of Government at Bombay, he says :—

“As the commanding officer of the troops employed at the siege of Baroach acted upon that occasion under my immediate orders, I consider that *I have a claim to a proportion of any benefit that may accrue* to those troops from the capture of that place. As *a party in the case*, therefore, my opinion can have little weight, and *I beg to decline giving it.*”

The allowances which the Governor-general thought fit to make him, of course form no part of General Wellesley’s own dispatches. We may reasonably suppose that his representations were duly attended to ; but we have no reason to believe that he was at any time placed in a position which could have given him pecuniary advantages.

His advance in rank was, of course, attended with advance of pay ; but we apprehend that European service is not of a nature to fill the pocket. When he entered

upon the exalted situation of Commander-in-chief of the largest British army upon record, we may very readily and truly believe that his personal expenses would have been fully, if not more than, equal to his appointments. A man who has his own private resources to fall back upon may find his professional income sufficient; and probably General Wellesley contrived to make it so. But it would have been no proof of a mercenary spirit if he had taken such advantages as his professional position might honourably lay open to him.

A considerable time elapsed before we again have an opportunity of observing his feelings upon such subjects; but the very first occasion offers to us again the same proof of his personal disinterestedness.

Upon his second appointment to command in Portugal his rapid movement upon Oporto, which was at that time in possession of the French, enabled him to take possession of it.

A question soon arose as to the rights of the captors, and how far the property thus taken from the enemy (for it must be acknowledged that they were, and had been for some time, in full and undisputed possession) was to be considered as prize. The navy, who, as being employed at the mouth of the river, considered themselves as parties contributing to the success of the operation, put in their claim; and of course, if it were granted, and the property condemned, Sir Arthur, as commander-in-chief, would be largely entitled to share.

The question was submitted to him, and the following is his answer to the British minister at Lisbon.

The most valuable part of the property was wine,

belonging to the English merchants (and some cotton, which the French had bought and collected here in charge of the French consul). The Admiral, on the notion that all the property at Oporto was to be dealt with by the rules of prize, thought us entitled to *salvage* upon the British portion. Sir Arthur says :—

“ My opinion is, that if we are entitled to it at all, we are entitled *to the whole of the property*; but the doubt I have is, whether we have a right to any part.

“ Oporto being a Portuguese port, and the British army acting in this country as allies, everything taken in Portugal belongs to the Government of Portugal.

“ However glad I shall be that the success of the army should turn out to their benefit, and however convenient it might be *to me to share in this benefit myself*, I am very unwilling to forward such a claim, if it is to put our friends out of temper.” (iv. 331.)

Some months afterwards he again writes :—

“ I considered well the whole question of the claim of the army to the property at Oporto, and the result was a conviction on my mind that we have no claim whatever. This is my opinion, but I may be wrong; and I should be sorry if the army were to lose any advantage to which they are entitled by any error of judgment of mine.” (v. 136.)

Whether his judgment were right or wrong, we cannot conceal from ourselves that he had a very considerable pecuniary interest involved in the ultimate decision; and though from his multitudinous duties, and no special legal learning upon such points, he might not have been induced to moot the point, yet if the navy or others were inclined to establish the claim, it cannot be denied that he showed much personal disinterestedness in the view which he took.

In the summer of 1809, the Spanish Government appointed him to the rank of Captain-general of the Spanish army. He replies:—

“ I have to express my acknowledgments to the Government for the honour they have done me; and I have to return them thanks for the horses which they have been pleased to present to me in the name of His Majesty Ferdinand VII.

“ In respect to the *pay* attached to the rank of Captain-general, I hope the Government will excuse me if I decline to become a *burthen upon the finances of Spain* during this contest for her independence.” (v. 3.)

We find his conduct regulated by the same disinterested principles in his connexion with Portugal. Writing to Lord Liverpool in Sept. 1811, he says:—

“ The Prince Regent of Portugal has been pleased to confer upon me the title of Conde de Vimeiro, and a pension of 20,000 cruzados per annum.

“ I have thought it proper not to accept of *any allowance* from the Portuguese Government for the *office of Marshal-general of the army*, which I fill.

“ In case H. R. H. the Prince Regent [of England] should allow me to accept the favour conferred upon me by the Prince Regent of Portugal, I propose in like manner to decline the acceptance of the *pension* offered to me during the *continuance of the existing war* for the independence of the country.” (viii. 252.)

In the commencement of the following year a proposition was made to him of giving him a regiment of two battalions, which, of course, in a pecuniary point of view, would have been more advantageous. This is the way in which he took the offer, in his letter to Colonel Torrens:—

“ I should esteem it a favour if you will tell Sir David Dundas that I am very much obliged to him, but that I have no

wish to be removed from the 33d Regiment, of which I was major, lieut.-colonel, and then colonel.

“I must say that my friend the late Secretary-at-War made it the least profitable of all the regiments of the army, and I believe a losing concern, having reduced the establishment at once from 1200 to 800, when it consisted of about 750 men; and I had to pay the freight of the clothing to the East Indies, and its carriage to Hyderabad, about 500 miles from Madras.

“With all this, I have the reputation of having *a good thing* in a regiment in the East Indies.” (v. 455.)

Some proposition appears to have been made by the Duke of York to the Prince Regent respecting a military government for him. It was without his knowledge, and was unsuccessful in consequence of a misunderstanding on the part of the Prince Regent.

Colonel Torrens apparently announced this to him, and received the following reply:—

“I am obliged to the Duke of York, as much as if his recommendation of me had been successful.

“His Royal Highness the Prince Regent must have misunderstood Lord Wellesley when he supposed that he intended to convey to him that a military government was no object to me, and that I had other views. Lord Wellesley must have said, that I had never *spoken* or *written* to him, or to anybody else, respecting such an object; but he could not have said that I had *other views*. Indeed I do not know what views I could have, excepting to serve the country to the best of my ability.

“I have never stated to anybody a wish to have a military government, because I *make it a rule never to apply to anybody*, in any manner, for *anything for myself*; and I have always been convinced that, if it was expedient and proper that I should receive such a favour, the Duke of York would recommend me, without any application from myself or my friends.

“I should have been very happy to receive, at the recommendation of H. R. H. the Commander-in-chief, the mark of favour of the Prince Regent which was proposed for me.

“I have not much time to *attend to my own affairs*, and I

do not exactly know *how I stand with the world* at present. The pay of Commander of the Forces, which is all that I receive in this country, does not defray my expenses here, while my family must be maintained in England; and I think it probable that I shall *not be richer* for having served in the Peninsula. A military government, therefore, would be desirable, as an addition to my income." (ix. 2.)

Some months afterwards, from Madrid, he writes:—

"I have been going on for more than three years upon the usual allowance of a Commander-in-chief, that is, ten pounds a-day, liable to various deductions, reducing it to about eight guineas; but it will be necessary that Government should now either give me an additional pay under the head of table-money, or any other they please, or that they should allow me to charge some of the expenses, such as charities, &c., which I am obliged to incur in the existing state of this country, or I shall be ruined.

"It is not proper, probably, to advert to other services, but I believe there is no service in which the Commander-in-chief, with such a charge as I have, is so badly paid as in the British service. Indeed, as far as I can learn, there is no instance of an officer holding a permanent command in the British service whose receipts have been confined to 10*l.* a-day with deductions. They all receive either the allowance of a government *with that* of a commander-in-chief, or an allowance of some other description; but I doubt that the trouble, or responsibility, or the expenses of any, at all equal mine. However, I should not have mentioned the subject, knowing that the public expect to be served at the lowest possible rate, if I did not find that I was in a situation in which I must incur expenses which I cannot defray without injury to myself." (ix. 373.)

The Government at home appear to have made arrangements upon the subject before they could have received the above letter, which was dated August 24; for on the 7th of September he writes:—

"I am very much obliged to your Lordship for having

adverted to my expenses in this country, and for having provided for them so handsomely. You will have received a letter from me on the subject since you dispatched yours: I should never have written it if I had not incurred an enormous expense at Madrid which I could not bear.

"You communicate to me that it is the intention to propose to Parliament to grant me the sum of 100,000*l.* to enable me to support suitably the honours which H. R. Highness has recently been pleased to confer upon me.

"I request your Lordship to take an early opportunity of expressing my gratitude for all his favours: they are far beyond my hopes, and I can show my gratitude only by continuing to serve H. R. H. with the same zeal and devotion which have already acquired them for me." (ix. 398.)

The Prince Regent at the same time granted certain heraldic distinctions, "as a lasting memorial of the glorious and transcendent achievements of the said Arthur Marquis of Wellington on various occasions."

"I shall receive with gratitude any honour which H. R. H. may think proper to confer upon me; but the addition proposed to my arms is the last which would have occurred to me. It carries with it an appearance of ostentation, of *which I hope I am not guilty*; and it *will scarcely be credited that I did not apply for it.*" (ix. 406.)

We see the modesty and simplicity of mind with which he received favours. He, no doubt, had an internal consciousness that he deserved them; and however insignificant such things are to the real advantage of man, they have acted as a stimulus to the human mind in all ages. But his mode of receiving them made every one of his countrymen additionally proud of the gift and of the recipient.

We do not know who is referred to in the conclusion of the same letter; but *his* conduct does not show to

advantage when contrasted with that of his illustrious leader:—

“I am quite surprised at the conduct of the ————. I always thought the Order of the Bath that mark of the King’s favour which it was most desirable for an officer to receive; and I mentioned it to you, as I thought it likely it would be agreeable to him. It might be very proper to create him a peer, but I would not propose such an arrangement. Even if it had been proper that I should do so for any officer, I should have considered it my duty to make you acquainted with what I know are * * *’s feelings on this subject. He was much disappointed and hurt that this mark of the King’s favour was not conferred upon him when the restrictions (imposed by the Regency Bill) ceased; and I really believe that his regard for me alone prevented him from resigning his situation. If ———— had been made a peer, I really believe that he would, notwithstanding that he is junior to ————.

“But your Lordship is aware that we none of us act discreetly in cases where our own passions are concerned.”

We think he might have made *one* exception!

He was made a Knight of the Garter in March 1813, and in the usual course would have to relinquish the Order of the Bath, of which he was a member. He writes to Lord Liverpool:—

“Some of my brother officers have expressed an anxious desire that I should continue a Knight of the Bath, into which I have admitted most of them; and all of them owe this honour to actions performed under my command. Under these circumstances, and adverting to the reasons which induced you to wish that I should resign the Order, I would wish you to consider whether it would not be better that I should keep it. I feel *great reluctance in suggesting this*, and should not have done so if it had not been suggested to me by some of the knights.

God knows I have plenty of Orders, and I consider myself to have been most handsomely treated by the Prince Regent and his Government, and shall not consider myself the less so if you *should not think proper* that I should retain the Order of the Bath." (x. 376.)

After the battle of Vittoria he was made a Field-marshal in the British service, accompanied by an autograph letter from the Prince Regent, containing these words :—"You have sent me, among the trophies of your unrivalled fame, the staff of a French marshal ; and I send you in return that of England."

Lord Wellington returned a respectful answer, concluding :—

"I can evince my gratitude for Y. R. Highness's repeated favours only by devoting my life to your service." (x. 532.)

Some officer applied to him to procure some mark of royal favour or distinction, adverting, as we may judge from the answer, to the favours which had been conferred upon himself. His answer is very characteristic :—

"What I would recommend you is, to express neither wishes nor disappointment upon the subject, even to an intimate friend, much less to the Government. Continue, as you have done, to deserve the honourable distinction to which you aspire, and you may be certain, that if the Government is wise you will obtain it.

"The comparison between myself, who have been the most favoured of His Majesty's subjects, and you, will not be deemed quite correct ; and I advert to my own situation, only to tell you that I recommend to you the conduct which I have always followed.

"Notwithstanding the numerous favours that I have received from the Crown, I have *never solicited one* ; and I have never hinted, nor would any one of my friends or relatives venture to

hint for me, a desire to receive even one. And much as I have been favoured, the consciousness that it has been spontaneously by the King and Regent gives me more pleasure than anything else.

“I recommend to you the same conduct and patience, and above all, resignation, if after all you should not succeed.” (xi. 98.)

At the battle of Vittoria all the baggage of King Joseph fell into his hands. It was all legitimate prize, and he was under no necessity of giving up any part of it. That, however, was not his mode of acting; and some months after he wrote to his brother:—

“I sent them all to England, and have found that there are among them much finer pictures than I conceived there were. And as, if the King’s palaces have been robbed of pictures, it is not improbable that some of his may be among them, and I am desirous of restoring them to His Majesty, I shall be much obliged if you will mention the subject to Don J. Luyando, and tell him that I request that a person may be fixed upon to go to London to see them, and to fix upon those belonging to His Majesty.” (xi. 586.)

After the battle of Toulouse, and the termination of hostilities, he was appointed to the post of British Ambassador at Paris. No man could be more qualified for the office, though he had never hitherto held a diplomatic situation. His acceptance was, however, expressed precisely in the same terms, and guided by the same principle, as upon any other public appointment in his own profession:—

“I am much flattered by your thinking of me for a situation for which I should never have thought myself qualified. I hope, however, that the Prince Regent and his Government are convinced that I am ready to serve him in any situation in which it may be thought that I can be of any service. Although I have been so long absent from England, I should have remained as

much longer if it had been necessary; and I feel no objection to another absence on the public service, if it be necessary or desirable." (xi. 668.)

To these instances of his total want of all affectation, all wish or attempt to push himself forward, or to apply for favour or benefit, we must add his candour.

During the long and arduous career through which we have been following him, it is true that there were not many *failures*. There were many instances, no doubt, in which the results that he might have anticipated were not realised; there were others, perhaps, in which his own sounder judgment would have induced him to decline taking a part, if it had not been for considerations of public policy; and therefore, if failure did take place, he had not himself to blame.

But there is one very striking instance of his honest candour, in a letter to Lord Liverpool in November 1812:—

"It is not easy to form a judgment in Spain of the strength of the enemy's armies. I have seldom found myself mistaken in my estimate of their numbers, when I *relied upon the returns*. The only occasion on which I have been *seriously mistaken* was at Burgos, when I relied upon the *reports of the country*.

"From what I see in the newspapers, I am afraid that the public will be disappointed at the result of the last campaign, notwithstanding that it is, in fact, the most successful in all its circumstances, and has produced more important results than any in which a British army has been engaged for the last century. We should have retained still greater advantages if I could have taken Burgos, *as I ought*, early in October.

"The fault of which I was guilty was, not that I undertook the expedition with inadequate means, but that I took there the most *inexperienced*, instead of the *best troops*. I left at Madrid the 3d, 4th, and Light Divisions, who had been with myself

always before ; and I brought with me, that were good, the 1st Division, and they were inexperienced. In fact, the troops ought to have carried the exterior line by escalade on the first trial.

“ I see that a disposition already exists to blame the Government for the failure of the siege. The Government had nothing to say to the siege : *it was entirely my own act !*” (ix. 563.)

A court-martial was to be held upon Sir John Murray, for his conduct when he relinquished the siege of Tarragona in July 1813 ; and the only reason for adverting to it here (as it was subsequently given up) is, to adduce a further proof of the Duke's *candour*.

He was compelled to prefer the charges, in his official capacity as Commander-in-chief (although Sir John Murray was acting in command of an entirely detached corps), and partly because an angry feeling existed on the part of the Admiral who was acting in co-operation with Sir John.

The change of circumstances arising from the removal of the British allied army into France, and the subsequent peace, had rendered it impossible to hold the court till after a very considerable lapse of time, and different places had been fixed for the purpose.

Mr. Larpent, the Judge-Advocate-General, was of course to have been employed ; and at the close of his “ Private Journal ” a letter is inserted from the Duke of Wellington, who was then Ambassador at Paris, in January 1815, from which we quote an extract in proof of our opinion :—

“ Sir John Murray contends, that one paragraph of my instructions directed him not to risk an action. I think he has mistaken my meaning.” And he gives his reasons for thinking so.

“ The Court has, of course, a right to judge of my meaning by *the words in which it is conveyed* (in whatever manner I may

now explain it), as the *obvious* meaning of those words was to be the guide of Sir John's conduct. I must add, also, that whatever care I may have taken, *it is not improbable* that, in drawing an instruction for the operations of so many corps, all with separate commanders-in-chief, I *may not*, in every instance, have made use of the language which should convey the meaning I had in my mind."

Here, again, is the kindly feeling towards the officer who would suffer, combined with the *candid acknowledgment* that he *might himself* have given ground for the conduct impugned by some deficiency in his own instructions.

SUBORDINATION.

PLACED very early in life in a position of great power, and compelled to exercise authority, it is not extraordinary that he should have attached much importance to the necessity of subordination amongst those who were serving under him. We do not here allude so much to the mere military technical discipline of the *soldier*, as to the moral, honourable, gentlemanly feeling of the *officer*.

Those who have had to struggle on till later in life, without attaining to stations of responsibility, are generally found to be more inclined to evade than to support principles of implicit obedience. But a man who is placed in command soon feels the necessity of enforcing due submission. It is true that there are different ways in which this is effected. Strict discipline, rigid severity, and the arm of power, no doubt will do it ; but we believe, and the instances before us in these Dispatches prove, that mild, dispassionate, and manly reasoning, appealing to the sense, the honour, and good principles of the person addressed, will frequently do it better.

We have only one instance to adduce during Colonel Wellesley's command in India, but it is strictly in point.

Colonel Murray, who had a command in the Presidency of Bombay, had had a difference of opinion with

the higher authorities; and General Wellesley had received some reference upon a part of the question. He writes to Colonel Murray:—

“ I have read with the utmost concern the letter to General Nicholls. It was hastily drawn and dispatched, to say no more: and I strongly recommend you to desire to withdraw it. It contains some strong censures upon Mr. Duncan (the Governor of Bombay) personally, and upon his government. An officer in the service of a Government, let his rank be what it may, has no right to, and cannot with propriety, address such sentiments to that Government, even supposing that they were merited by a long course of injurious treatment by such Government.

“ Remember I tell you, that no person can approve of your having written that letter, and I again most anxiously recommend you to withdraw it.” (i. 541.)

Soon after he writes again, and after some reference to the grounds of the misunderstanding he adds:—

“ For my part I shall shortly resign my charge in this part of India, and, excepting as far as good wishes go, I shall be indifferent to what passes. But I shall be sorry to hear that you misapply your talent by entering into these disputes, and that you have thereby tired the Government, and put it under a necessity not to employ you.” (ii. 66.)

This appeal seems to have produced its effect, for very shortly after he writes to the Secretary of the Governor-general:—

“ I have received a letter from Colonel Murray, in which he acknowledges his error in writing to the Governor of Bombay; according to my advice he has made an apology, and has desired leave to withdraw his letter.” (ii. 89.)

His return to Europe reduced him for a time to a subordinate station; and we believe that no page of history will produce a more modest, touching, and honour-

able example of what an officer and a gentleman should feel than Sir Arthur's on that occasion.

An expedition was fitted out to proceed to Hanover in 1805, and he was appointed to command a brigade in it. It was afterwards abandoned, and the brigade was stationed at Hastings.

The compiler of his Dispatches tells us, that an intimate friend having inquired in familiar terms of Sir Arthur how *he*, having commanded armies of 40,000 men in the field, having received the thanks of Parliament, and having been made a Knight of the Bath, could submit to be reduced to the command of a brigade of infantry? he answered: "For this plain reason,—I conceive it to be *my duty to serve with unhesitating zeal and cheerfulness when and wherever the King or his Government may think proper to employ me.*" (ii. 616.)

His conduct afterwards, when the arrival of his seniors deprived him of his first command in Portugal, is exactly founded upon the same principles. He became by it a junior and subordinate officer. He might not, and he did not, agree with, or approve the course adopted by his superiors, *but he obeyed!* He felt that from that time his services would be comparatively useless, and he requested to be allowed to retire; but as long as he remained, no young junior ensign was ever more obedient to his commander.

His own conduct thus furnished a test of the sincerity of his principles; and a man who had so done was fully justified afterwards in exacting similar obedience from those who were placed under him.

When he was on the passage, on the first expedition to the coast of Portugal, he wrote home to the Secretary of State:—

“Burghersh and Pole have apprised me of the arrangements for the future command of their army.

“All that I can say is, that whether I am to command the army or not, or am to quit it, I shall do my best to ensure its success; and you may depend upon it, that I shall not hurry the operations, or commence them one moment sooner than they ought to be commenced, in order that *I may acquire the credit of success.*

“The Government will determine for me in what way they will employ me hereafter, whether here or elsewhere.” (iv. 43.)

A month after he writes:—

“I assure you matters are not prospering here; and I feel an earnest wish to quit the army. I have been too successful with it ever to serve with it in a subordinate situation with satisfaction to the person who shall command it, and of course not to myself. *However, I shall do whatever the Government may wish.*” (iv. 118.)

A week later he writes again:—

“It is impossible for me to continue any longer with this army; and I wish that you would allow me to return home and resume my office [Chief Secretary for Ireland], if I shall still be in office, and it is convenient to the Government that I should retain it; or if not, that I should remain on the staff in England; or, if that should not be practicable, that I should remain without employment. You will hear from others of the causes which I must have for being dissatisfied, not only with the military and other public measures of the Commander-in-chief, but with his treatment of myself. I am convinced it is better for him, for the army, and for me, that I should go away, and the sooner I go the better.”

He accordingly returned to England, and the inquiry into the Convention of Cintra took place.

He was asked why, if he dissented from the propriety of the armistice, he had affixed his signature to

it? His answer was quite characteristic, and in accordance with the principles he had always professed:—

“I never said, or gave authority to anybody else to say, that I was compelled, or even ordered to sign the paper.

“It is true I was present when the armistice was negotiated by the Commander-in-chief, and I did assist in his negotiations, and I signed it by desire of the Commander-in-chief: but I never said and never will say, that the expression of the desire of the Commander-in-chief was in the shape of an order which it was not in my power to disobey, much less of compulsion.

“I thought it my duty to comply with this desire of the Commander-in-chief, from the wish which I have always felt, and according to which I have always acted, to *carry into effect the orders* and objects of those placed in command over me, *however I might differ in opinion* with them. I certainly did differ in opinion upon more than one point in the detail of what I was called upon to sign: but as I concurred in, and advised the adoption of the *principle*, I did not think proper to refuse to sign on account of any disagreement on *the details*.” (iv. 153.)

For some months after he was re-appointed to the command in Portugal, in April, we find no letters or observations upon the point now under our consideration. The first which occurs so strongly exemplifies his principles, that it is well worth inserting.

Some Portuguese officer (probably of rank) had written a letter to the Portuguese Government direct, without going through the hands of Marshal Beresford, his superior officer; and apparently containing a complaint of the Marshal, which the Government had published.

Sir Arthur Wellesley writes to the Marshal:—

“——’s conduct appears to be very bad. These people are so much accustomed to trick that they cannot refrain from

it, and they have recourse to it now to acquire popularity. There is only one line to be adopted in opposition to all trick ; that is, the *steady, straight line of duty, tempered by forbearance, lenity, and good nature.*

“ You ought to publish an order to forbid any officer to make a report to any superior authority, excepting through his immediate commanding officer ; and to point out the falsehoods in the report of — as the cause of the order at that moment. I would insert in this order or in the correspondence *no severity or asperity*, only a plain and short abstract of facts.” (iv. 441.)

His earliest, and, for a long time, his most serious inconvenience, arose from the Commissariat. Writing to Mr. Huskisson, the Secretary of the Treasury, and urgently calling the attention of the home Government to the lamentable want of money with the army, he says :—

“ The gentlemen of the Commissariat are very new in their business, and I am not without grounds of complaint of their want of intelligence ; but I believe they do their best, and I shall not complain of them. I dismissed one, two days ago ; but I have cancelled the order for his dismissal, upon his promise of greater exertion.” (iv. 445.)

All his general officers suffered from the same cause, and some of them apparently took strong measures ; for we find the following letter to General Sherbrooke in July :—

“ I am not astonished that you and the general officers should feel indignant at the neglect and incapacity of some of the officers of the Commissariat, by which we have suffered so much : but what I wish to impress upon you is, that they are *appointed by the King's authority*, though not holding *his commission* ; and that it would be more proper if all their faults were reported to me, by whom they can be dismissed, than that they should be abused by the general officers, however well deserved we may deem it to be. I do not enter into the grounds you had for being displeased with Mr. —, which I dare say were suffi-

cient; but I only desire that in all these cases *punishment may be left to me*, who alone can have the power of inflicting it." (iv. 483.)

It was not only in cases of this nature, where, in fact, there was a sort of mixed authority between the civil and the military departments (for the Commissaries were not commissioned officers, but were appointed by the Treasury), that he felt the necessity of *sole* responsibility; but, *à fortiori*, he exacted it in purely military cases.

A letter to Mr. Villiers gives us reason to infer that, for reasons which no doubt appeared sufficient to that gentleman, he had suggested to General Blunt, who was in command at Lisbon, some changes in the distribution of the troops there, of which Sir Arthur did not approve:—

"I intend to assemble the army on the Tagus, and to act on the north or south bank as I may think proper. I hope, however, that the troops will be left in their stations *till I send them orders to move*.

"The foundation of all military plans is compounded of the situations of one's own troops, those of the allies, and those of the enemy: but if I cannot be certain even of my own, it is impossible for me to form, much less to execute, any military plan. I do not in general leave the troops idle, and you may depend upon it they will have enough to do before the campaign is over. The troops *must not be moved without my direction*." (iv. 337.)

After the retreat following the battle of Talavera, some occurrence took place without his orders, which, upon the principle as explained above, deranged his plans. No names of the person or the place are given, but the following memorandum shows how strongly he felt it:—

"From the orders sent yesterday to ——— he will see how important it is that an officer should *strictly obey the orders which he receives*; and, having obeyed them, should patiently wait for further orders.

“ He could not suppose that he was forgotten, or that any of those points respecting which he *has taken upon himself* to give orders, such as the march of the 11th Regiment and the artillery from Lisbon, &c. had not been attended to.

“ The orders given yesterday contain a detailed plan for the defence of Portugal, founded upon a supposition that different corps were in certain situations.

“ In consequence of ——’s orders and arrangements all this now becomes a matter of doubt; and he will understand that his movements and orders have involved him in very serious responsibility.” (v. 36.)

Writing shortly afterwards to Marshal Beresford, he adverts to the same circumstance, as connected with some proposed movement of the latter, and says:—

“ General ——’s disobedience of orders, although well intensioned, was positive, and committed with his eyes open; and as his corps was useless at Zarza Mayor, and in your retreat might have embarrassed you, I was not sorry, by ordering him back to the position he had quitted, to *show him and the army that I must command and they must obey.*” (v. 55.)

It is possible that some of these events may not be inserted here in strict chronological order; but the object has not been to record the events of the campaign, so much as to illustrate the feelings and objects of the commander.

We have already seen that he had had reason to complain of the selection of officers sent from home into the Portuguese service, and the following letter shows that his objections were not confined to the junior ranks:—

“ I enclose a letter to your Lordship relative to Brigadier-general —— and Colonel —— who have absented themselves from the Portuguese service without leave; and who, it appears, cannot be punished, as they are not in His Majesty’s service.

"I beg to recommend, that in future persons of this description may not be sent to serve in Portugal, because no means exist of punishing the military disorders and irregularities of which they may be guilty, of the kind committed by Brigadier-general —— and Colonel ——.

"In respect to these gentlemen, I should also beg leave to suggest that they may not in future be employed in England, as inspecting field-officers, &c." (v. 236.)

By the following letter we see that it was not merely the military efficiency in the field, or the obedience to his orders upon professional subjects, with which his time and talents were occupied, but that he had actually to pay attention to, and endeavour to control, the *private conduct* of men hundreds of miles from him.

With the weight pressing upon his mind, and occupying (as one should have thought) every faculty, it might have been hoped, that those who were left in charge at distant points might have relieved him from these minor cares. But the following letter shows that this was not the case.

To Colonel Peacocke, commanding at Lisbon, he says:—

"I am concerned to be obliged to inform you, that it has been mentioned to me that some British officers in Lisbon have conducted themselves in a very improper manner at the theatres. I cannot conceive for what reason officers should conduct themselves at Lisbon in a manner which would not be permitted in their own country.

"Officers commanding regiments, and superior officers, *must take measures* to prevent a *repetition of such conduct*; or *I must take measures* to prevent the character of the army, and of the British nation, from suffering by the misconduct of a few.

"I beg you to take such measures as may be necessary to prevent a repetition of this conduct."

The Commissariat still continued to be the source of

his principal embarrassment. They had great difficulties to contend with, no doubt, and Sir Arthur was well aware of it. But there was a great want of experience in the department; and, probably, from the tone of the following letter to the Commissary-general, Mr. Murray, some want of energy and exertion:—

“I have the mortification to learn that the horses of the cavalry have been worse supplied in their present quarters than they have yet been.

“You were informed on the —, by the Quarter-master-general, of the proposed distribution of the cavalry, with a view to the supply of forage.

“I beg to know *what orders* you gave, and *what arrangements* you made, and on *what dates*, and *to whom*, to ensure these objects? I also desire to know *who* gave Mr. — leave to go to Lisbon? He ought to have made arrangements before he left his station, even if he had leave.

“I am determined that the Government shall know how the public are served, and all the most important objects are disappointed, by the inefficiency or neglect of the officers of the Commissariat.” (v. 421.)

In another letter shortly after to General Payne he says:—

“This failure of all our measures for the re-establishment of the heavy cavalry is entirely attributable to Mr. —, of whom I shall make a formal complaint to the Treasury, and shall suspend him from his office till their pleasure is known.

“If the cavalry had been in order, and had recovered, as I had reason to expect they would, I might now strike a blow of essential importance. However, it cannot now be helped. Mr. — shall be punished, and I hope the next commissary will do his duty better.” (v. 445.)

British officers were employed with different divisions of the Spanish armies to communicate confidentially with the British; and so little reliance was to be placed upon

all the Spanish reports of their own proceedings, that the accuracy of these officers was of vital importance. Lieutenant-colonel Carroll was one of them, and had written to Lord Wellington after some affair, of which a very different account reached him from other quarters. The Spaniards were reported to have dispersed in a dastardly way, which Colonel Carroll had not reported.

"If this fact be true, it is desirable that you should have reported it; and, indeed, as the reports of officers employed as you are, are the foundation of the measures of the Government, and upon which I must found the operations of the army under my command, it is most desirable that they should be correct and full in every particular." (v. 362.)

A correspondence had taken place with General R. Crawford, in which that officer had apparently felt hurt at some of Lord Wellington's observations, who now writes :—

"I am concerned that you should believe I had any feeling of disapprobation in consequence of our discussions upon commissariat concerns. You and I must necessarily take a different view of these questions: *I* must view them in their relations with the different parts of the army, and with the departments at home; *your* view is naturally confined to their relation with your own immediate command.

"In discussing them, I considered that it was to be carried on as if neither had any concern in things as they stood, and made my remarks with perfect freedom, without taking much trouble to choose the terms: but there was no feeling of disapprobation during the time or since.

"I conceive that a part of my business, and not the most easy, is to prevent discussion and disputes between the officers under my command; and I therefore did not send you the letter, from General Cox to General Beresford, to which you refer. The observations which I made on the letter would show you what I felt.

"But it is really better to drop the whole of the subject. I

am convinced that in all you have done you have been actuated solely by a desire to forward the service, and to force those, who are more interested than we are, to do their duty by their country and by us."

The different officers who were in command of brigades, &c., were on many occasions extremely solicitous to increase their strength, more especially in British. The following is one of his replies to such application:—

"I have no doubt of the zeal of the troops under your command, or of their desire to be actively employed.

"In answer to your desire to have more English, I must inform you that I class and dispose of the troops of different descriptions according to my views of the service which will be required of them, *and not as a matter of favour to any officer.*" (vi. 380.)

The Portuguese Government were still very troublesome in urging their views of military operations:—

"They will end in forcing me to quit them: and then they will see how they will get on. They will then find that I alone keep things in their present state. Indeed the temper of some of the officers of the British army gives me more concern than the folly of the Portuguese. I have always been accustomed to have the confidence and support of the officers which I have commanded: but for the first time, whether owing to the opposition in England, or that the magnitude of the concern is too much for their minds and their nerves, or whether I am mistaken and they are right, I cannot tell; but there is a system of *croaking* in the army which is highly injurious to the public service, and which I must devise some means of putting an end to, or it will put an end to us. Officers have a right to form their own opinions; but officers of high rank ought to keep their opinions to themselves. If they do not approve of the system of their commander, they ought to withdraw from the army. And this *is the point* to which *I must bring some*, if their own good sense does not prevent them from going on as they have done lately." (vi. 403.)

Some correspondence appears to have taken place between Lord Wellington and Dr. Frank, the head of the Medical Department. Lord Wellington writes to the latter, with the temper and moderation which distinguished him, in order to prevent erroneous impressions from taking effect amongst the valuable members of that branch of the service. But the necessity for his writing illustrates strongly the truth of his observations in the letter which we have quoted a few pages back, as to the difficulty which he had in executing "*the part of his duty, and not the most easy*, of preventing discussions and disputes amongst his officers."

"I have ordered a Board to inquire into the complaint of Lieutenant —, which I have no doubt will end in a manner satisfactory to you. But I feel concerned at the tone of the letters which I have received from you lately, written under the notion that these complaints were reflections upon *you*, encouraged by *me*.

"Lieutenant —'s complaint, in particular, is a reflection upon *me* much more than upon *you* !

"We all do our best to carry on the service in a manner the most satisfactory ; and I have been much misunderstood by you and the gentlemen of the Medical Department, if it is supposed that I have expressed dissatisfaction.

"But the best arrangements may fail, and it may be necessary to inquire into the causes of these accidents.

"These inquiries, it is true, always suppose that there has been some *failure* : but it does not follow of course, that there has been *fault*, much less on the part of the head of the Department."

Applications from persons in high stations, sometimes, perhaps, private friends, on behalf of officers who had incurred Lord Wellington's displeasure, were no doubt, at times, a source of much embarrassment and annoyance to him. Every man who got into a scrape

was apt to think that a word from a person of rank or importance would influence Lord Wellington, and effect his reinstatement. The application was, no doubt, frequently made to him from mere easiness of temper, or to get rid of importunity, without a full knowledge of the case on the part of the writer; but the following is an instance how little effect they had with one who did not form an opinion in a hurry at the beginning of a case, and did not change it from fear or favour at the end:—

“ To the Right Honourable ——— ”

“ Oct. 19, 1810.

“ My dear Sir,—I received your letter regarding Mr. ———, late Lieut. of the ——— Regiment, and I am much concerned that the conduct of that officer was such as to prevent me from attending to your request. When in arrest for one crime, he insulted, in the grossest and most wanton manner, another officer; for which he refused to make any apology, though desired to do so by me; and he broke his arrest.

“ If I were to interfere in favour of those who commit offences of this description, I should give such a blow to the discipline and subordination of the army, that there would very soon be no army remaining.

“ I am convinced that you will perceive the impossibility of my interfering in any manner.

“ I enclose the orders of the army, and the decision of the court-martial.” (vi. 496.)

Applications for leave to go home, as we have already seen (p. 97), were amongst the most irksome trials that he had. He had himself been upon service from the very commencement, without an hour's relaxation. It is true that, if he had been compelled by health or any other consideration, to vacate his post for even the shortest time, everything must have been paralyzed; but though this did not apply with equal force, in the case of every officer serving under him, it did weigh heavily

when they held responsible situations. The following letter to General R. Crawford explains his feelings : —

“ Officers (general officers in particular) are the best judges of their own private concerns ; and though my own opinion is, that there is no private concern that cannot be settled by instruction and power of attorney (and that, after all, is not *so* settled), I cannot refuse leave to those who say that their business requires personal superintendence.

“ It is certainly the greatest inconvenience to the service that officers should absent themselves as they do, each requiring that, when it is convenient to return, he shall find himself in the same situation as when he left. In the mean time, who is to do the duty? How am I to be responsible for the army? Is Colonel —— a proper substitute for General Crawford, in the command of our advanced posts? or General —— for Sir Stapleton Cotton, in command of the cavalry?

“ I may be obliged to *consent* to the absence of an officer, but I cannot *approve* of it. I repeat that you know the situation of affairs as well as I do, and you have my leave to go, if you think proper.” (vii. 191.)

The following is an admirable specimen of a courteous yet stern refusal to an unreasonable application :—

“ It always gives me great concern to be under the necessity of refusing compliance with a request, and I might have hoped to be spared this by one who must know that I would gratify him if it were in my power ; and who must be aware that it is absolutely without precedent that any officer should ask, much less obtain, leave of absence, on any account, excepting that of sickness or of business, the neglect of which may be prejudicial.

“ I repeat that I cannot give leave to any officer whose health does not require his return to England, or who has not business which cannot be done by another, or delayed. You cannot bring forward *either of these pleas*. Your health is good ; and as for your business, I know of none that can require your immediate return, which would not have required that you should have remained, when you left England six months ago.

“ I trust that I shall be spared the pain of again refusing you.” (v. 302.)

An officer, who had been suspended from rank and pay by sentence of court-martial, applied for leave of absence :—

“ When I observe in Lieut. ——’s letters a disposition to repeat the offence, which it had been the object of the sentence to punish, I cannot think him an officer entitled to any indulgence.

“ A very trifling degree of education and practice will enable an officer to string together a few words in a letter, in a manner and conveying a meaning which a superior cannot bear. But this is a dangerous qualification, unless the possessor has sense to guide his pen, and discretion to restrain him from intemperate language.

“ As the sentence of the court has not had the effect upon Lieut. ——, I hope that the refusal to grant an indulgence (which, probably, would not have been refused, if applied for in those terms of civility in which indulgences are usually asked), will correct a disposition which can never tend to his advantage.

“ He must remain at the head-quarters of his regiment till the term of his suspension is concluded.” (vii. 222.)

He writes to Lord Liverpool respecting officers on leave :—

“ I assure you that the departure of the general officers was as much against my inclination as their arrival in England was injurious to the public interests. I did everything to prevail upon them not to go, but in vain ; and I acknowledge that it has given me satisfaction to find that they have been roughly handled in the newspapers. The consequence of the absence of some of them was that, in the late operations, I have been obliged to be general of cavalry and of the advanced guard, and the leader of two or three columns, sometimes on the same day.

“ I have requested Col. Torrens not to allow any general officer to come out in future, who is not willing to declare that he has no private business to recall him to England, and that he will remain with the army as long as it shall stay in the Peninsula.”

The following observations may be said to refer rather more to discipline than to subordination; but as the conduct and character of officers are involved, it is not improperly connected with this branch of our subject. They are contained in letters to Marshal Beresford, with respect to the cavalry:—

“ I recommend you to keep your troops very much *en masse*. I have always considered the cavalry to be the most delicate arm that we possess. We have few officers who have practical knowledge of the mode of using it, or who have ever seen more than two regiments together; and all our troops, cavalry as well as infantry, are a little inclined to go out of order in battle. To these circumstances add, that the defeat of, or any great loss sustained by our cavalry, would be a misfortune amounting almost to a defeat of the whole, and you will see the necessity of keeping the cavalry as much as possible *en masse* and in reserve, to be thrown in when an opportunity may offer.”

This was written on the 20th of March. A gallant affair of cavalry, but not attended by any result, took place within a very few days, (on the 25th,) in which the very circumstances foreseen by Lord Wellington occurred from want of attention to the principles above laid down.

“ I wish you would call together the officers of the dragoons, and point out to them the mischiefs which must result from the disorder of troops in action. The undisciplined ardour of the 13th Dragoons and the 1st Portuguese cavalry is not of the description of determined bravery and steadiness of *soldiers*, confident in their discipline and their officers. Their conduct was that of a *rabble*,—galloping, as fast as their horses would carry them, over a plain, after an enemy to whom they could do no mischief when they were broken, and sacrificing all the objects of your operation by their want of discipline.

“ If the enemy could have thrown out of Badajoz only 100 men, regularly formed, they would have driven back these two regiments; and would, probably, have taken many whose horses were knocked up. If the 13th are again guilty of this conduct,

I shall take their horses from them, and send the officers and men to do duty at Lisbon." (vii. 400.)

Another affair took place afterwards (June 1812), which thoroughly proved the soundness of the principles he had laid down for the management and use of cavalry at the time of the affair at Campo Mayor, and the disregard of which had led to the present disaster:—

"I have never been more annoyed than by ----'s affair, and I entirely concur with you in the necessity of inquiring into it. It is occasioned entirely by the trick our officers of cavalry have acquired of galloping at everything, and then galloping back as fast as they gallop on. They never consider their situation, never think of manœuvring before an enemy, so little that one would think they cannot manœuvre except on Wimbledon Common; and when they use the arm as it ought to be used, they never keep nor provide a reserve.

"The two regiments were the best in the cavalry in this country, and it annoys me particularly that the misfortune has happened to them. I do not wonder at the French boasting of it; it is the greatest blow they have struck." (ix. 240.)

Another letter, a few weeks later, touches on the same subject, not referring to cavalry only:—

"The frequent instances which have occurred lately of severe loss, and, in some instances, of important failure, by officers leading the troops beyond the point to which they are ordered, and beyond all bounds [mentioning the instances], have induced me to determine to bring before a court-martial any officer who shall in future be guilty of this conduct.

"I entertain no doubt of the readiness of the officers and soldiers to *advance upon the enemy*; but it is my duty to regulate this spirit, and not to allow them to follow up trifling advantages, in which they incur the risk of being prisoners to the enemy whom they had before beaten. The desire to be forward in engaging the enemy is not uncommon in the British army; but the quality I wish to see the *officers* possess is, a cool judgment in action, which will enable them to decide with promptitude how far they *can and ought* to go; and to act with such

decision that the soldiers will look up to them with confidence, and obey them with alacrity.

“ I trust that this letter will have the effect of inducing the officers to reflect seriously upon the duties they have to perform before the enemy, and avoid the error which is the subject of it.” (vii. 545.)

The provocations to himself and his army to take the law into their own hands were abundant, and nothing but the most decided conduct of the commander could have prevented fearful reprisals. The people of the country were ready enough to cry out, but very little disposed to assist in detecting or punishing the offenders ; and the difficulty of maintaining due discipline was increased to the greatest degree, in spite of all his efforts.

“ I have received reports as to the misconduct of certain officers at Espinhal, on the 11th of May. I have ordered Capt. — into arrest, in hopes that the Government [Portuguese, as he would be tried by *civil* law,] will adopt measures to enforce the attendance of evidence.

“ I observe that, as usual, there is great readiness to complain, but no desire to prosecute ; and though Capt. — will be brought to trial for having taken upon himself to do himself justice, I am not astonished when a British officer is guilty of this conduct.

“ They scarcely ever enter a village in which they or their people are not robbed, and they can get no redress on the spot ; and I repeat, that since I have been in Portugal I have not known any man punished except for being a French partisan.

“ But whatever may be the conduct of the Portuguese, I *shall not allow the British army to commit irregularities with impunity* ; and Captain — shall certainly be tried, if within a month evidence is produced against him.” (viii. 98.)

We do not know who the following delinquent was :—

“ In regard to — —, surely no man can complain that the want of ‘ daily state reports ’ for so many days was not a

ground of complaint. I ordered the person responsible to the Adjutant-general to be put in arrest; and upon being informed that ——'s superiors were in fault (for fault there was), I said, Let them be put in arrest. I do not think there is anything unreasonable or harsh in this: and with every good disposition towards ——, he must not expect that I shall recall anything I have ever authorised to be written respecting anybody on *any omission of duty*." (viii. 127.)

Some months before this time (Sept. 1811) he had written home respecting certain officers, who had then been proposed to be sent out (*vide* p. 92). He now says:—

"When I wrote in February in regard to Clinton, things were in a very different state, and opinions very different.

"I object to the mode which our officers have of adopting an opinion before they entirely understand the subject; and then acting as if it were necessary that he should produce an alteration of measures in an army as he would in the House of Commons. Every man has a right to form his own opinion, and to retain it: but I expect, what I do not always find, that when he comes to the army he shall act according to *my* opinion, I being alone responsible. However, matters are so altered, that not only I have no objection, but I shall be glad to have the assistance of General Henry Clinton.

"Former subjects of difference are gone by, and are not worth considering; neither would ever think of them under existing circumstances." (viii. 264.)

A complaint had been made against General Campbell by —— of the —— Regiment, who felt that he had spoken in violent and abusive terms to him, and who demanded a court-martial. In that division of our subject which treats of courts-martial we shall find Lord Wellington's reasons for not granting one at that time. But though the language in that officer's letters had been highly improper, Lord Wellington's sense of justice

made him feel that the General was not free from blame, and he wrote to the General himself. It is impossible to conceive a more manly, dignified suggestion to a superior officer, of the mode in which duty (occasionally most harassing and painful) should be carried on, than the following :—

“Harsh and ungentlemanlike language by a superior, does afford ground of complaint to an inferior officer. But the complaint ought to be made at the moment.

“It would, undoubtedly, be better if language of this description were never used ; and if officers placed as you were could correct errors and neglects, in language which should not hurt the feelings of the person addressed, and without vehemence.

“But, unfortunately, there are some of us who cannot avoid to feel warmly for the success of the operation of which we have the charge, and to express ourselves with vehemence, and in language not perfectly correct ; and though I consider every officer responsible for language of this description, the complaint ought to be made immediately, in order that the circumstances may come fairly before those whose duty it may be to inquire into the subject.

“Conceiving, therefore, that Lieutenant-colonel ——’s feelings could not have been hurt by the language now complained of, or that he could not have allowed *four months* to elapse, and that it is now only made to aggravate complaints upon other subjects, which afford him no ground for complaint, I do not think it proper to make his complaint upon this head the subject of further inquiry.” (viii. 292.)

An officer of the rank of Major-general had been furnished with detailed instructions, which he had disregarded. Lord Wellington gives his proofs of the disobedience of his orders, and of the inconvenience resulting from it ; and concludes with what may be regarded as a most quiet, yet impressive reprimand :—

“Till I received your letter I did not conceive it possible

that you would so far have disregarded your instructions, otherwise I should certainly have prevented it.

"I am willing to believe that the omission to obey my instructions was not intentional, and that it is to be attributed to that description of inattention which is too much the practice of the service. If the instructions of the 5th March had been read with attention, and pains had been taken to understand them, and a plan had been taken for the mode of executing them, in case of the occurrence of the case for which they were provided, it is impossible that the mistakes of which I complain could have occurred." (ix. 72.)

We have nothing to guide us as to the regiment alluded to in the following observations :—

"There exists a committee in the ——th Regiment, which, I suppose, is the committee for mess, &c.; but you will see that it extends its attention to other matters, with which it ought to have no concern, and which is improper and injurious to discipline.

"Nothing upholds discipline and good order to a greater degree than the sentiments and spirit of the officers. No man dares to neglect his duty, or to conduct himself in a manner unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, if he knows that his conduct will be noticed with disapprobation by his brother officers. But such a spirit among the officers is very different from what appears as the proceedings of the committee in the ——th.

"In the former case every officer judges and acts for himself, and discourages misconduct or neglect of duty by his demeanour towards those guilty of either. He does not bend his opinion even to a whole mess, which, I am sorry to say, sometimes acts in the spirit of combination; much less does he shape his conduct according to the opinion of a *committee* of that mess.

"The existence of such a committee, taking upon themselves to advert to circumstances such as the ——th have considered, must be prejudicial to subordination; and that even the officers themselves cannot with propriety act as this committee has.

"I beg you to call before you the officers, and point out to them the danger and impropriety of such conduct; and inform the commanding officer that *I shall consider him responsible.*"
(x. 179.)

Much discontent had been excited in the cavalry regiments by the orders to draft their horses, and some of the officers seem to have remonstrated in a tone which displeased Lord Wellington.

We have seen in a former chapter how much opposed he was to the measure, and how strenuously he endeavoured to avoid carrying it into execution. But his efforts were unavailing. It was *ordered!* he must *obey!* and those under him *must obey!*

He writes as follows to General Alten:—

"I have received the orders of the Commander-in-chief to draft the horses from the — —; and whatever may be the feelings or opinion of the regiment, I shall certainly obey the orders if it should be necessary.

"I did not require the opinion of — — to be aware of the merits of the 2d Hussars, which I, probably, should have taken a proper opportunity of expressing, if it had not appeared by your letter that the probability of drafting the horses had occasioned dissatisfaction, inconsistent with military subordination; and which had induced you to 'advise' the regiment to bear their fate 'quietly, and as good, disciplined, brave soldiers ought, and to behave on their march everywhere as such:' and to tell me that 'you trust they will do so.'

"I had believed that the — — would *certainly* behave so on all occasions: and if there were any doubt, that something more than *advice* would have been given to ensure it.

"I have now to inform you that, if I find it necessary to draft the horses I shall order — — to march with the regiment as their colonel, and to remain with them till they are embarked, in order that I may be certain that they 'behave as good, disciplined soldiers ought;' and that, contrary to my usual practice, I shall refrain from paying in general orders the

compliment their services may deserve till they shall have quitted the country." (x. 257.)

The officer who had remonstrated did not gain much by high-sounding words.

The recommendation of individuals to serve in different capacities, through the medium of private friends, was a source of embarrassment, and his power of writing civil letters must sometimes have been severely tried. His brother, Sir Henry Wellesley, had recommended a gentleman, who, we may suppose, had been hitherto employed, or who had employed himself, in collecting intelligence :—

"Although I do not very much approve of General —, I shall have no objection to employ him, provided he *will join*, take *the command of*, and *stay with* the troops to which he is appointed, and *confine his attention solely to them*.

"His letter from —, of the 22d April, is a counterpart of all those I have ever seen from him. I possess many, which would convey equally good information; and the letters are not confined to *you, who may have sent him* to acquire information, but they fly about the army and England, addressed to persons of all descriptions. I possess *accurate* information on every point on which he has written, and can supply you with it if you like.

"If he will discontinue his attention to *universals*, and confine them to his particular duty, I will employ him as a general, otherwise not: but I will not allow him to remain as an idler and amateur with any army, in order to give him an opportunity of circulating the description of intelligence which he picks up." (x. 366.)

Whether he ever was employed we know not; but it is evident that Lord Wellington's horror of *gossip* was as strong as ever.

The occasional absence upon leave, and subsequent return of officers, occasioned many temporary appoint-

ments, the holders of which were afterwards reduced to their former positions. The nature of these temporary promotions, on most of the occasions, must have been obvious; and under the presumption (which from his general character we must entertain) that Lord Wellington was not guilty of *injustice* to the officer so circumstanced, we should believe that none but a very sensitive (not to say *huffy*) man could have taken offence. Unfortunately we find many such, and the following letter shows that he was not free from them :—

“ I cannot understand the nature of the feelings of an officer which are to be mortified by his performance of his duty in the situation in which His Majesty and the rules of the service have placed him. I can only say, that in the course of *my military life I have gone from the command of a brigade* to that of *my regiment*, and from the command of *an army* to that of a *brigade* or division, as I was ordered, without feeling mortification.

“ As, however, you feel mortified upon reassuming the command of your regiment from the command of a brigade (of which your regiment forms a part), you will see the propriety of my determination not to remove officers from their regiments to the temporary command of brigades of which their regiments do not form a part; as it is probable that your feelings would have been mortified in a greater degree if you had now been obliged to return to your regiment from a brigade of the line.” (x. 369.)

After the battle of Vittoria he writes home :—

“ Any reinforcements may come to Santander, though I am very apprehensive of marching our vagabond soldiers through the province of Biscay, in *the state of discipline they and their officers* generally come out to us. The people will shoot them as they would the French, if they should misbehave.

“ We started with the army in the highest order, and up to the day of the battle nothing could be better; but that event annihilated all order and discipline. The soldiers have got about a million sterling in money. The night of the battle

was passed in looking for plunder: the consequence was, they were totally knocked up, and incapable of pursuing the enemy. The rain came on and increased their fatigue, and we have now, out of the ranks, double the amount of loss in the battle: we have lost more men in the pursuit than the enemy.

"This is the consequence of the discipline of the British army. We may gain great victories, but we shall do no good till we alter our system, so far as to force *all ranks* to do their duty. The —th — are a disgrace to the name of soldier, in action as well as elsewhere; and I propose to draft their horses from them, and send the men to England, if I cannot get the better of them in any other manner." (x. 473.)

"It is an unrivalled army for *fighting*, if the soldiers can only be kept in their ranks during the battle: but it wants some of the qualities indispensable to enable a general to bring them into the field in the order fit to meet an enemy, or to take advantage from a victory: the cause of their defects is want of habits of *obedience and attention to orders by the inferior officers, and indeed by all*. They never attend to an order, with an intention to obey it, and therefore never understand it or obey it when obedience becomes troublesome or difficult.

"I cannot recommend — — for promotion, because I have had him in arrest since the battle for disobeying an order given to him by me verbally. I put him in arrest, and had determined to make an example of him; but I have since released him. But I cannot recommend him for promotion.

"Our soldiers are terrible fellows for everything but fighting with their regiments. What do you think of seventy or eighty of them having wandered during the late operations, and having surrendered themselves to some of the French *peasantry*, whom they would at other times have eaten up?" (x. 624.)

He always acknowledges their readiness to *fight*: and we have seen in some of the preceding pages that the object he had most at heart was to make his *officers* exercise proper judgment in restraining their men, when common sense and ordinary prudence ought to show

them that there was no necessity to incur loss of life. Here is another case in point :—

“ I shall be obliged to you to tell ——— that I am concerned again to be obliged to disapprove of his conduct. He has just lost 150 men for nothing, and in disobedience of your orders. If the enemy were ten times worse, and more disheartened than they are, the conduct of ——— in getting his brigade into unnecessary scrapes would make them soldiers again.

“ It is unworthy of one of his reputation to get his brigade into scrapes for the sake of the *gloriole* of driving in a few piquets, knowing as he must do that it is not intended he should engage in a serious affair.

“ I hope he will reflect upon what has passed, and observe that the best he can do is to obey orders, and execute strictly the designs of his commander.” (xi. 181.)

Promotion of officers, within their own regiments, is of course the regular process, and naturally looked to by the members of it.

One of the cavalry regiments had grossly misconducted itself, in Lord Wellington's opinion, during and immediately after the battle of Vittoria, and he had stopped promotion in it. Three troops had been since given to officers from other regiments, and a fourth was now vacant, for which, apparently, interest was being made at home; as Lord Wellington writes to Colonel Torrens, to tell him that the regiment was still in very bad condition, adding,—

“ I will not recommend any officer belonging to it for any promotion whatever. From what I have seen of them, my opinion is that they cannot be called a regiment at all: there is no established system of discipline or subordination among

them, and the gentleman at their head is quite incapable of commanding them.

“The question is, whether to refrain from promoting the officers of a bad regiment is the way to improve it? If it is, they ought not to be promoted, and I will not recommend them till the regiment is improved, *whatever may be the extent to which private interests may be effected*. If it is not, the sooner the officers of the ——— are promoted the better!” (xi. 189.)

The following remarks probably refer to the same regiment: and though in a work of this nature the promotion of any given officers is of very minor importance, it is adduced here as a proof of his readiness to take a lenient and favourable view if he could:—

“Captain ——— of the ——— was killed in an awkward affair which a squadron of that regiment got into: and there are now two troops vacant. Although they are still in my opinion the *worst, the worst commanded, and the worst officered* regiment that I have ever met with, and we are obliged to get the general officer of the brigade to look after them as the commanding officer of the regiment, yet, as Sir Stapleton thinks they are in some degree improved, I have recommended the oldest lieutenant for one of the vacant troops, and Lieutenant ——— for the other.” (xi. 415.)

He had at length got the Spanish troops into some sort of discipline. When they got to the borders of France he says:—

“The Spaniards plundered a good deal, and did a good deal of mischief in the first two days: but even this misfortune has been of service to us. Some were executed and many punished; and I sent all the Spanish troops back into Spain to be cantoned, which has convinced the French of our desire not to injure individuals. The inhabitants have in general returned—many at the risk of their lives, having been fired at by the French sentries, and are living very quietly and comfortably with *our* soldiers cantoned in their houses.” (xi. 304.)

They still gave him much trouble wherever they did remain. It was, perhaps, not unnatural; probably they were not very carefully treated as to food, &c. by their own authorities; and it must be borne in mind that the spirit of *retaliation* had an effect upon a Spaniard which did not influence an Englishman. Lord Wellington writes to General Morillo, and was apparently a good deal excited; it is in warmer terms than usual:—

“Before I gave the orders of which you and your officers have made such complaints, I warned you repeatedly of the misconduct of your troops, which I *told you I would not permit*. I give you notice, that whatever may be the consequences, I will repeat those orders if your troops are not made to conduct themselves as well-disciplined soldiers ought.

“I did not lose thousands of men to bring the army into France, in order that the soldiers might plunder and ill-treat the French peasantry; and I beg that you and your officers will understand, that I prefer to have a small army that will obey to a large one that is disobedient and undisciplined: and if the measures which I am obliged to adopt to enforce obedience and good order, occasion the loss of men and the reduction of my force, it is *totally indifferent to me*; and the fault rests with those who suffer their soldiers to commit disorders.

“I cannot be satisfied with *professions* of obedience. My *orders must be really obeyed*, and *strictly carried into execution*; and if I cannot obtain obedience in *one way*, I will in *another*, or I will not command the troops which disobey.” (xi. 390.)

Don Manuel Freyre, under whom General Morillo was, wrote to Lord Wellington upon this subject, and probably in a tone of remonstrance. Lord Wellington replies:—

“Finding that all my remonstrances to General Morillo and his officers were vain, that the disorders still continued, and that I received warnings from various quarters of the danger to the General and others from the vengeance of the peasantry, I

directed that his troops should be *kept under arms during the day*, till further orders.

“Notwithstanding General Morillo’s doubts that I have *the right* to give such orders, I believe he will find that every officer in command not only has the right, but that it is his duty.

“His letter appears to be a *complaint of me*, which *he* certainly has a *right to make*, and it is *my duty to transmit it to the Government*.” (xi. 400.)

Every reader of this proceeding, we believe, will consider Lord Wellington to be perfectly justified ; and that General Morillo’s remonstrance was merely a specimen of Spanish pride and temper, which Lord Wellington would have been fully authorised to treat as such. But no : as usual, he views it in the most tranquil and placable manner, and proves again, as in so many former cases, how leniently he could view matters ; and with a consideration, of which the General hardly seems worthy, he merely says :—

“As the letter shows that it was written in a moment of irritation, and contains some matters not very relevant to the subject, I detain it, till I shall hear from you, that it shall be forwarded as it is, or altered and confined to the simple complaint of my order.”

The General, however, was not satisfied, and General Freyre wrote again ; to whom Lord Wellington replied :—

“It would be very satisfactory to me to allow this subject to drop ; but General Morillo’s letter contains some assertions which I cannot allow to pass unobserved.

“In regard to the particular expression in the order to which he refers, I have no hesitation in stating why I used it. I had *repeatedly* sent to General Morillo, to request he would keep his troops in order ; in answer to which he told General Hill, *that it was impossible ; as his officers and soldiers received letters by every post from their friends, urging them to take advantage, and make their fortunes*. There was no remedy for this, then,

but a strong one. I considered what General Morillo told General Hill, as an acknowledgment that neither he nor his officers *could* stop the evil, and *I acted accordingly*.

"I hope this letter will show the General that there is no foundation for his complaints, and that he will withdraw them, as made in a moment of irritation, to which every man is liable.

"If he does not do so, I hope he is prepared to *prove them*. My regard for him and his troops must prevent me from allowing these charges to remain unrefuted; and they *must be proved, or formally withdrawn*." (xi. 422.)

We hear no more of the General's complaints; and we close this head of our subject by showing that, to the last, Lord Wellington's opinions as to subordination did not depend upon the rank of the offender.

CONDUCT AND FEELINGS RESPECTING COURTS-MARTIAL.

THERE is no part of an officer's duty which is more distressing than that of passing judgment upon the sentences of courts-martial. Even at home, with all the assistance of skilful and experienced professional men, and with abundant leisure to consider and re-consider a case, it is embarrassing enough ; and we can easily conceive how that must be increased by all the circumstances attending foreign service.

The Duke has been reckoned hard and stern. We cannot read these Dispatches without feeling that he unfortunately had cause enough to become so ; but the perusal of the many cases in which he may show it, prove that there never was a mind more thoroughly imbued with a sense of *justice* !

But though there may be many proofs of inflexible decision, there are many touching instances of his wish for lenity. We have no means of forming a judgment in many of the cases why he was influenced one way or the other ; the only wonder is, that amidst the numerous and overwhelming duties which pressed upon him, he should have had the time and the power of cool reflection upon each case, to enable him to write and to record so much as he did. We trace clearly a wish to look at

the favourable side; and we find, certainly, in many of the cases, that he trusted to what a more petulant or intemperate man would have disregarded, viz. the *sense*, and *honour*, and *good feeling* of the delinquent.

It has been urged against him, that having once formed and pronounced an opinion he was immovable, and that no circumstances which might subsequently transpire could effect a change. This, if true to the letter, would savour of injustice; but we must bear in mind the circumstances in which he was placed. He was not a rash or passionate man: his maxim was "*Audi alteram partem*," or, at least, his practice in all the other events of life was "look at both sides of the question." In order, therefore, to be enabled to form his opinion, he was, we believe, very strict in requiring that *every part of the case* should be brought forward *at once*. He could have no *personal* knowledge of it, and his only means of forming a judgment was by duly balancing what was laid before him. When that decision was formed and pronounced, it is not to be wondered at that his other avocations should compel him to dismiss it from his mind, and that subsequent attempts to alter his judgment were steadfastly resisted. It might be harshly done in some cases, and the friends of the suffering parties would say unjustly. But however we may feel for them, we must have some consideration for the arduous, overpowering nature of his own position.

We have evidence from the best authority, as to his feelings and conduct on these subjects, in the "Private Journal" of Mr. Larpent, who was appointed Judge-Advocate-General in 1812, and who joined the head-quarters in November, at the commencement of the retreat after the failure at Burgos.

There does not appear to have been any permanent

officer previously filling that post ; and he tells us that Lord Wellington said to him :—

“ If your friends knew what was going on here, they would think you had no sinecure. And *how do you suppose I was plagued when I had to do it nearly all myself?*”

In spite of Lord Wellington’s assiduity there were many cases still undecided, which were passed over to Mr. Larpent ; “ some,” as he says, “ of near two years’ standing.”

His description of Lord Wellington may be received without reserve. He was personally a stranger to him, and acknowledges with much *naïveté* that at first he approached him “ like a boy going to school.” This did not last : Lord Wellington’s quickness and habits of business soon got over any such feelings. On the second opportunity of meeting, when Mr. Larpent had taken his papers upon the mere chance of seeing him, Lord Wellington said,—“ ‘ Come up ;’ and in ten minutes he looked over four sets of charges against officers, and they were all settled, with a few judicious alterations in which I entirely agreed.”

“ I like him much in business affairs. He is very ready, decisive, and civil. He thinks and acts quite for himself : *with* me, if he thinks I am right ; but not otherwise. I have not, however, found what I was told I should, that he immediately determines against anything that is suggested to him. On the contrary, I think he is reasonable enough ; only, often a little too hasty in ordering trials where an acquittal *must* be the consequence, when they could not be made out *in evidence*, which is the great difficulty.”

The coolness and the experience of the practised lawyer was here of value ; and we cannot but agree with him in

thinking "it does harm, as I would have the law punish almost always when it *is* put in force."

The first proofs which we find of his sentiments respecting courts-martial, and the conduct of officers who were implicated, are very early in his Indian career.

Writing to Colonel Murray respecting some transactions which had led to them in his division, he says:—

"These courts-martial are distressing at present. We must endeavour to stop these trifling disputes.

"It occurs to me that there is much *party* in the army in your quarter. This must be put an end to: and there is only one mode. The commanding-officer must be of no side excepting that of the public, to employ indiscriminately those who can best serve the public, be they who they may.

"The subjects are generally referable to private quarrels in which the public have no concern. The character of officers is undoubtedly a public concern; but in many instances it would be much more proper and creditable to both parties to settle it by mutual concession, than to take up the time of the army by courts-martial, for the gratification of any private pique." (i. 378.)

The active service which followed, probably did not furnish officers with leisure to quarrel, and we find no more such observations. But towards the conclusion of his service in that country a case seems to have arisen which exemplified more than one of General Wellesley's characteristics: his sense of duty to the public in ordering the court; his sense of the inadequacy of the sentence pronounced, which his duty to the public compelled him to order to be revised; a sense of justice to the offender himself, by allowing a mere form to invalidate that sentence; but, finally, the determination that such a man should not be again at large to the injury of the service, by ordering him to be suspended till the pleasure of the Court of Directors could be obtained.

“ Capt. — was put in arrest by my orders, and a court-martial was assembled. In the course of the proceedings it appears that the members and the Judge-Advocate were not sworn, which is fatal to the legality of the sentence. The Court acquitted him of some charges; and for those charges of which they found him guilty they sentenced a very inadequate punishment, by no means likely to operate as an example.

“ The late Commander-in-chief referred the trial to me, and I ordered that it might be revised.

“ From various causes it has not been possible to assemble the Court till to-day, and the number of members at present alive is not sufficient. The sentence passed is obviously illegal, supposing it to be adequate to the crimes proved. There never was a more flagrant instance of breach of trust; and if he should by any accident be suffered to escape with impunity, the worst impression will be made on the minds of the natives in general.

“ Under these circumstances, I beg leave to recommend that he may be suspended from the service till the pleasure of the Court of Directors is known.” (ii. 582.)

When he commenced his glorious but trying career in European warfare, he had a different class to deal with. The common soldiers of the British army were composed, for the most part, of the lowest classes,—indeed it might be said, the dregs of society; men who, under the most favourable circumstances, would be difficult to control, but who, when half starved, were often driven nearly to desperation, in spite of all discipline. The Duke's letters upon the subject of our military law, showing its total inadequacy to meet the evils of such a state of crime and abomination as he is often forced to describe, are painful pictures of what he had to undergo.

“ The state of discipline of the army is a subject of serious concern to me. It is impossible to describe the irregularities and outrages of the troops. They are never out of the sight of

their officers that outrages are not committed. I am convinced that the law is not strong enough to maintain discipline upon service. It is most difficult to convict any prisoner, for the soldiers have *little regard to the oath*; and the officers, who are sworn to try 'according to the evidence,' have *too much regard to the strict letter of it*. A court-martial is no longer a court of *honour*, where a soldier was certain of receiving punishment if he deserved it; but is a court of *law*, whose decision is to be formed upon the evidence of those upon whose actions it is constituted as a restraint.

"The law in this respect ought to be amended, and when the army is on service in a foreign country, any one, two, or three officers ought to have the power of trying criminals, and punishing them *instantly*." (iv. 404.)

A complaint having been forwarded from the Commander-in-chief's office at home, of delay in respect to a court-martial, he says:—

"In an army so large and so dispersed as it is in general, it is not at all times possible to collect the members of a court, and the witnesses who it is necessary should attend; and when a court is assembled its proceedings must be suspended when the army, or that part of it, are in operation against the enemy. I am much concerned if any officer suffers from delay in bringing him to trial, or in bringing it to a conclusion. It can be no object to me to delay a trial; on the contrary: but I must take care that when it does take place it is one in earnest, and that the law is attended to.

"If the mode of trial by court-martial is inconvenient in active service, the fault is the law, and, I hope, not in the mode in which it is carried into execution." (viii. 163.)

No doubt he was very often obliged to sanction the execution of a sentence which he felt was well deserved; but we find many instances in which (with an acumen that no professional lawyer could have exceeded) he detects a fallacy, and points out the true bearing of the case, which required further consideration or revision.

We do not aver that his observations always went to a *mitigation* of the sentence; but there was a nicety, a delicacy, and a selection of the right point, in many of his comments, which are very striking from their justness.

A soldier was tried for quitting his post, and afterwards selling a silver cup, which had been stolen from the church where he had been upon duty.

He was found guilty of *quitting his post*; and of *infamous conduct* in *having*, and afterwards *selling*, the cup: but he was acquitted of quitting his post *for the purpose* of going in search of this plunder and stealing this cup.

Lord Wellington returns the sentence to the President for revision, saying,—

“Unless the prisoner had evidence to the contrary, it seems the most natural, and almost necessary inference to be drawn by the Court, that he quitted his post [of which he was found guilty] for the *purpose* of stealing [of which he was acquitted].

“If the Court retains its opinion, I think he should be acquitted of *all*, but *quitting the post*: as the *having* the cup, and *selling* it without accounting for how he obtained it, is (though the strongest evidence of felony), in itself no offence at all, except as a receiver of stolen goods, with which he is not charged.” (xi. 186.)

No professional counsel whom the prisoner could have employed, could have dissected the case, and defeated the fallacies, with more skill and acuteness than is displayed here. We have no detail of the result.

A Paymaster had absented himself from his regiment after the battle of Talavera. His defence was, that he had public money in his charge; but that he remained with the sick and wounded on their retreat. He was

found guilty of *absenting himself*, and sentenced to be "*privately*" reprimanded.

Lord Wellington was dissatisfied with the sentence, and sent it back to the Court. He says to the President :—

"The point is, did Mr. — *really* remain with the hospital? did he *ever make inquiries* respecting the position of his regiment? It will appear to the Court that the hospital was *within two miles of his regiment*.

"This may induce the Court to alter their sentence; but, if it should not, I beg to suggest to them to omit the word '*privately*.' I have to observe that *privacy* is inconsistent with every just notion of *punishment*." (v. 164.)

Another case is recorded, in which he feels that the *wording* of the sentence required revision; and points out to the Court the injurious effect to the service, arising from want of attention to that point; and he writes to the President :—

"Lieutenant — of the —th Regiment was tried for 'most unofficer-like and ungentleman-like conduct,' of which he was *honourably* acquitted. I request you to revise this sentence. The affray in which he was concerned arose in a disgraceful place; and though, by the activity he showed to quell it, he might merit the acquittal, I should not do my duty if I did not draw attention to the term '*honourably*.'

"*Honourable* acquittal by court-martial should be considered by officers and soldiers as a subject of exultation; but no man can exult in the termination of a transaction, a part of which has been disgraceful to him.

"The *honourable* acquittal of Lieutenant — in this sentence, which records that he was concerned in an affray originating in a disgraceful place, will connect with such an act the honourable distinction which a court-martial has it in its power to bestow.

"I therefore anxiously recommend the Court to omit the word '*honourably*' in their sentence." (v. 217.)

A similar case is afterwards recorded.

A Regimental Surgeon had been tried by a court-martial for having confined a man in the guard-house upon a charge of having stolen a mare, and afterwards having agreed to liberate the man if he would pay sixty dollars; of which he was *honourably* acquitted. Lord Wellington sends the sentence back for revision, and adds :—

“Whatever may be the opinion as to the prisoner’s guilt or innocence, I would suggest that it is not an *honourable* transaction to take money from a supposed thief, in order to compromise a prosecution for robbery; and there is nothing which entitles Surgeon — to the distinction of an *honourable* acquittal.

“Surgeon — confined the man for *justice*, or for *money*. If for *justice*, he abandoned it, and made a compromise for 60 dollars, which is not an *honourable* transaction. If for *money*, the charge is proved, and the Court should sentence accordingly.

“It gives me concern to differ with the Court; and I shall assure them that I have no knowledge of Surgeon —; that I brought him to trial as an act of duty; and that, as far as he is concerned, I am indifferent as to the result.

“I have a feeling, however, for the honour of the army, and for the character of the country for justice; and I hope the Court will see the necessity of supporting the discipline and character of the army by marking their own disapprobation of the transaction.” (vii. 70.)

A Deputy-purveyor had been tried for neglect of duty, in not attending to certain sick and wounded men. The Court found him guilty, but passed a lenient sentence, stating that “*no material injury had occurred to the service.*” Lord Wellington desired them to revise their sentence, and comments upon the case :—

“I recommend the Court to *omit that remark*; as it con-

veys a notion that their sentence has been lenient, *because* the gentleman's conduct *was excusable*, as he had ordered an inferior officer to attend the wounded. This is a principle very erroneous, and very detrimental to the service. Every officer is *personally* responsible for the execution of the orders which he receives from his superiors, and I am responsible for the whole. It is no excuse for me, or any other officer, to state that he ordered an inferior to carry it into execution. Instances may occur when an officer receiving an order may be under the necessity, or it may be his duty, to entrust it to another; but in this case there was no such necessity.

"If the Court agree with me, they will consider whether the punishment they have inflicted is adequate to the offence. A person in Mr. ——'s situation has but few duties to perform: but those, however trifling, are important to the service, and the well-being of the soldier.

"It is the duty of a court-martial to prevent such neglect, and the chance of suffering to the soldiers, by the punishment they inflict; and this Court will judge whether they have performed that duty by their sentence." (xi. 404.)

We may reasonably (as, in fact, almost connected with the subject) here advert to his conduct towards officers whom he did not think fit to visit more severely, or to try by court-martial, but whose proceedings merited some animadversion; and because it proves what we have already noticed, his natural bearing towards leniency.

It is true that these cases are not all confined or (in some cases) even connected with *military* offences, but we adduce them as they arise in the course of the Dispatches, merely to prove that he *could* take a lenient view of a subject, and that he was not in every case the Iron Duke.

In the very first movement that he made upon Oporto, in 1809, the Portuguese army was in a very raw and in-

efficient state. British officers were attached to parts of it; and the following letter is addressed to Brigadier Campbell:—

“The Adjutant-general has communicated your letter, reporting the conduct of Captain the Marquis of —— in absenting himself from his battalion without leave, when the troops were in pursuit of the enemy; and that you had put him in arrest.

“I am not disposed to carry matters to extremities with the Marquis; and I beg that you will call him and the officers of the regiment before you, and point out the extreme impropriety of his conduct, and that it is incumbent upon the nobility and persons of fortune and station to set the example.

“You will tell the Marquis, that *I hope the lenity* with which his fault has been treated upon this occasion will *induce him* to be more attentive to his duty; and you will then release him from his arrest.” (iv. 334.)

Here is exactly a case in which temper, moderation, and a view to ulterior effect, were shown. We may be quite sure that the same lenity would not have been shown to any British officer who had so misconducted himself. Sir Arthur would have felt that the latter *ought* to know his duty, and would have no excuse; but the present offender was probably a young man—certainly a young soldier; and what would have been misplaced lenity in the one case, would act as encouraging forbearance in the other.

In another case, a Mr. Downie (afterwards Sir John Downie, and who became a lieutenant-general in the service of Spain), who was at that time a commissary in the British service, was induced by a spirit of gallantry to exceed his duty. Sir Arthur writes thus to General Mackenzie, to whom Mr. Downie was attached:—

“I beg that you will let Mr. Downie know that he is a commissary, and his business is to collect supplies; and that I

am much surprised and highly displeased with him for quitting his station to move forward to Alcantara, where a few shots were fired, to *see what service he could render* there; as if he could render *any so important as that upon which he was employed by me*. I thought he had seen too much service to be so inconsiderate." (iv. 385.)

Mr. Downie was apparently hurt at this reprimand, and Sir Arthur writes again to General Mackenzie:—

"My objection to his conduct was founded upon his own report, written in pencil on the letter from Colonel Grant, upon the military principle that the only proper place for *any military officer was that to which he was ordered*. However, I am not *irreconcilable* upon this or any other subject: I am quite convinced that Mr. Downie did what he thought best for the service; and that a gentleman who feels a censure so sorely, will *take care not to incur the risk* of receiving another." (iv. 435.)

An allegation had been made against a particular regiment for misconduct during the battle of Vittoria. If it were well-founded, Lord Wellington felt that the officer who commanded it must be brought to trial. If the regiment, *as a body*, had been disgracefully repulsed, it would, of course, reflect upon the commanding officer, who must take his fate. If it was only a part of the regiment which had given way, as such things must be expected, it would not require further inquiry. Lord Wellington had himself seen the regiment shortly before the event spoken of, and with his characteristic leniency is the person to suggest the latter view of the case, and concludes his letter thus:—

"Under these circumstances, and advertng to the desire in which we must all participate, that there should be no discussion on the conduct of any part of the army which gained such a victory, I would request you to consider whether your censure would not apply exclusively *to the light infantry or other skir-*

mishers in front of the regiment. If it would not, we must bring the major to a court-martial." (x. 530.)

He was not only subjected to the labour of looking through, and passing final judgment upon, courts-martial which had already been held, but, as we see by the following letter, had to take cognizance of many such cases before they were brought to trial. He writes to Major Davy, commanding the 5th battalion, 60th Regiment:—

"I have received your letter relative to the charge exhibited by Lieutenant S—— against Captain A——.

"Captain A—— has entirely cleared himself; and I shall certainly not gratify the malicious spirit of Lieutenant S—— by submitting the conduct of Captain A—— to further inquiry.

"I desire also that you will inform Lieutenant S—— that I will not order a court-martial for the trial of Lieutenant de E——, the subject of that charge having been already incidentally before the general court-martial.

"I desire you will put Lieutenant S—— in arrest, for unmilitary conduct in disturbing the harmony which ought to subsist amongst the officers of the regiment.

"You will keep him in arrest *with the regiment*, as I know enough of the character and past conduct of that officer to be suspicious that his late conduct is to be attributed to a desire to leave his regiment during the time it may be actively employed." (v. 355.)

In a letter to Lord Liverpool, 11th April, 1810, he says:—

"The army is becoming healthy: it would, indeed, be an excellent army if the soldiers did not plunder.

"Several have lately been convicted and executed; which I hope will have effect, as well upon officers as men. It will induce the former to take more pains to keep their men in order, and support the authority of the non-commissioned officers; and I hope will convince the latter that I possess the power, and *am*

determined to exert it, to punish those who are guilty. I am still apprehensive of the consequence of trying them in any nice operation before the enemy, for they really forget everything when plunder or wine is in their reach." (vi. 30.)

The difficulty in compelling the magistrates and people of Portugal to obey the orders (or professed orders) of their Government, for the supply of articles required by the troops, had occasioned a wish, at Lisbon, to establish *military* law.

Lord Wellington, as we have already seen, was painfully aware of the bad effects resulting from the neglect of the law as it stood, on the part of the inhabitants; more especially as weakening or destroying the efficiency of military law in his own army; and many readers might imagine that his turn of mind was one which would have made him hail such a proposition with avidity. On the contrary, we find the coolest, the most just, and most convincing arguments against it:—

"What is military law? As applied to any persons excepting the army (for whose government there are particular provisions of law), it is neither more nor less than the will of the General. He punishes, with or without trial, by his own orders.

"For what object is it to be established in Portugal, except with a view to *restrain* the people? We have no such object. What we want is: 1st, to make the *magistrates* do their duty. We may try them by court-martial for neglect, but what punishment could it inflict except dismissal from office? *and that the present Government can do.* 2ndly, we want to make the *people* perform their duties, and supply the articles required by the law. The law which imposes those duties and requires those articles *furnishes the means of its own execution*, and *imposes penalties for non-performance*, and it is the duty of the inferior magistrate *to impose that penalty.*

"If military law is to supersede every other authority, the troops must be the executive officers of the law; and, probably, when the enemy may be in the country governed by this law,

the troops must be employed in the *civil* government, instead of opposing the enemy.

“Depend upon it, military law will only increase our difficulties.” (vi. 43.)

In pursuing the perusal of the Dispatches, which extend over so long a time and embrace so many subjects, it is difficult to separate all the subjects referred to under precise and definite heads. The present section relates more especially to his conduct and feelings upon the subject of courts-martial; but that has an almost inseparable connexion with his conduct towards officers, of or to whom he might have been obliged to address himself upon subjects not deserving more severe treatment. We have already adduced one or two cases, and others may present themselves hereafter, though mixed with more important ones; but in them all there is a quiet, gentlemanly, yet feeling severity, that makes them striking and remarkable.

Colonel Peacocke was left as Commandant at Lisbon; he had had some disagreement with Lieut.-colonel Walsh, who was also left there in command of detachments and convalescents.

Lord Wellington feels that Colonel Peacocke has put himself in the wrong, and this is the tone of his reprimand, if it may be so called: —

“I consider that Lieut.-col. Walsh in his line has rendered very essential service to the army; and I am so little disposed to allow him to be removed from either of the offices of which he has, till you took the command, done the duty in a satisfactory manner, that if these complaints should continue I shall be under the necessity of making an *entirely new arrangement* at Lisbon, however disagreeable it may be to me.” (v. 163.)

The following is a private letter to Mr. Villiers, which, though not immediately referring to any military event or person, is worth notice from its friendly and playful mode of giving a reproof:—

“I am concerned to be obliged to make any complaint of any *protégé* of yours, but I must say that I think I have some cause to complain of Mr. —.

“He was appointed by me to the Commissariat in *June*, and on the 16th of *July* he writes a letter to the Lords of the Treasury, in which he gives them to understand neither more nor less than that the Commissary-general and all his officers, as well as myself, are either knaves or fools; and that he can save thousands to the public by some new mode he has discovered of supplying the troops with bread!

“Now I must say, if Mr. — has made any discovery it was his *duty* to apprise *me* of it; and, at least, to try whether our failure to save the public these thousands upon thousands was to be attributed to knavery or folly, before he wrote to the Treasury upon the subject.” (v. 376.)

In a subsequent letter he says:—

“As for Mr. —, I only beg that he will not write letters to the Treasury on subjects which he does not understand.” (v. 380.)

He appears in all his correspondence to have had a very high opinion of General R. Crawfurd, who commanded the Light Division, and had been the most in advance towards the enemy during the whole winter of 1809–10. In some letters a probable necessity for withdrawing some of those regiments was communicated, and by the tone of Lord Wellington’s letter we may infer that it was unsatisfactory to the General: for Lord Wellington concludes one letter by saying:—

“You may depend upon it, however, that whatever may be the arrangement which I shall make, I wish your brigade to be in the advanced guard.” (vi. 34.)

We do not, of course, hear what reply the General made; but in all probability it was with some warmth, and apparently accompanied with a proposition of resigning, as we may infer from the following:—

“In answer to your letter of the 17th, I will only tell you that it has excited any feeling in my mind *excepting anger*. I have already told you that I shall regret exceedingly the existence of a necessity to place in other hands the command of our advanced guard; and I shall regret it particularly if it should deprive me of your assistance altogether.

“I shall be able, in a day or two, to make arrangements that may enable me to leave you in the command of your division, which I am very anxious to do.” (vi. 48.)

We must acknowledge that a man in his position of a more hasty and intemperate nature, or one of a more sullen, and what in common parlance might be called a *huffy* temper, would not have been so placably disposed; and we find many communications afterwards which never testify the slightest symptoms of any angry feeling.

A most friendly letter follows very soon:—

“Nothing can be more advantageous to me, or can give me more satisfaction, than to receive the assistance of your opinion upon any subject; but you may depend upon it, there are few of the general arrangements which have not been maturely considered by me. I request, therefore, that whenever you see reason to wish to make any alteration you will let me know it; but *do not make the alteration without reference to me*.” (vi. 87.)

Cases of this nature, occurring between himself and the senior or more responsible officers of his army, were, of course, the cause of much anxiety to him; and we have abundant proofs of his desire to avoid public animadversion, or to make the matter worse by public exposure. He had a natural repugnance to all courts of

inquiry, or courts-martial, excepting in cases of absolute necessity; and, when possible, he always endeavoured to avoid them. But it was not the *rank* of the officer that deterred him; a junior ensign was as sure of a just view of his case as a general officer. In a letter to General Sherbrooke we find:—

“ Upon considering the charge against Ensign —— of the —— ——, and the second charge, founded solely upon his writing certain letters, I think them so frivolous that I shall be obliged to you to call before you General ——, and the commanding officer of the regiment, and Ensign ——, and inform them that I consider the first charge as frivolous, and the second as groundless; and, therefore, that I have ordered Ensign —— to be released from his arrest. At the same time I beg you to point out to Ensign —— that I will not allow him to disobey any order of his commanding officer, however trifling; and that the next time he errs he shall certainly be brought to trial.” (v. 154.)

A frivolous charge, arising out of private quarrels and abusive letters between three British officers in the Portuguese army, had been laid before him:—

“ I do not think it proper to employ the time of the officers of the army in investigating the truth or falsehood of all the nonsense these contain. Nor do I think it expedient to expose to the Portuguese army, by such an investigation, the weakness and the futility of the disputes of those who, to be of any use to them, or to do credit to the British army, must command respect.

“ I am of opinion that you should recommend to the Prince Regent to dismiss the gentleman who does not attend to the admonition to reconcile the differences; and you may depend upon it, that I will take care not to admit such a firebrand into the medical department of this army.

“ Although I do not deem it expedient to assemble a general court-martial for the investigation of these charges, I cannot pass them by without animadverting upon the spirit with which

they have been formed, and how necessary it is that it should be crushed, if we do not wish to expose to the curiosity of the public in this country a scene of vindictive but childish slander, such as, perhaps, has never before come out before a general court-martial." (vii. 167.)

These cases are, perhaps, trifling in themselves; but they show how the time was occupied, and the mind was worn, of a man who had much more important duties to attend to. And when we see the sound practical common-sense and the honourable feeling with which he animadverted upon them, we cannot but testify our feeling of admiration and approbation.

We have already adduced several instances of his reluctance to push matters to extremity, and to avert the necessity of trial, by urging the offender to adopt some course which would enable him to avoid it. Here is another case:—

"I am very desirous to prevent these charges coming before a court-martial.

"You imagine that you have reason to complain of an order issued by your commanding officer, and you have remonstrated. I put out of the question the justice or injustice of that order for the present, as bearing in no manner on the case. If you address your superior officer, you must avoid the use of offensive terms. You sent a letter containing the terms '*totally destitute of foundation;*' '*the reverse of what has been stated;*' '*gross injustice to yourself.*' I believe it will be admitted that such expressions would not be tolerated in private life, much less can the use of them be allowed from an officer to his superior, upon an order issued by that superior. These expressions are entirely unnecessary: your object was to show General Campbell that he was mistaken respecting the —th Regiment; your *comments* were not necessary, and when conveyed in offensive terms, would appear as if added only for the purpose of offending.

"The discussion cannot lead to any good, and if the Court.

view it in the light that I do, you will be in a situation in which I should be concerned to see an officer of your rank. I request you, therefore, to reconsider the subject; and *nothing will give me more pleasure* than to have succeeded in prevailing upon you to recall expressions which nothing should have provoked you to use." (viii. 199.)

The majority of these cases were not likely to be attended with more severe punishment to the delinquent than being obliged to quit the service, or degradation of some sort. But we now meet with one in which the offence must have been more heavily visited; and it is impossible not to be alive to the feeling manner in which Lord Wellington looks at it, with reference to the officer implicated, combined with the manly, honest way in which he looks upon its ill effects upon the army at large.

An officer of the Brunswick troops had been accused of *cowardice in the presence of the enemy*. He had afterwards applied for leave of absence or to resign, which was refused:—

"I have delayed to reply to your Highness's letter till I had received information regarding Lieutenant ——.

"I recollect to have refused him leave of absence after the siege of Badajoz, or to accept his resignation, because I was not aware of the circumstances: if I had been made acquainted with what had occurred, I should have thought it desirable that he should quit the service.

"The instances of want of spirit amongst the officers are very rare, and the example of punishment for this crime is not required; and this being the case, I should *wish to avoid giving the soldiers a notion* that an officer can behave otherwise than well in the presence of the enemy: and if there should be an unfortunate person who fails in this respect, I would prefer to allow him to retire to a private station rather than expose his weakness.

"I beg your Highness to accept his resignation, and to

allow him to return to Germany, as being in every respect unfit to serve His Majesty in your Highness's regiment; at the same time, that it is not expedient to expose his weakness by bringing him to trial before a general court-martial." (viii. 233.)

These are proofs that his leading object in all such cases had reference to the effect upon the army at large; upon all the classes and ranks of it. The *soldiers* could not be kept in a state of discipline if their *officers* set them the example of insubordination. It was essential to the due subordination of an army, that the lower ranks of it should *look up* to those under whom they were placed. Respect for their *character* was of importance, as well as deference to their *professional skill*. If a case was made public by being brought before a court, every soldier in the army would be apprised that *officers* had been charged with offences of the same sort as *themselves*. Though it was not possible to avoid it on all occasions, his object was to maintain discipline, but without exposure.

The court-martial held upon a soldier for *desertion* and for *serving with the enemy* had found him guilty, *but recommended him to mercy*. Lord Wellington writes to the President:—

"There is not a shadow of a doubt that this soldier *deserted*; and having deserted, *served in the enemy's ranks*. Indeed, if he had not so served, he could not have been taken in the battle at Salamanca. After being taken, he did everything in his power to conceal himself, and denied all knowledge of his comrade of the 66th, who happened to be in the hospital and recognised him. These facts, all proving his guilt, are perfectly known, at least, to the regiment to which he belongs; and yet the Court having found him guilty, and passed sentence of death, have recommended that *I should pardon him*.

"I wish the Court to reconsider their recommendation, and

particularly to consider the task they throw upon me, whose duty it is to uphold the discipline and efficiency of the army. If they persist, I shall certainly attend to it; but I must say, that this case is the most clearly proved of any that has come before me, of premeditated desertion to the enemy, and of subsequent service in his ranks; and that it does become general courts-martial to take serious notice of a crime of this nature so proved, in an army in which, amongst other crimes, desertion is so prevalent." (x. 98.)

In another case of an officer who had been found guilty, but *recommended to mercy*, he writes:—

"I would beg the Court to observe, that it is never thought necessary to trouble a court with any but cases carrying *an appearance* of an extra ordinary degree of guilt; and it is a waste of public time, and in itself very extraordinary, that a court having the *guilt proved*, and having convicted the prisoner by their sentence, and decreed a punishment, should then do worse than defeat all the objects of the trial by holding up an example of impunity, procured through the means of the very tribunal appointed to maintain the good order of the army.

"I am quite convinced, that if I were to exercise my own judgment on their recommendations, or if courts-martial were to consider them (as they are) mistaken lenity, and were to be more sparing of them, the army would be in a better state.

"The Court have found Lieut. — guilty 'of behaving in a *scandalous, infamous* manner, unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.' In the whole catalogue of military crimes, it is hardly possible to find one more enormous or injurious to the service.

"Supposing H.R.H. the Prince Regent should attend to their recommendation, do the Court believe that the officers of his regiment would associate with a man to whom such infamy attached? Is there any regiment in the service of which the officers would not think it a disgrace to associate with him? Is there an officer of the Court who would not consider himself disgraced, if he were seen in company with him?

"His R.H. will be called upon to pardon an officer for a

crime so infamous that neither the officers of the corps to which he belongs, nor of any other in the army, will associate with him.

“ I entreat the Court to feel that confidence in the justice and propriety of their sentence which it deserves, and to allow it to go without recommendation. If they still desire it, I shall send it to England, but without remark on my part; as I never will be instrumental in retaining in His Majesty’s service as an officer, a person found guilty of scandalous and infamous conduct, and of forcing him into the society of officers, by whom to associate with him will be deemed disgrace.” (x. 315.)

A corps had been formed to assist the Provost-marshal of the army in the repression of disorders, selected from all the cavalry regiments, and called the Staff Corps. The duties were, perhaps, severe (though there was some pecuniary advantage), and, as acting against men of the same class of life as themselves, perhaps somewhat odious; but, as Lord Wellington observed,—

“ If the *odium* is accompanied with *danger*; if a serjeant can be resisted with impunity when endeavouring to prevent a private from plundering; if such sergeant (as appears by this court-martial) is put in fear of his life, and is actually obliged to remonstrate with the private soldier to induce him *not to shoot him*; *what can be expected*?

“ There is no crime so fatal to the very existence of an army, and no crime which officers, sworn as members of a court, should feel so anxious to punish, as that of which this soldier has been guilty.

“ It is very unpleasant to me to resist the inclination of the Court to save the life of this man; but if the impunity with which this offence will have been committed should occasion resistance to authority in other instances, the supposed *mercy* will turn out extreme *cruelty*, and occasion the loss of some valuable men. I recommend the Court to withdraw their recommendation, and to allow the law to take its course.” (xi. 328.)

The following case, with the particulars of which we are not acquainted, was, probably, of a heinous nature. The culprits were all foreigners, and not with his own army. It is the first instance which we have met with, during the long and severe trials to which his temper and patience had been exposed, where we find him offering no extenuating considerations, and taking so sweeping and severe a view of it :—

“ I have received the eight proceedings against certain soldiers of Dillon’s regiment, and confirmed them all.

“ I desire that — and — may be pardoned ; that — and — and lance-corporal — may be shot ; and that the remainder should draw lots for one more to be shot : according to the sentence of the Court. The other eleven are to have the choice of corporal punishment or to be executed, according to sentence : those who are punished to receive not more than 300 lashes.

“ The punishment to take place in the most solemn manner, in presence of the troops, to be paraded for the purpose ; and care to be taken to impress upon them that their entrance into the service is voluntary, and that any attempt to desert will be followed by certain punishment.” (xi. 340.)

In making our selection out of the very numerous letters upon Courts-martial in the Dispatches, we have been influenced mainly by taking those which tended to show Lord Wellington’s object or feeling in the particular case, or his peculiar talent of detecting a fallacy, or showing the probable effect of a sentence, rather than with reference to their real importance, and without adhering to the exact period at which they occurred.

We may, perhaps, be open to the charge of giving too many repetitions of cases illustrative of the same subject. It may be so : but we have been induced to do it, in order to prove that he acted upon principle,

and that his decision was not confined to a solitary instance.

Many of them are comparatively trifling; but they furnish, perhaps, for that very reason, a stronger proof of the labours and anxieties of his position.

Serious, urgent, and highly criminal cases, might naturally call for his best attention: but when we see his valuable time taken up and his mind distracted from more important avocations by the consideration of many such as we have adduced, it is only wonderful that he could have got through them, and have recorded in such detail his feelings and opinions upon them.

HIS ENTRY INTO FRANCE.

THIS put an end to his vexations and annoyance from the weak and paltry Portuguese, and from the wretched and contemptible Spanish Government.

He entered the French territory in December, and it is curious and interesting to observe the difference of his bearing and conduct.

From a very early period after his second arrival at the head of the army at Lisbon, he had been subjected to all the paltry intrigues which we have already recorded; and, *upon principle*, had submitted to them with a forbearance that probably would have been shown by no other general so circumstanced. He felt that he was in the kingdom of Portugal *as an ally*, and as such, that he was subject to the laws and government of that country. He had writhed under the vexatious indignities to which the acting Government had subjected him; and though he must have felt on many occasions that he could have enforced his own views, it would have been in violation of the high principles which always influenced him.

He said, as we have already seen (p. 109), that his situation would have been preferable in *an enemy's country*, as *there* we could *take* what we required; but, even under the highest provocation, he would not permit his officers to proceed to extremities in the country of an ally.

Some measures of that nature had occurred near the frontier of Portugal, in May 1810, and we find his firm and strong determination to permit nothing of the sort. Writing to Colonel Cox, governor of Almeida, and afterwards, upon the same subject, to General Crawford, he says :—

“ Neither I, nor any other officer in the British service, has the power of confining and punishing a magistrate, whatever may be the nature of his crime ; and *I certainly shall not permit* such a practice. I beg to know the officer, or the civil magistrate of Castello Bom, who received corporal punishment.” (vi. 119.)

“ I wish to mention to you, that neither I nor any other officer of the British army have the power of confining or punishing magistrates or others in Portugal. All that can be done is to report them to me : and I shall order them to head-quarters, and thence to Lisbon *to be punished by the Government.*” (vi. 120.)

There can be little doubt that he would have been heartily supported by his own army, who were half starved on many occasions by the infamous neglect of those whose country they were defending ; and there can be as little doubt that he would have been equally supported by the Portuguese *army*, who were well aware that their only chance of ultimate success depended upon him. But, strong as these considerations were, and almost irresistible as the temptation must frequently have been to take the law into his own hands, he *did* resist, and went through to the last.

The impediments from the Portuguese were rather passive, and indolent neglect of what was required ; but the vexations which he experienced from the Spanish Government were even worse : for, in addition to the same neglect as to provisions and means of transport, the in-

tolerable vanity of the national character (at least of that class who had the power in their hands) made it almost impossible to deal with them. Their army was said to be numerically strong, but it was useless, because it was immovable, either from want of equipment or of discipline; and when at times it was in some measure more complete in arms and clothing by the assistance of England, the empty vapouring of the higher authorities, and the boasting bravado of those who called themselves soldiers, invariably led to attempts against the enemy which inevitably failed. They were always clamorous with Lord Wellington to induce him to advance and to co-operate, though it was obvious to any military man that they were unequal to the task; and when, on one or two occasions, he was induced to yield to their importunity, they invariably neglected every precaution which he had suggested, and deserted him at the important moment. In fact, from the moment he set foot in their country he never received cordial support, either from the civil or the military authorities.

His entry upon the soil of France placed him, however, upon a new footing. He was then in an *enemy's* country, and was justified in using the powers of a conqueror. But his efforts, even in that capacity, were most earnestly directed to prevent his army from committing depredations, and to obtain the supplies for them through the regular established authorities, instead of by force and violence. Every letter to officers commanding divisions or brigades of his army, whether British or foreign, were directed to this point; and he published numerous proclamations, calling upon all public functionaries to continue at their posts, and upon the inhabitants generally not to quit their habitations. He had acted upon the same principles in Spain and Portugal, and in each

country had found how useless his efforts were, and how feebly (if at all) he was seconded by the authorities. But there his high sense of duty would not permit him to fly in the face of the Constitutional Government; and although he saw his soldiers in many cases almost dying of famine, he would not attempt to take power into his own hand, or permit his officers to do so.

Here, however, in France, the case was different. He *had* the power, and with the firmness which was inherent in him he *exercised* it.

He wished and endeavoured to confide everything (not inconsistent with military security) to the mayors and municipal officers of every district; and all his letters and addresses to them are couched in a tone calculated to uphold their authority.

But when they attempted to set him at defiance, and to give themselves airs, his conduct was very different from what it had been in Spain. He must have been equally conscious in each case of the injury resulting to the service from the presumption, the arrogance, or the insolence of the individual; and it is impossible to believe that he could have been insensible to the personal disrespect to himself. But in the one case he was acting as *the ally* of the nation to which the offender belonged, and therefore appealed for redress to the Government of that nation; in the other case he was, for the time, virtually the chief of the country which he had conquered, and might make his own rules.

Disturbances caused by the plunder and irregular conduct of some of the Spanish troops under Mina, in Sir W. Beresford's division, had created a strong feeling of hostility amongst the peasantry, more particularly in the villages of Bidarry and Baygorry. The feeling and conduct of these peasants might have been quite natural,

and in fact justifiable; but it was essential to the safety of the army to put a stop to it.

The Duke's language upon the occasion is the first instance which we meet with *of a threat*. On the 28th January he writes to Sir William Beresford, who had secured some of the offenders:—

“ I enclose a letter which shall go to you in print; and I will be obliged to you to read, and have it explained, *to the gentry* you have with you, and send off one of them with an officer of the Staff Corps to give it to the people of Bidarry and Baygorry. You may also give the person you send to understand, that if I have further reason to complain of these or any other villages, I will act towards them as the French did towards the towns and villages in Spain and Portugal; that is, I will *totally destroy* them, and *hang up all the people* belonging to them that I shall find.

“ Let the rest of the people of Bidarry be detained till we see what effect my letter produces.” (xi. 483.)

He here felt the necessity of showing the authority which he possessed to subdue turbulence; but it is clear that the natural goodness of his disposition was predominant. Is it possible to suppose that an austere, violent, ill-tempered man, embittered perhaps by well-grounded causes of offence, writing to his officers, and threatening to burn houses and hang their inhabitants, would have commenced his letter by alluding to “ *those gentry whom you have with you?* ” The kindly feeling of the man appears in every line, notwithstanding his authoritative denunciations, though we cannot undertake to say what he might have been compelled to do, if forced.

He issued a proclamation respecting mayors and other civil officers throughout all the country which he had conquered. It was not unnatural that these injunctions should have been received with angry feelings, and

rather negligently complied with; and we find that he was obliged to write to Sir W. Beresford, in whose cantonments there had been some difficulty or disturbance.

“I send you all the proclamations respecting mayors, civic guards, &c., and will send you more when I get them.

“If your *adjoints* (assistants to the mayors) will not continue in office, call together the respectable inhabitants, and tell them that a civil government is much more interesting to *them* than to me: that I will *make them comply with my orders*, whether they have a magistrate or not; and that they had much better have the protection of a magistrate than be without one, and that I require them to name one.” (xi. 541.)

Here is certainly the exercise of authority and the dictation of power, but it is not *arbitrary*. It is temperate, it is cool: it is issued more for the benefit of the conquered than the conqueror; and even in cases where he might have been justified in taking the law entirely into his own hands, by the military at his command, and exercising summary justice upon those who had given him cause of offence, he prefers doing it through the proper course.

Some disturbances (the Dispatches do not say what, or whether connected with our troops) had occurred at a place called Hagetnau. Lord Wellington writes to the mayor:—

“Vous *aurez la bonté* de faire arrêter Dupay, ancien maire; Saubigné, ex-adjoint; et le nommé Mathieu, ex-employé des droits réunis; et tout autre qui ont eu part dans l'affaire des partisans à Hagetnau. Pour moi, je suis en cela l'exemple des généraux Français, et je fais pendre tous ceux qui font le métier de partisans, et je ferai brûler leurs maisons. Je serais fâché d'être obligé de faire avancer les troupes pour maintenir la police.” (xi. 601.)

It may seem rather ironical to request one mayor to *have the goodness* to arrest his predecessor; but it shows

the tone and temper which characterised all his proceedings.

It was not to be expected, however, that the national vanity, combined with the natural exasperation at the fact of their being now under the rod and domination of a foreign (and perhaps, of all others, a British) army, should be entirely subdued. And it was to be expected that many a vain jack-in-office would hardly conform without some swagger, though we have no reason to believe that this conduct was extensive or prolonged. The following proves, that when it did show itself it did not pass unnoticed.

The Earl of Dalhousie had been left in charge of the troops near Bordeaux, which town had declared in favour of the Bourbons; and our fleet were making arrangements for coming into the Garonne. Sir William Beresford had occasion to communicate with the fleet; but the person who was sent with his letter was stopped by the mayor of a place called La Teste. Lord Wellington writes to Lord Dalhousie:—

“When your lordship *shall send in that direction* you will *take that mayor prisoner*, and send him to my head-quarters. If mayors of villages are each to have a military force sent to them to receive their formal surrender, they must be considered as military men, and must be made prisoners of war. I shall consider them accordingly, and will send Monsieur le Maire de La Teste a prisoner of war to England when he falls into my hands.”

Here is the same firmness and determination, but accompanied by the same calmness and temper. The petulant vanity of this Frenchman had obstructed public business. It was necessary to check such presumption, but it was not of the urgent character to require moving a regiment. Lord Dalhousie is merely instructed, or

rather *requested*, “when *he shall send in that direction*” (as if he was going out hunting or coursing), to catch this mayor! We have no further record of the fate of the mayor; but the whole proceeding is strongly illustrative of the calm, easy, playful (though not-to-be-trifled-with) temper of Lord Wellington.

We have no further instance of it during the short remainder of that campaign; but a knowledge of what was likely to be the consequence would probably check any exuberant display of importance.

A very similar case arose the following year in another part of France, when the British army moved up to Paris after the battle of Waterloo.

The Sous-préfet of Pontoise had thought proper to refuse compliance with a requisition made upon him,—a course which the Duke adopted in all cases of provisions or forage; not with a view of paying for what was received, but to avoid abuse and plunder on the part of the troops.

The Duke’s letter appears to have been almost an excess of ironical politeness:—

“Monsieur, j’ai ordonné qu’on vous fasse prisonnier parce que ayant envoyé une requisition à Pontoise pour des vivres, vous avez répondu que vous ne les donneriez pas sans qu’on envoie une force militaire assez forte pour les prendre. Vous vous êtes donc mis dans le cas des militaires, et je vous fais prisonnier de guerre, et je vous envoie en Angleterre.

“Si je vous traitais comme l’usurpateur et ses adhérens ont traité les habitans des pays où ils ont fait la guerre, je vous ferais fusiller: mais, comme vous vous êtes constitué *guerrier*, je vous fais prisonnier de guerre.” (xii. 556.)

The choice of the word *guerrier* to this self-sufficient gentleman is inimitable, and we can really picture to ourselves the Duke’s chuckle at sending this letter, and

afterwards sending off Monsieur le Sous-préfet to England,—if he ever went !

We are not writing the Duke's memoirs or a history of his military deeds, and we have not thought it necessary to say anything respecting his transactions between the termination of hostilities at Toulouse and the final march to Paris after Waterloo.

His last brilliant and triumphant campaign did not expose him to the same difficulties : his renown was acknowledged throughout the world, the allies with whom he was acting were cordial and zealous, his own countrymen were prepared to hail every act with approbation, and the characteristics which were so strongly displayed as he was rising to eminence, were not called for in the same degree when he had attained the summit.

We have followed him, as far as our professed object is concerned, through the whole of his glorious and eventful life. We believe that we have adduced abundant evidence, from the most unquestionable sources, to prove what we set out with saying,—that there never existed a *more noble, great, and glorious* spirit ; and with that impression we leave his example for the admiration and imitation of his fellow-countrymen.

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